Sartre and Nietzsche on Morality
Evaluates the similarities and differences in the ethical theories espoused by Sartre and Nietzsche, and argues that Nietzsche goes further to create a positive morality than is usually thought.
The rejection by existentialist writers of absolute moral values makes the construction of an existentialist morality a paradoxical task, but a task which nonetheless has been attempted by successive writers. Jean-Paul Sartre and Friedrich Nietzsche both attempted to replace traditional morality with an ethics based on authenticity. This essay will discuss some of the initial similarities in their approaches, and identify where and why their approaches diverge. In the course of this examination, a number of prima facie objections to their theories will be examined, and I will argue that Nietzsche goes much further to create a positive morality than is usually thought. Finally, a number of problems common to any morality based on authenticity will be discussed, and I will conclude by suggesting briefly that a new reading of Sartre and Nietzsche may have the potential to overcome these problems.
One reason that both Jean-Paul Sartre and Friedrich Nietzsche are known today as existentialist writers is that their philosophies of how we ought to live our lives share some important characteristics. Both reject the way in traditional morality is founded on rationality, and the way in which it attempts to universalise a code of conduct. They both decry our blind acceptance of social mores, and champion personal choice, subjectivity, and responsibility. I will argue that the concept which unites these similarities is authenticity?the process of taking responsibility for oneself by engaging in a project of self-creation?and that although their moral philosophy starts from this common point, their positions ultimately diverge and the acceptability of their theories of morality ultimately falter.
Although Nietzsche called himself an ?immoralist?,[1] his critique of morality is effectively directed to the existence of an universal morality. His argument is that an absolute morality forces values on everyone in a society which advance the interests only of one group of people and which for the remainder are ?life denying?. He holds that the traditional distinction between good and evil has arisen from the perspective of a group he calls the ?slaves?, and insists that, like everything else, morality is ?conditioned by perspective?.[2] He protests against the negative way in which traditional codes of conduct are framed, and the way in which they promote ascetic values like sin, humility, and self-denial. The starting point of Nietzsche?s morality is thus essentially negative?it is based on the errors he thinks have contaminated traditional thinking about morality, and on his diagnosis of the state of European society.
Sartre?s morality is also negative in the sense that it is concerned with bad faith, a problem which he sees as arising unavoidably from his ontology. For Sartre, our consciousness gives us the ability to be aware of not only how things are but how they are not, which allows us the freedom to be able to create a world which is different from the one we see before us. This, in turn, gives us absolute responsibility over the choices we make?a responsibility which leads to anguish and which we repeatedly try to avoid by, in ?bad faith?, deceiving ourselves about the extent of our freedom.
Both philosophers thus developed at length explanations for how and why we fail to be authentic: Sartre?s ontology is used to explain the appeal of bad faith, while Nietzsche?s genealogy of morals describes how our subscription to ?slave morality? came about and how it has been self-perpetuating. Both of these explanations hinge on the idea that human beings are evading responsibility: for Sartre, the evasion is from absolute freedom which is a necessary state of existence; for Nietzsche, we hide our passions, our will to live and our will to power from ourselves by invoking God and traditional morality.[3] It is thus vital for both philosophers to tell us how it is possible to live an authentic life?bad faith and slave morality must be overcome. It is on this question that the views of the philosophers most clearly diverge; yet, as we will see, in the end their answers suffer very similar problems.
