The 'ism' in Humanism: Sartre and Heidegger as Humanists
Argues that Heidegger should not be considered a humanist, and that Sartre's claim to humanism in Existentialism and Humanism is less problematic.
While Sartre considers in Existentialism is a Humanism many of the important objections to his philosophy, one criticism which he did not fully address is the subject of Heidegger?s Letter on Humanism. In the Letter, Heidegger engages indirectly with Sartre by arguing that his existentialism?like all other metaphysics in the Western tradition?has overlooked the question of Being. The Letter is a useful paradigm for understanding Heidegger?s philosophy and provides a framework for considering how it relates to the wider humanist tradition. In the first part of this essay I will offer four arguments to defend Sartre against Heidegger?s criticism. These arguments question the foundations of Heidegger?s philosophy and its potential to have a practical impact on what Heidegger calls ?ontic? truths. In the course of outlining these arguments, a number of key differences between the two philosophers will be noted, especially Heidegger?s rejection of Sartre?s Cartesian view of consciousness. In the second part I will critically consider whether Heidegger is right to call himself a humanist. I will specifically argue that commentators have been far too generous to Heidegger in agreeing with him on this point, and I will later suggest that Sartre?s claim to be a humanist is less problematic. In the third and final part I will identify briefly a number of alternative views of humanism and evaluate Heidegger and Sartre against them.
[b]I[/b]
At the centre of Heidegger?s criticism of Existentialism is a Humanism is the claim that all humanism is grounded in metaphysics. He holds that Sartre?s existentialism presupposes Cartesian ?subjectivist metaphysics? as well as metaphysical concepts such as cause and effect, and subject and object. In Heidegger?s view, Sartre focuses exclusively on beings, and so remains ?in oblivion of the truth of Being? (250). Even his motto, ?existence precedes essence?, is merely the reversal of a metaphysical statement and remains metaphysical. There are four ways in which we may be able to free Sartre from Heidegger?s criticism. Firstly, we can prove that there is no such thing as Being, and that Sartre?s Cartesian view of consciousness is correct. Secondly, we can argue that even if there is such a thing as Being, it is impossible to find out what it is.[1] Thirdly, even if it is possible to find out what Being is, we can argue that doing so would not have any implications for Sartre?s theory. And finally, we can contend that it is reasonable for ontic statements to continue to be formulated until such time as we discover Being.
An important part of Heidegger?s project of encouraging us to rediscover the ?splendor of the simple? is his rejection of the dominant philosophical view of consciousness?Cartesian subjectivism. Heidegger contends that Dasein is both being-in-the-world and being-with-others, and hence related only to our experience of the world. Heidegger?s main argument against the Sartrean model of detached consciousness relies on what he calls care. We do not observe the world, Heidegger says, we experience it, and traditional philosophy has made the mistake of confusing the latter for the former. In Heidegger?s view, we do not contemplate on objects in the world but rather see them as ?equipment? for our own use; similarly, our encounters with other people are framed in the context of the equipment which they can provide us. Heidegger?s version of human consciousness is thus widely different from Sartre?s ontology. Interestingly, however, Heidegger reaches many of the same conclusions as Sartre. He sees the potential for inauthenticity in our relationships with other people when we attempt to conform to the standards of the crowd (the das Man), and many of his writings on the subject closely mirror what Sartre says about the waiter in the caf?; for example, Heidegger defines authenticity as ?a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way? Thus, despite the lure of inauthenticity, Heidegger, like Sartre, says that man has the freedom to remake himself and to live authentically. Both philosophers thus see the need for man to engage in the world, and to define himself free of external influence.
However, these similarities should not obscure the fact that Heidegger?s rejection of subjectivism results in one crucial difference between the two philosophers: in Heidegger?s ontology there is room for Being. This difference becomes important because, for Heidegger, the existence of Being makes our reality only one part of a wider scheme of things?for Sartre, by contrast, man alone is his own future. Olson uses an effective metaphor to describe the difference: for Sartre, man creates meaning for himself out of blank cloth; for Heidegger, the cloth is not blank?it has on it the face of Being.[2] The question we need to ask is whether Heidegger is right to reject subjectivism and proclaim the existence of Being in its place. Sartre offers two arguments to defend subjectivity. The first is that the Cartesian cogito must be true because in order to grasp the concept of the probable we must have an absolute truth which can come only from one?s sense of oneself. The second argument is that subjectivism ?alone is compatible with the dignity of man? because ?it is the only [theory] which does not make man into an object? (361). The second argument seems circular, because it presupposes that man is not an object, and has a type of consciousness which it compatible with Sartre?s observations. But although these arguments themselves may not be cogent, the Cartesian view of consciousness has a number of important assets. It is the only theory which can adequately explain the subjective nature of consciousness, and it accords well with our intuitions on how our mind works.
