Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 ? 1831)
By B. Kim

Philosophers remember Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel as more than the professor rumored to arrive for lecture minus a shoe (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 31). Hegel?s meticulous and conceptual methodologies echo his psychologically challenged life, and his dialectic perception emulates the political upheaval of his time. Humanity still questions his direct intentions, but Hegel remains an essential element to philosophical elucidations. The German sage upholds the tradition of a skeptical existence turned significant genius upon death. History reflects a past loaded with Hegelian influences, from the politics of Karl Marx (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 6) to the sociological perspective of Emile Durkheim (Tekiner, par. 1). Hegel, along with J.G. Fitche and friend, F.W.J. Schelling, succeeds the theories of Immanuel Kant, the man responsible for permanently revolutionizing a notable ?German Idealist? (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 17).
Georg Ludwig Hegel, officer in the Department of Finance for the Duchy of Wittenberg, fathered three children, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, his eldest, born August 27, 1770, in Stuttgart, Germany (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 2). Reading became an early infatuation of G.W.F., and in his youth, he embarked upon a life-long quest for knowledge (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 4). His formal education began at a gymnasium in Stuttgart (Turner, par. 1). At age eleven, Hegel?s mother passed (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 2), but left a positive impression upon her son; she taught him Latin (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 4), laying the foundation to his erudition of Greek and Roman classics (Turner, par. 1). Hegel was fifteen at the rise of his hypothetical notions, and he began documenting his independent commentary of studied materials (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 4).
Georg, Sr. raised his children in an atmosphere of ?Protestant Pietism? (Turner, par. 1), inducing a prejudice against Catholics upon his offspring (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 4). He imposed his religious biases on Georg, Jr., insisting upon his son?s entrance into the (Turner, par. 1) Stift Theological Seminary in the vicinity of Tubingen in 1788 (Kim, par. 1). Perhaps the patriarchal advocacy inspired Ludwig, the middle child, to enlist in Napoleon?s army leaving his older brother to deal with their sister, Christiane. Already traumatized by the loss of their mother, she latched onto her remaining sibling to fulfill the needy, emotional void. G.W.F. endured the strain of an abnormal family tie, which almost literally followed him to his grave; three months, subsequent to Georg, Jr.?s death, Christiane drowned to her suicide (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 3).
Despite anomalous, domestic effects, G.W.F. managed to be sociable, and found a kindred spirit amidst the theologically induced hell. Classmate Friedrich Schelling shared Hegel?s inquisitive curiosity for philosophy, specifically, an affinity for Greek ideologies (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 5). In 1789, his university peers established a ?political club? (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 6), and Hegel discovered an outlet to debate his perceptions of liberty and confer opinions related to the French Revolution. The league opened the door to the underground network of Jacobin secret societies, which in Hegel?s mind, were callously inhibited by the system (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 6). He awakened to the reality of the elections, competitions designed to benefit of the ruling elite without a bit of thought about public welfare. Inside his mind, thoughts stewed over whether or not the ?promise of the French Revolution could ever be realized? (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 12) ? the people seemed oblivious to the manner in which ?politicians manipulated public sentiments? (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 12).
In 1793, Hegel earned the statement finalizing his achievements in theology and philology, however; despite the record of his ?good parts and character? (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 8), his philosophical aptitude left much to be desired (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 8). Contrary to his father?s hopes, Hegel opted for the life of a private tutor, rather than dedication to the seminary. He relocated to Berne, Switzerland, until 1796 (Turner, par. 1), but returned to Germany, continuing his employment in the city of Frankfurt am Main. The month of October reunited Hegel with Friedrich Holderlin, a past roommate who named his fame as a ?great poet and scholar of Greek tragedies? (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 16), however; given the times, popular belief deemed Holderlin as ?radical? (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 16) on the basis of his ?unpopular political beliefs, non-traditional views on religion, and prone to volatility? (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 16). The friendship finally cracked under the weight of Hegel?s previous experiences with his sister?s mentally tormented soul. Holderlin became a handful; his outlandish conduct exceeded his colleague?s capacity to tolerate such antics (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par 16).