Nietzsche?s answer is that the ?highest specimens? should reject slave morality and engage in a project of artistic self-creation. By living our lives as a work of art, embracing the individual and the natural rather than the artificial, and by rejecting the ascetic ideals such as equality sin, guilt, and evil, we can come close to recognising the ideal of Nietzsche?s Ubermensch. Nietzsche calls this approach ?naturalism in morality?,[4] and it involves affirming an ?instinct of life? that has hitherto been inhibited by traditional slave morality. Sartre?s answer is that we can live an authentic life by assuming responsibility for ourselves and acting in full recognition of our freedom. Additionally, because bad faith can involve denying both our facticity and our transcendence, we must simultaneously acknowledge responsibility for what we have done and recognise that we are free to change the pattern.[5] These various aspects of authenticity are best summed up when Sartre writes that we ?must assume the situation with the proud consciousness of being the author of it?.[6]
It is clear that both writers place special emphasis on the process of self-creation. They both hold that taking responsibility for our lives is a crucial step on the route to authenticity, and that on the way we must reject the role played by external influences. Some passages in Sartre seem to echo Nietzsche?s declaration that we must invent our own values through a process of independent self-creation: ?This is my way? For the way ? that does not exist?.[7] The fact that Nietzsche?s Ubermensch is a man who actively chooses values in a very Sartrean way is captured perfectly in two remarks made by the character of Roquentin in Sartre?s Nausea. On the same page in the book, he asks, ?What summits would I not reach if my own life were the subject of the melody??, revealing the importance to Sartre of living life as a work of art, and declares ?To live it all over again, in the same circumstances, from beginning to end??a clear allusion to Nietzsche?s eternal return. Sartre would no doubt endorse the Nietzsche?s claim in The Birth of Tragedy that we are ?veiled? by our blind acceptance of social dogma, and that we can only ever be authentic by engaging in a perpetual process of creating our own values and crafting our own perspectives.
However, there are a number of important differences in the types of self-creation espoused by Nietzsche and Sartre. First, in Sartre, both the problem of bad faith and the solution of an authentic existence are universal?anyone can overcome self-deception and lead an authentic life. Nietzsche, by contrast, highlights the need for different modes of life for different people, and in the end he seems concerned only with the changes which must be made to society in order to allow the flourishing of his Ubermenschen. Whereas Sartre?s authentic man need not lead an extraordinary life, Nietzsche?s Ubermensch seems to be a very rare character; Nietzsche admits that ?as yet history does not offer us any certain examples?.[8] Thus, although both philosophers advocate a project of self-choice, in the end the results are rather different.
On this point, Sartre?s ?universal? position is far more palatable than Nietzsche?s ?elitism?, and a number of questions may be raised about Nietzsche?s approach. We may wonder whether human beings differ in respects relevant to the formulation of morality. If morality really is conditioned by perspective, as Nietzsche would have us believe, there seems to be an awful lot of agreement on fundamental questions of morality from people of vastly different perspectives (cultural, societal, experiential, etc.). We may also question Nietzsche?s presupposition that the value of a society is in its highest specimens.[9] This is, of course, only one hypothesis?there is nothing to prevent us from holding an alternative view; perhaps even the very antithesis: that the value of society is revealed by the way it treats its lowest specimens. Nietzsche himself admits that ?slave morality? is best suited to the preservation of the slaves, so in order to prove that a ?reversal? in moral values would be desirable, Nietzsche either needs us to accept his presupposition, as a consequence of which any morality which suited the highest specimens would be more desirable, or he needs to prove that it would be possible for slave morality to coexist with a morality suited to the higher specimens (which he calls the ?higher morality?). If, as Kaufmann says, the theory of higher morality is ?the most crucial point of his philosophy of history and theory of values?,[10] we may wonder about the consequences of our rejecting it. In any event, these contingencies have the effect of progressively undermining the reader?s faith in Nietzsche?s project.