Consequently, we can fairly say that that the onus should be on Heidegger to provide us with an acceptable alternative to the Cartesian model. Of course, however, Heidegger cannot offer any proof that his Being does exist, because he rejects epistemology. But in a number of passages in Being and Time, he argues very persuasively that an understanding of Being is presupposed whenever we think about the world:
[q]Inquiry as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way? even if we ask ?What is Being?, we keep within an understanding of the ?is?? this vague average and understanding of Being is still a Fact.[3][/q]
However, if we accept that there is a possibility that Being exists, we can still save Sartre by establishing that the existence of Being will have no implications for his theory. One way by which we may do this is to establish that it is impossible for us to find out what Being is.[4] Heidegger himself is not able to establish precisely what Being is in the first volume of his Being and Time, but he does outline the method by which he thinks we will be able to discover Being, and the method he prescribes highlights the impossibility of the task. He says, in short, that we will discover it by engaging with the world. This is expressed in various degrees of generality?at one point in Being and Time, he says that ?looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing? [are] all ways of behaving constitutive of our inquiry?.[5] It seems absurd that activities as commonplace as these could ever reveal the nature of Being. Looking, understanding, choosing, etc., have been done for all of history and no one has yet been able to answer the question. Of course, Heidegger believes that all philosophy since Plato has been on the wrong track in this respect, but even if this is the case then he is committed to outlining some new method for discovering Being which hasn?t yet been attempted.
In his Letter, Heidegger outlines two distinct aspects of the method of discovering Being: thinking and language. Thinking, Heidegger says, ?accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man?. It does so because Being will reveal itself to man through thinking. The second aspect, language, is the medium through which Being reveals itself??in thinking Being comes to language?. In his later writings, Heidegger suggested that Being could be discovered through a specific type of language?the language of poetry and literature. Language, in Heidegger?s view, is the ?house of Being? (258), and the original use of language has the capacity to illuminate the world. Heidegger is concerned that words, which were initially conceived in an experience of Being, have had their meanings obscured by continued everyday use. This might initially sound plausible, but it should be contrasted with Derrida?s theory that all thought is mediated through language?so the problems inherent in communication are as a result of conceiving thought in the first instance rather than in expressing it. Derrida?s theory is surely equally plausible, and it seems an especially good explanation when what needs to be expressed is something for which there is no worldly precedent: like discovering Being or, for Sartre, encountering being-in-itself. For example, it is hard to imagine that Roquentin in Sartre?s Nausea would have been able to communicate the full significance of the incident with the maple tree if he had access to the appropriate vocabulary! Perhaps Heidegger?s concern about language is really evidence of a more fundamental Derridean problem. Perhaps Dasien has no access to Being.
Even if we accept that it may be possible for Being to be discovered, we can still contend that its discovery may have no implications for Sartre?s existentialism. This third contention relies on establishing that the existence of Being has no bearing on ontic truths. Stern argues persuasively that Heidegger?s
[q]Dasein does not know of any concupiscentia, of any instinct, of any toothache. Very soon we will see that it knows just as little of caritas or friendliness or duties, or the state.[6][/q]
Heidegger?s response to this line of criticism is that ontic statements dealing with values, ethics, and so on, can only be made after we have discovered Being, and that current systems of values and ethics make important presuppositions which could be proved wrong by discovering Being. Heidegger would replace Sartre?s dictum, ?we are precisely in a situation where there are only human beings?, with his own: ?we are precisely in a situation where principally there is Being? (254). The question to ask here is whether it is not possible for both Sartre?s human beings and Heidegger?s Being to coexist, and whether the existence of Being would necessarily intrude on Sartre?s territory. This gives rises to the fourth objection?that it is absurd to expect us to suspend the making of ontic statements until such time as we discover Being. Of course, Heidegger himself did not suggest that all ontic truths should be rejected pending the discovery of Being. He would not say that we should not eat food because we don?t know whether doing so is consonant with Being, or that we should feel free to commit murder because we can?t be certain of its ontological status. He is not concerned with our making these types of ontic statements, provided that we do not forget about Being. But he does say that Sartre is wrong to develop a philosophy in the ignorance of Being. In fact, he says more generally that ?when philosophy attends to its essence it does not make forward strides at all? (255). This may be true if philosophy is defined as a discipline whose sole purpose is to investigate ontological truths, but clearly this definition is too restrictive. It is unreasonable to deny that philosophy has made progress in an enormous number of other areas since Plato?and, even it has only been progress in the ontic realm, it is surely going too far to suggest that this progress is of no value, and that it cannot continue concurrently with Heidegger?s ontological project. Thus even if we grant Heidegger everything else, Sartre?s existentialism may still be able to remain intact.