The death of Georg, Sr. in 1799 bequeathed Georg, Jr. breathing space, psychologically as well as financially. He invested a portion of the ?financial legacy? (Turner, par. 1) in 1801, reopening his studies at the University of Jena, eventually taking a position among the staff (Turner, par. 2). Two years later, Schelling sent Hegel the news regarding Holderlin?s inevitable, mental breakdown ? apparently schizophrenia. Holderlin spent his last, three decades, confined to a life of institutionalized solitude, forbidden all contact with the outside world; yet even in his delusional mind, he maintained his skill of writing. Hegel?s actions may be perceived as aloof and detached; yet the attitude indicates a personal response to his own emotional instability (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 16). Nevertheless, Holderlin served a key purpose in Hegelian theory; he originated Kant?s infusion, commencing a modified constant in the future of G.W.F. Hegel?s philosophy (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 17).
Napoleon?s defeat of Prussia in 1806 seized the city of Jena, closing the university (Kreis, par. 2). Although Hegel was forced to flee to Bavaria (Turner, par. 2), he commemorated about the political club at Tubingen and his inspiration drawn from the French Revolution, admiration of the infamous general, and respect for the French monarchy. The reverence for dictatorship is illustrated throughout the diversion of his philosophy. He became a ?loyal supporter of that of the authoritarian state and a morbid hater of democratic measures? (Kreis, par. 2).
Hegel?s inheritance ran dry while in Bavaria, and he coerced himself to accept an editing position for the Bamberger Zeithung, however; journalism redefined the underworld to him. A Gymnasium in Nuremberg (Turner, par. 2) appointed him Rector, in 1808, and he remained the school?s headmaster for eight years (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 24). During his stay, he met and married Marie Von Tucher (Turner, par. 2), but his marriage reeked havoc in the hysterical Christiane. Prior to Marie, his envious little sister turned green at every female who shared relations with her brother. The event caused her one-year commitment in an asylum, and eventually, she would leave her job as a governess in 1820 (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 3).
Marie bore him three children, a daughter who passed shortly after birth, but their two sons survived (Turner, par. 2). February 5, 1807, Hegel?s first son, Ludwig, was born, indicating a fling with his landlord?s wife (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 23). In 1816, he arranged for his illegitimate son to live with Hegel?s family (Turner, per. 2), but the father-son relations caused nervous tension. Ludwig eventually exiled himself to the East Indies (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 26).
The Science of Logic, the three-volume work published in 1812, 1813, and 1816 defined the study of philosophy instruction. The ?massive, abstract work catapulted Hegel to the forefront of German academia? (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 27), and the offers ensued the distribution of his compilation; Berlin, Heidelberg, and Erlangen among the proposals. Berlin?s Minister of Education monitored Hegel?s classroom discussion. The representative reported his scholarly tirade as "false pathos, shouting, and roaring, little jokes, digressions... arrogant self-praise..." (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 27). The Minister warned him about minding his manners during his presentations. After heeding caution to the ultimatum (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 27), Hegel accepted Heidelberg?s proposition, and employed him as a professor of philosophy (Turner, par. 2).
Publication of The Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Outline in 1817 adjusted the attitudes of the University of Berlin (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 29), and Hegel procured professorship at the institution in 1818 (Turner, par. 2). The Royal Academic Board of Examiners in Brandenberg appointed Hegel in 1821. He was thrilled by the allocation; finally, he sat among the reformers of the Prussian and German education system he once condemned (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 29). Hegel spent the final decade of his life committed to his endeavor of advancing theories and broadening philosophies via lectures, texts, and essays, yet; the arrangements too vague and intangible (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 30). His preoccupation increased with age, but supposedly, the fall toward the end of his life was hypocritically scarred (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 31). On November 14, 1831 (Turner, par. 2), Hegel died peacefully in his sleep. He only suffered twenty-four hours from the cholera epidemic (Tameri.com, ?Existentialist? par. 31).
Hegel is notorious for his immeasurable scope of speculation (Wikapedia, ?George? par. 4). He aspired a philosophical contrivance incorporating the concepts of his precursors by devising a theoretical foundation for a sapient perspicacity of history and prospective destination (Turner, par. 4). The enlightenment of the German Idealists brought closure to the Kantian legacy, however; modern assessors credit the Hegelian theory as the refined link between Kant?s ?universalist dimension? (Redding, par. 16) and civil speculations of historically inclined, progressive thought (Redding, par. 16), yet he envisaged a primary, all-inclusive accord, the ?Absolute? (Turner, par. 4). The thought based upon ?this rational whole is real and true? (Kreis, par. 3) eliminated Spinoza?s dualism. He abandoned the pragmatism of controlled and detached entity and aptitude in liberty and circumstance of the Kantian ?thing in itself? (Kreis, par. 3). In the nature of Kant, Hegel centralizes his concentration on proving the standard union among the perplexing miscellany of tentative substances, however; his angle is viewed as more methodical than Kant?s. ?Absolute consciousness? (Kemerling, par. 10) is Hegel?s focal point and resolute derivation amid everything else (Kemerling, par. 10).