A second difference is that Sartre is curiously silent on the topic of what values he would have the authentic man possess. Nietzsche, by contrast, seems to be actively campaigning for a certain type of life and consequently his approach seems far more pragmatic. He suggests that we can judge the value of systems of morals by asking ourselves, ?have they hitherto inhibited or promoted human flourishing??.[11] This is closely related to the concept of the will to power, which ?enables us to discriminate between different actions according to the strength or weakness of the will involved in these actions?.[12] These concepts seem to provide us with a practical decision-making criterion which is absent in Sartre?s thought. Our first reaction, though, is that it seems inconsistent for Nietzsche to both disdain universal morality and to advocate the single ?good? of ?human flourishing??after all, he is quite firm that ?the value of life cannot be assessed?.[13] However, Nietzsche does not say that human flourishing is a universal value which ought to be pursued by everyone?he mentions it only in the context of promoting flourishing among his Ubermenschen, and never suggests that it should apply to everyone. Indeed, Nietzsche doesn?t believe that slave morality shouldn?t continue to exist, suggesting that ?The ideals of the herd should rule in the herd?.[14]
Nietzsche?s pragmatism goes further?he even outlines the values he wants for his Ubermensch: creativity, self-overcoming, control of the passions, and so on. It is certainly wrong to assume that Nietzsche would want these values to be universalised among his Ubermenschen, although Nehamas probably goes too far in the opposite direction when he concludes that the values being promoted reflect the character of Nietzsche himself.[15] If we accept Nehamas? view that Nietzsche ?cannot and will not supply?[16] values for his readers, it seems as though he is in the same predicament as Sartre?he is unable to offer us any positive advice. But Nehamas misses two important points here. The first is that Nietzsche does consider certain values as prerequisites to becoming an Ubermensch. This is because he sees becoming an Ubermensch as a process which necessary involves the rejection of artificial moralities and the adoption of his naturalist morality, and which requires self reflection, creativity, and resoluteness. He also seems to think that the development of some values?for example, self control? are an inevitable consequence of becoming an Ubermensch. We cannot deny the important role that these values play in Nietzsche?s philosophy because, if we do, Nietzsche has no ability to discriminate between ?life affirming? and ?life denying?.
The second point is that Nietzsche places a very real restriction on the types of values we can hold by insisting that our beliefs must originate from our authentic selves. Undeniably one of the central messages of Nietzsche?s philosophy is that our values must be created and not absorbed from outside influences. So Nietzsche both encourages us to adopt certain life-affirming values and dissuades us from adopting values in a way which is inauthentic. These two aspects give Nietzsche?s view much more worth as a positive morality than is acknowledged by Nehamas. Sartre, as we shall see, is less willing to identify certain values as good in themselves, and so is limited to the second aspect?all he can do, in the end, is criticise people who are in bad faith.
Thus, although Nietzsche?s morality is stronger in a positive sense because of his promotion of specific values, the two philosophers share a focus on the second aspect?they are concerned less, in other words, with what we decide to do than with the fact that we do it independently and without the aid of external moral codes. Lester Hunt explores Nietzsche?s view of authenticity, and suggests that in the end his morality ?does not tell us? what we should do or avoid. It concerns the states of character from which actions arise?.[17] Setting aside the first aspect of Nietzsche?s morality?which, I have argued, does in a limited way tell us what we should do or avoid?we see here that Nietzsche is on an astonishingly similar footing to Sartre. Sartre, as we have seen, is concerned less with the content of our decisions than with their form?the sole criterion he offers is that decisions must not be made in bad faith.