[b]II[/b]
Despite the fact that Heidegger would prefer not to use the term ?humanism?, in the Letter he remains confident that his philosophy could easily be described as humanistic. Heidegger?s argument is, in short, that although his philosophy rejects traditional humanism, he goes even further to ?realize the proper dignity of the human being? by allowing him be the ?shepherd of Being? (252). His critics have often been willing to agree with him that this constitutes a new form of humanism, but I will argue that this is unreasonable because they overlook the fact that man is not, in Heidegger?s philosophy, accorded the central role demanded by humanism. The problem stems from the use of an unreasonably broad definition of humanism which effectively allows Heidegger to subvert its main principles. A comment made by David West is symptomatic. West says that approaches taken by Hegel, Marx, and Freud, ?retain a qualified or conditional role for the subject and so remain within the pale of humanist assumptions?.[7] It is paradoxical that a philosophy could be called humanistic if it conceives of a qualified or conditional role for the human?on this definition, any philosopher could call himself a humanist. A philosophy which speaks of only a ?pale form? of human centrality is no humanism at all. Heidegger?s rejection of human subjectivity and his focus on the question of Being does precisely this?it replaces the centrality of the human with the centrality of Being?and it should not properly be regarded as humanistic. Although West does not make this mistake with respect to Heidegger (his comment is only in relation to Hegel, Marx, and Freud), other commentators do.[8]
Even though his philosophy is not humanistic in the traditional sense, Heidegger may yet be able to offer us good reasons as to why we should reject the traditional version of humanism and embrace becoming the ?shepherds of Being?. He appears to rely on the idea that since his humanism is ontologically ?prior? to traditional theories, it is necessarily better, writing: ?In the determination of the humanity of the human being as ex-sistence what is essential is not the human being but Being? (254). But even we accept that Being is prior to the human being, and assume that he is right that the question of Being has been largely ignored in the philosophical tradition, it does not follow that the humanism which has come out of that tradition is necessarily inferior to his. He still needs to prove that his brand of humanism (which I will call ?ontological humanism?) is in some way better than traditional humanism (?ontic humanism?). It does not follow that his humanism is better simply because it is conceived in an ontological framework which was overlooked in traditional philosophy.
In fact, it seems as though we may have perfectly good reasons to value ontic truths more than ontological ones in this context. We have an excellent knowledge of what makes human beings happy, satisfied, healthy, and so on, and surely we should value attempts to formulate an ethics based on this knowledge. By contrast, we have very little knowledge of ontological truths, and even less grounds for applying that knowledge in a practical way. It should be noted that there is nothing to prevent the ontological truths which Heidegger wants us to discover as being damaging to human life?what if Being were Osama bin Laden? Thus Heidegger needs to do more than establish that Being has been overlooked. He needs to tell us precisely why we should value his ?ontological humanism?, and he does not do this adequately.
[b]III[/b]
The twentieth century has seen the growth of new theories of humanism, based on the traditional model of human centrality. One of the most original of these theories was developed by the German philosopher Ernst Cassirer. Cassirer?s humanism is very much a reaction to Heidegger?s philosophy?he diagnoses the main problem in Western society not as ?forgetfulness of Being? but the very opposite: forgetfulness of the importance of man. In our time, Cassirer writes, ?Man?s claim to being the center of the universe has lost its foundation?.[9] Cassier focuses especially on the achievements of society, and holds that social cooperation leads to the great accomplishments of civilisation. This raises the question whether Sartre and Heidegger have neglected the social dimension of human existence. Heidegger, in focusing on Being and Dasein, is often oblivious to the importance of interpersonal relationships. Although it is true that because his approach is ?ontological? rather than ?ontic?, he is not committed to develop theories about Dasein?s relationship to other people, it does seem paradoxical that he could call his philosophy humanistic when it overlooks such an important part human life.