The idea entailed, ?nothing short of a full account of reality itself; thus, conceiving the subject matter of philosophy to reality as a whole, reality or total developmental process of everything that is, referring to (it) as the ?Absolute,? or ?Absolute Spirit? (Turner, par. 4). Hegel?s philosophical mission entailed tracking the progression of Absolute Spirit and clarifying the inner, balanced configuration of the Absolute by expounding the ?teleological nature? (Turner, par, 4) of the Absolute, which is, demonstrating the outcome regulated by the Absolute (Turner, par. 4). He stated, ?Only the Absolute is non-self-contradictory? (Kreis, par. 3), viewing the initial defense mechanism to conceal the schema of theological practices and beliefs, followed to achieve independent communication or union with the divine faith inspired by the divinity of Christianity (Kreis, par. 3).
To comprehend Hegel?s dialectic method, or ?rational structure of the Absolute? (Kreis, par. 3) and ?further claim the Absolute must be ultimately regarded as Thought, or Spirit, or Mind in the process of self development? (Kreis, par. 3), one must identify with the argument of ancient Greek philosopher, Parmenides, ?What is rational is real and what is real is rational.? The reason admonishing this growth is ?dialectic,? and the technique implicates ?the notion that movement, or process, or progress, is the result of the conflict of opposites? (Kreis, par. 3). Habitually, the measurement of this deliberation has been scrutinized in the categorical terminology of ?thesis, antithesis, and synthesis,? however; this tends to be a deceptive, Hegelian myth. The philosopher intended to shun the expressions, although applied to this reference, the convoluted elaboration of the dialectic is easier to grasp (Kreis, par. 3). By ?positing something (thesis), denying it (antithesis), and combining the two, half-truths (synthesis), which will contain a necessarily greater portion of truth in its complexity? (Kreis, par. 3) surmises the hypothesis of the sequence (Kreis, par. 3).
?Thesis? refers to a thought or past faction encompassing within itself a deficiency, which in turn, causes the materialization to antagonism, or ?antithesis,? a rebellion. From the rebellion a third opinion, a ?synthesis,? trounces the revolt by integrating at an advanced tier of truth within both the thesis and antithesis. The synthesis results in a new thesis, which produces another antithesis, creating a new synthesis, and such in a manner the development of academic and historical progression is continually originated (Turner, par. 5). ?Dialectic? means that any ?ism,? which has a polar opposite, or is a particular position abandoning ?the rest? to itself, has to be critiqued by the rationality of philosophy, whose malfunction is authenticity as such, the ?World-itself? (Mueller, par. 1). In summary, the entire deliberation, incorporating the ?dialectical logic itself? (Kemerling, par. 13), solidifies by the ?thesis Idea? (Kemerling, par. 13), whose intrinsic ?antithesis is Nature? (Kemerling, par. 13), the apartness of the identified measured freely of its connection to the aware; and the ?grand synthesis? of the dichotomy is ?Spirit? (Kemerling, par. 13), the ?self-knowing, self-actualizing totality? (Kemerling, par. 13), that is to say, ?the Absolute itself? (Kemerling, par. 13).
The Absolute Spirit itself, (in other words, ?the total sum of reality?) (Turner, par. 5), cultivates in this dialectic profile toward a definite conclusion or objective, therefore; truth is appreciated as the Absolute dialectically relating in the course of self-realization. As the Absolute endures this realization, it observes its existence in character and in anthropology, character the ?Absolute Thought? or ?Being? ?objectifying? (Turner, par. 5) itself in physical appearance (Turner, par. 5). Predetermined intellect and anthropology are the proceedings of the Absolute illustrating itself in which it is closest to itself, specifically, ?spirit or consciousness? (Turner, par. 5). This preliminary phase of ?consciousness? (Kemerling, par. 15), deemed as the Subjective Spirit, monitors realism of humanity depicted by the psychological branch of learning and must develop a ?sensory awareness of objects? (Kemerling, par. 14-15); however; mankind ingenuously simplifies palpable normality of the outer shell of ?sensory images? (Kemerling, par. 15), The eye forgets that physical looks perpetually tangible, although the mirages are completely dissimilar. We inflict upon these figures ?the forms of space and time and the generalized laws of nature? (Kemerling, par. 15).