One important objection to Sartre?s ethics of bad faith is raised in the example of the woman in the restaurant. Although Sartre seems to condemn her indecisiveness unconditionally, we may ask whether it is acceptable for Sartre to claim that indifference, indecision, and apathy necessarily involve bad faith. The woman may wish to postpone making a decision until, say, the second date, and to insist that she take a position immediately is to deny her freedom to be indifferent, undecided, and apathetic. Another objection arises from Sartre?s treatment of emotions. Like Nietzsche, he refuses to oppose will and passion, suggesting instead that they work towards the same ends. In Existentialism as a Humanism, he declares that all of the techniques we may use to assist us in solving an ethical problem?asking for advice, looking for signs, consulting our feelings?are examples of bad faith. He would replace these activities with the realisation that we must make decisions alone and unaided?in short, in a state of abandonment, where ?man is forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend on either within or outside himself?.[18] One of the most important steps in this argument is that we cannot rely on feeling as a guide to action since ?feeling is formed by the deeds that one does?.[19] This move is questionable. Firstly, it seems intuitively true that we can consistently predict our feelings on a wide range of issues, based on past experience and an understanding of the circumstances surrounding the issue. Secondly, this argument seems to contradict Sartre?s assertion in Being and Nothingness that emotions, like actions, are the product of conscious decisions. Both of these two inconsistent approaches?that our feelings are the product only of conscious decisions or only of the deeds that we do?are counter-intuitive and should not be accepted without justification.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that an ethics based on ?bad faith? would suffer from the same problems that Sartre identifies for feelings. How are we able to determine whether an action will lead to ?bad faith? unless it is ?defined and ratified?? If, in the example of the young man, he travels to England, he may be in bad faith if he deliberately engages himself in the role of being a soldier, or if, on the front lines, he treats his body as a ?passive object? by refusing to make a decision about whether to advance or retreat. It is impossible for us to predict every eventuality, and so in the way that present feelings cannot be a guide to the future, bad faith cannot provide us with a positive type of morality. We may use it to criticise those who are currently in bad faith, but we cannot use it to decide what someone ought to do when faced with a choice in any practical situation where both (or neither) of the alternatives may involve bad faith.
In his later writings, Sartre may have realised the limitations of his ethics based on bad faith. At one point in Existentialism and Humanism, he seems to go so far as to argue for an almost Kantian ?moral imperative?. By making a decision, Sartre says, I am:
committing not only myself, but humanity as a whole? I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself I fashion man.[20]
If Sartre is seriously arguing for a universal principle here, he is undoubtedly being inconsistent with his earlier position.[21] This passage also raises an important paradox which is common to all existentialists: any rules we formulate cannot, by definition, carry universal validity?and if authenticity itself were to become a universal norm, only by rejecting authenticity could we be authentic! This is a problem which Sartre tried desperately and unsuccessfully to escape.
One alternative comes from Sartre?s treatment of freedom, which may offer us a moral imperative which is more consistent with the existential position. The imperative is that we must destroy barriers to free choice, and it becomes especially important in Sartre?s later writings, which canvass the potential for authenticity to be established by social progress. (Nietzsche, by contrast, remained wholly ?innocent of politics?.[22]) But, significantly, both philosophers have much to gain by promoting freedom?for Nietzsche, it would involve the destruction of universal morality; for the late Sartre, it involves realizing what he called ?integral humanity? through a classless society. But, like any other moral imperative, this one remains inconsistent with the existential worldview?we can hardly expect Nietzsche to accept that everyone should be involved in a campaign against slave morality, or the early Sartre to be of the view that we should all become Marxists.
However, I think that there is perhaps one final way to save existential ethics. This is if we read Nietzsche and Sartre not as constructing new ?tables? of morality, or even of values, but rather as individuals reacting to a particular milieu. Nietzsche, of course, was reacting to much of the philosophical tradition before him and to the direction of ?nihilism? in European society; and he is, after all, one of the philosophers whose work, according to his famous dictum, is a ?confession of faith on the part of its author?.[23] The examples that Sartre provides in Being and Nothingness also seem to be concerned with specific types of behaviour which he regarded as unacceptable, and maybe we should apply Nietzsche?s dictum to him too?he may have met many excessively eager waiters in his lifetime, or too few women who were as responsive to his advances as he would have liked. This is not to say that their theories don?t have any value to us, but only that we should read them in light of the problems which they were formulated to address. It would be absurd, for example, to use Sartre?s model of bad faith in analysing situations of life and death. Although bad faith for Sartre is no doubt a universal phenomenon, this does not mean we should necessarily attempt to employ it as a universal moral criterion?especially since the scope of Sartre?s use of it is relatively narrow. Perhaps all we can take from Nietzsche and Sartre is some sense of the importance of reacting to social mores, and of creating a life which is not constrained by them.