Sartre?s ?ontic humanism? starts on much firmer ground because, as we have seen, Sartre takes the individual human and the choices he or she makes to be the sole source of meaning in the world. This is an eminently humanistic starting point, and the criticisms Sartre answers in Existentialism is a Humanism relate not to that starting point itself but to its consequences. The most important criticism that Sartre needs to answer is how his claim that ?man is nothing but that which he makes of himself? is consonant with the humanist ideal of recognising the importance of all mankind. Sartre attempts to overcome this problem by saying that man, ?in choosing for himself he chooses for all men?, but this claim is wholly inconsistent with the rest of Sartre?s writings.[10] Another similarly unsatisfactory aspect of Sartre?s philosophy, is his view of our relationship with others as characterised by conflict. This view seems to ignore the potential for social cooperation, and for individuals to take part in what Cassirer calls the ?achievement of civilization??great artistic, intellectual, or social creations. It is also often said that Sartre?s ontology does not adequately take into account the capacity for society to shape the choices made by individuals. David Detmer has identified that Sartre recognises seven types of restraints on human freedom,11 and argued that consequently Sartre takes full account of the influence which society has on individual freedom. However, Detmer?s investigation concentrates primarily on the negative aspect of social influence, and the seven factors he identifies don?t properly account for the capacity for positive social interaction of the type that Cassirer identifies.
Despite these criticisms, however, it is in the end impossible to deny that the fundamental themes in Sartre?s existentialism?a world of human subjectivity, with absolute human freedom, and complete human responsibility?resonate with a humanist worldview. If we define humanism strictly as the belief in human centrality, it is hard to see how existentialism could not be considered a version of humanism?albeit an extreme one. In fact, it seems that these criticisms are rightly criticisms which should be leveled at humanism generally: perhaps existentialism is humanism?s reductio ad absurdum. What Cassrier has done, then, is to make it clear that humanism itself cannot adequately explain all of human behaviour, because it overlooks the importance of aspects of life such as society, and culture. So although Sartre made every effort to try and defend existentialism as a humanism, in the end he succeeds only in drawing our attention to the absurdity of humanism itself, because it is patently obvious that there are dimensions of human life for which a narrow humanist view cannot account. Perhaps what we need to realise is that the very technique of attempting to encapsulate all of man?s complex existence into a single, restricted definition of what it is to be human is fundamentally problematic. Ironically, this is a view that Heidegger himself attempted to draw to our attention in his attack on techne. Although, as we have seen, a number of aspects of Heidegger?s philosophy itself are questionable, it is to his credit that he recognised the absurdity of the ?ism? in humanism.
[b]Bibliography[/b]
T. C. Anderson, Sartre?s Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Humanity, Chicago, Open Court Publishing, 1993.
E. Cassirer, An Essay on Man, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944.
M. Heidegger, Letter on Humanism, in Martin Heidegger: Pathmarks, ed. W. McNeill, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
??, Being and Time, in Heidegger: Basic Writings, tr. D. F. Krell, London, Routledge, 1978.
R. G. Olson, An Introduction to Existentialism, New York, Dover, 1962.
J. P. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, tr. P. Mariet, London, Methuen, 1948.
??, Being and Nothingness, tr. H. E. Barnes, London, Methuen, 1957.
G. Stern, ?The Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger?s Philosophy?, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 8, no. 3, p. 349.
D. West, An Introduction to Continental Philosophy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996.
[b]References[/b]
In-line references to and quotations from Sartre and Heidegger are from the editions of Existentialism and Humanism and Letter on Humanism cited above.
[!1] I do not mean to suggest that Heidegger?s view is that we must (or even can) completely discover Being?Heidegger sees the project of discovering Being (or, more correctly, the process of Being revealing itself to Dasein) as a gradual one which is valuable in itself. When I use language like ?discovering Being? or ?finding out what Being is?, I therefore do not mean that Being must be completely revealed, but just that it must be revealed sufficiently to provide us with some information about what it is.
[!2] An Introduction to Existentialism, New York, Dover, 1962, p. 138.
[!3] Being and Time, s 10.
[!4] For a clarification of what is meant here see supra, note 1.
[!5] Being and Time, s 7.
[!6] G. Stern, ?The Pseudo-Concreteness of Heidegger?s Philosophy?, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 8, no. 3, p. 349.
[!7] An Introduction to Continental Philosophy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996, p. 159
[!8] See, for example, G. Stern, supra, note 6.
[!9] An Essay on Man, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944, p. 218.
[!10] See my Comparing Sartre and Nietzsche on Morality, Essay 1.
[!11] Freedom as a Value, La Salle, Open Court, 1988. Detmer calls the seven restraints facticity, coefficient of adversity, situation, human condition, practico-inert, counter-finality, and relations with others.