Realization of our purpose instigates from Kantian standard directing us to the ?antithesis of ?sensory experience? (Kemerling, par. 16), or ?self-conscious awareness of the individual thinker? (Kemerling, par. 16), who admits ?self as individual ego? (Kemerling, par.16). The consequential beginning leans toward cynicism about the planet of principles, but eventually entails the subsistence of alternate ?selves? (Kemerling, par. 16). Hegel claimed these stages are surpassed by their ?synthesis in universal consciousness? (Kemerling, par. 17), a speculative mediation of personal position within the bigger plan of ?Absolute Spirit? (Kemerling, par. 17). The union of individual ideas of knowledge and understanding fall under the illumination that all is fully held in the elementary truth of a collective ?whole? (Kemerling, par. 17). At this point, the sense of deduction becomes critical, since it evidently extracts upon what is ordinary to everyone (Kemerling, par. 17).
?Are we independent and self-sufficient individuals?? (Velasquez, 131) Hegel ?forcefully challenged? (Velasquez, 135) this notion, claiming personal character evolves upon the basis of social affiliations and cannot be distant from these contacts. To be considered autonomous, others must first acknowledge us as being a self-governing person, but striking a compromise among humanity stirs suspicions and doubts (Velasquez, 135). Personal recognition and the decisions we make derive only from others acceptance of us. He asserts that everyone is constantly engaged in a conflict to gain free acknowledgement and respect from our peers (Velasquez, 136-7). In summary, who we are ?ultimately depends on relationships with others? (Velasquez, 137). Hegel says, ?Each self is in a struggle to convince the other that he is a free being worthy of the other?s respect and recognition? (Velasquez, 135).
Hegel?s social and political beliefs emerge most distinctly in his analysis of morality, Moralitat, and social ethics, Sittlichkei. In Moralitat, ?right and wrong is a matter of individual conscience? (Turner, par. 8), yet; ?one must move beyond this to the level of social ethics, for duty? (Turner, par. 8). He viewed social service as the sole milieu in which obligation truly survives. Individuals have a responsibility to pass the stage of ?social ethics? (Turner, par. 8), and sovereignty to the ?state? should be ?one of the individual?s highest duties? (Turner, par. 8). Objective analysis concerns the communication of ?many selves? (Kemerling, par. 18) who are the appropriate citizens of ?ethics, or social, or political theory? (Kemerling, par. 18). Logic, again, of the areas is not understood by simplifying observations. Instead, we outline the ?dialectic through new triads? (Kemerling, par. 18).
Ethics start with the idea of independence contemplated as personal rights of humanity to behave freely while exploring ?self-interests? (Kemerling, par. 19). The antithesis is to the rise of ?moral rules? (Kemerling, par. 19), which need the burden of responsibility as the limitation upon the innate freedom of humanitarian request. From the two, the synthesis is ?the ethical life? (Kemerling, par. 19), which appears from a sincere appreciation of the importance of a person?s risk in the ?greater good of the whole? (Kemerling, par. 19). ?Political order? (Kemerling, par. 20) derives from the family, in which the fundamental requirements are labored by communal sentiment, without official standard of association. In turn, the antithesis to this social existence, in which the integration of single components most likely directs toward a structure of solely proper decree of behavior, expected by principle without expressive attachment. Hegel viewed the collaboration of the social order into a ?sort of civil family? (Kemerling, par. 20) arranged in a legitimate manner, but tied by a philosophical feeling of dedication as ?the State? (Kemerling, par. 20), the synthesis of ethics and political order (Kemerling, par. 20).
In an ideal world, the state demonstrates the universal motivation as the utmost manifestation of the ?ethical spirit? (Turner, par. 8); submission to this universal motivation is the sign of an independent and balanced person. The contemporary country must provide a definition of the ?self-conscious ethical will of the people? (Kemerling, par. 21). While this thought emulates Rousseau?s ?general will? (Kemerling, par. 21), the Hegelian method directs the entire accentuation on the cooperative articulation of the best way for the people, rather than basing it on the personal understanding to find it for themselves. This illustration of the State reflects the emergence of European nationalism in the nineteenth century (Kemerling, par. 21). Allegedly, Hegel ?emerges as a conservative? (Turner, par. 8), rather than an interpretation of an individual who is in favor of ?sanctioning totalitarianism? (Turner, par. 8), but he disputes that the synopsis of liberty by any definite state is ?morally unacceptable? (Turner, par. 8).