In the end, the moral theory which Nietzsche and Sartre can formulate will always be constrained by their rejection of absolute moral values. Golomb concludes that, for this reason, authenticity can only be ?a kind of regulative and corrective ideal rather than a manifestly viable norm?.[24] A morality based on authenticity certainly cannot provide any norm or code for behaviour, and, as we have seen, it is right to question whether we think it is practical or a desirable even as an ideal. This dilemma is all the more distressing because the need for authenticity is clear in our society of conformity and mediocrity. I have suggested that one way of solving the dilemma is to ?read down? the theories advanced by Nietzsche and Sartre, and see them as applying not to every sphere of human behaviour but only to areas of specific concern for the two philosophers. Indeed, maybe it is wrong to make authenticity the sole component in morality, and perhaps this is why Nietzsche?s solution?which tells us both how we must invent our own values, and also recommends what values we should invent in order to promote ?human flourishing??is in many ways more satisfactory than Sartre?s. Nietzsche would be distressed to hear it, but perhaps the only way in which authenticity can be a viable societal norm is if it is integrated into and systematised with a more comprehensive moral theory.
[b]References[/b]
T. C. Anderson, Sartre?s Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Humanity, Chicago, Open Court Publishing, 1993.
H. E. Barnes, ?Sartre?, in R.J. Cavalier et al ed. Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy, St Martin?s Press, New York, 1989.
G. Foulk, ?Plantinga?s Criticisms of Sartre?s Ethics?, Ethics, Vol. 82, No. 4.
L. H. Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue, Routledge, New York, 1991.
W. Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968.
S. H. Lee, ?The Central Role of Universalization in Sartrean Ethics?, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 46, No. 1.
A. Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985.
F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, tr. W. Kaufmann, New York, Vintage Books, 1974.
--, Ecce Homo, tr. W Kaufmann, New York, Vintage Books, 1968.
--, Twilight of the Idols, in tr. W Kaufmann The Portable Nietzsche, New York, Viking Press, 1954.
--, Beyond Good and Evil, tr. W Kaufmann, New York, Vintage Books, 1966.
J. P. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, tr. P. Mariet, London, Methuen, 1948.
--, Being and Nothingness, tr. H. E. Barnes, London, Methuen, 1957.
J.P. Stern, Nietzsche, London, Fontana, 1978.
A. Tillich, The Courage to Be, New York, Yale University Press, 2000.
References to Nietzsche?s works are to section and paragraph numbers, and quotations are generally from the editions listed above.
[!1] Ecce Homo, IV 2.
[!2] Will to Power, 272.
[!3] See The Gay Science, 347, where Nietzsche describes faith as corresponding to a ?lack of will?.
[!4] Twilight of the Idols, V 4.
[!5] H.E. Barnes, ?Sartre?, in R.J. Cavalier et al ed. Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy, St Martin?s Press, New York, 1989.
[!6] Being and Nothingness, op. cit., p. 554.
[!7] Thus Spake Zarathustra, p. 307.
[!8] The Gay Science, 288
[!9] See Untimely Meditations, II, 9.
[!10] Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 149.
[!11] On the Genealogy of Morals, 3.
[!12] J.P. Stern, Nietzsche, London, Fontana, 1978, p. 82.
[!13] Twilight of the Idols, II 2. Nietzsche also says, elsewhere, that ?In order to live, one must evaluate?.
[!14] Will to Power, 287.
[!15] Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 233.
[!16] Ibid., p. 234.
[!17] Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue, Routledge, New York, 1991.
[!18] J. P. Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, tr. Philip Mariet, London, Methuen, 1948, p. 34.
[!19] Ibid., p. 37.
[!20] Op. cit., p. 42.
[!21] See S. H. Lee, ?The Central Role of Universalization in Sartrean Ethics?, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 46, No. 1. For a different perspective, see G. Foulk, ?Plantinga?s Criticisms of Sartre?s Ethics?, Ethics, Vol. 82, No. 4.
[!22] J. P. Stern, op. cit., p. 69.
[!23] Beyond Good and Evil, 6.
[!24] In Search of Authenticity, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 81.