The goal of the ?dialectic cosmic process? (Turner, par. 6) can be elucidated at the height of reason; ?finite reason? (Turner, par. 6) improves in clarification as the Absolute evolves toward full self-awareness. The final phase, when thought of as entirely untainted, ?as the absolute in itself? (Kemerling, par. 22), or the ?Spirit? (Kemerling, par, 22), is merely mankind?s contemplation toward a growing competence the basic union of all veracity (Kemerling, par. 22). To note the manner in which the Absolute instinctively ascends into individual unearthing and extraction, the ?Spirit of the World? (Kemerling, par. 22) can only be seen as ?triad of triads? (Kemerling, par. 22) moving dialectically as three, illustrious planes through which civilization attains its ?transcendental aim? (Kemerling, par. 22). Analysis of humanitarian progression is tacit at three strata: art, which ?grasps the Absolute in material forms, interpreting the rational through sensible forms of beauty; conceptually superseded by religion? (Turner, par. 6); religion, which ?grasps the Absolute by means of images and symbols? (Turner, par. 6). To Hegel, the highest form of religion is Christianity---in this belief, ?the truth that the Absolute manifests itself in the finite is symbolically reflected in incarnation? (Turner, par. 6). The final plane, philosophy is, ?conceptually the supreme because it grasps the Absolute rationally; once this has been achieved, the Absolute has arrived at the full-consciousness, and the cosmic drama reaches its end goal? (Turner, par. 6). At this stretch only does Hegel identify the Absolute with God, being, ?God is God; only in so far as he knows himself? (Turner, par. 6).
Analysis of ?the nature of the Absolute Spirit? (Turner, par. 7) substantially contributes in various philosophical subjects. ?The only Thought,? contemplates Hegel, ?which philosophy brings?to the completion of History is the simple conception of Reason; that Reason is the Sovereign of the world, therefore; presents us with rational process? (Turner, par. 7). His resolution of the world is conclusively historical; he evaluated ?history itself? (Kemerling, par. 26), encompassing an additional ?triad? of ?original/reflective/philosophical history? (Kemerling, par. 26), displays the rising of ?self-consciousness in the Absolute? (Kemerling, par. 26). The World comes to terms with itself through this progression, but since the past imitates the design of ?logical necessity through the dialectical movement? (Kemerling, par. 26), referring to Idea (thesis), Nature (antithesis), and Spirit (synthesis), the current era must be the pinnacle of modernization (Kemerling, par. 26).
The two imperative types of explanation, in retrospect to history, are freedom and reason. As a cogent practice, history is a documentation of the progress of humanitarian independence, for anthropology is a succession from ?less freedom to greater freedom? (Turner, par. 7). Applying the primary ?dynamic? (Kreis, par. 3) standard of ?non-self-contradictory? (Kreis, par. 3) as the Absolute in relation to social history directs toward credible revelation (historicism), but ?bad history? (Kreis, par. 3). Once again, Hegel?s consideration of the intellectual feats of his life---?nationalism, romanticism, Protestantism, and idealism? (Kemerling, par. 26)---as the finale of times gone by, infusing his own philosophies and utmost manifestations are highly reflective of the times (Kemerling, par. 26). Garth Kemerling of the Philosophical Pages dot Com falls under the impression that Hegel shows, ?nineteenth-century optimism at its peak, full of self-confidence in the possibilities of rationality and enlightenment.?
Hegel published his first, philosophical endeavor, The Difference between Fitche?s and Schelling?s System of Philosophy in late 1801, and two years later, edited the Critical Journal of Philosophy with Schelling (Redding, par. 3). After his death, series of notes from Hegel?s lectures, provided mainly by his students notes and Hegel?s own transcripts, received publication. Among these works compiled mainly from Hegel?s classrooms at Berlin, The Philosophy of Fine Art (published 1835-1838; translated in 1920), Lectures on the History of Philosophy (published 1833-1836; translated in 1892-1896), Lectures on the Philosophy of History (published 1837; translated 1858), and Lectures on the History of Religion (published 1832; translated 1895), The Philosophy of Fine Art and Lectures on the History of Religion draw the most attention (Turner, par. 3)
The Philosophy of Fine Arts is historically considered the most appealing of Hegel?s published lectures, despite the fact that the content was not directly prepared by him (Knox, par. 1). The collection was prepared by H.G. Hotho and published in three volumes, but then later interpreted and revised by numerous other, philosophical minds (Knox, par. 3-9). Regardless of the translation, the rigorous accuracy of Hegelian style blatantly appears throughout the texts (Knox, par. 11). In the discussion of Aesthetics, Hegel considers the artistic natures of the ancient civilizations, specifically, the Egyptian, Persian, and Greek cultures into contemporary times. He claims the lectures are about the analysis of Fine Art, the subject matter appeals to the appreciators of art and art history (Knox, par. 1). The historical dialectic theory is revealed through the ?meaning of art? (Knox, par. 2) becoming a noteworthy revelation surpassed into daily life turns to the inability to show the purpose. Hegel concludes that, ?art in the last resort is superfluous? (Knox, par. 2).
?Religion is the loftiest object that can occupy human beings; it is the absolute object,? says Hegel in Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Kim, par. 5). Within this work, Hegel draws the connection between philosophy and theology explaining that one cannot exist without the other. From the Hegelian perspective, theology fails to ?yield any cognitive knowledge of God? (Kim, par. 5), and he claims one can ?know God in essence? (Kim, par. 5). If God is equivalent to ?absolute Spirit? and ?for spirit? is merely the spirit, humanity, which is spirit, cannot yet instantly know the absolute Spirit, who reveals ?God-self to our consciousness? (Kim, par. 5). ?God is revealed immediately in the consciousness of human beings,? says Hegel, stating the ?immediate knowledge? is the alpha to the relationship with God (Kim, par. 5). Through concept and reason, philosophy explores the existence of the Absolute Spirit (or God) as it develops historically, and God can be comprehended only by humanity?s predetermined consciousness and past (Kim, par. 19), however; a couple of problems exist in this lecture. One was Hegel?s effort to categorize global theology as a progressive process, and the other involving his presentation of Christianity upon the dominant seat (Roldan-Figueroa, par. 14).
While residing at the University of Jena, he completed Phenomenology of the Mind (or Spirit) (published 1807; translated in 1910), deemed one his most significant works (Turner, par. 2). Hegel's mission is to redirect a person's inexperienced position toward achieving insight, which is attained solely by expulsion of undeviating self (Jurgen-Eckhardt, par. 15). In this work, there is an apparent link between Kant?s ideas and Hegel?s philosophy, although some may consider Phenomenology of the Mind as a form of ?propaedeutic? instead of a practice of it (Redding, par. 18). The layout of the text has been thought of as an ?educational novel,? which ?shapes consciousness (Redding, par. 18). Revisionists view Phenomenology of the Mind as the ?accession to an argument to justification? (Redding, par. 25).
He concentrates on the evolution of human mentality, via the phases of simple and self-awareness into "reason, spirit, and religion" (Hodges, par. 8) ending with "absolute knowledge" (Hodges, par. 8). Contemporary science accomplishes the realization of the "sense-world" (Hodges, par. 8) surrounding civilization, but this is merely the alpha for Hegelian maturity of "human consciousness" (Hodges, par. 8). Beyond this realm exists a type of knowledge, which links our psyche with the "transcending Absolute Spirit" (Hodges, par. 8). Segregation of traditional standards into prudent sectors and isolation of the "human Geist" (Hodges, par. 8) partitioned from the circumference of expediency demands the analytical application of scientific intuition. The rationale is important to humanity, yet not quite nirvana; attaining monumental essence requires ?human consciousness? (Hodges, par. 8) balanced with expediency.
Amid this progression, our intellect experiences numerous tiers of perception before establishing mystic virginity of oneself as first-hand, recallable information. The state of ?Absolute Reality? molds ?mere consciousness? (Hodges, par. 8) to an advanced, personal enlightenment, to analytical speculation furthering toward a higher relationship the superior truth of theological revelation and its conventional assertions, and finally---one forms a spiritual union with ?Absolute Reality? (Hodges, par. 8)---fundamentally, the words of Jesus, through the beliefs of Christianity (Hodges, par. 8).
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences consists of The Object of Logic (published 1812) and The Subject of Logic (published 1816). Although at Heidelberg, the University of Berlin would change their opinion about Hegel?s radical antics, and later he would take a position among the staff at Berlin (Tameri.com, "Existentialist" par. 29). A year later, the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences in Outline was released in New York, the content drawn mostly from his lecture notes (Hodges, par.10). The work is deemed the ?systematic statement of his entire philosophy,? and in 1959, the massive collection was translated (Turner, par. 2). Supporting this text was the pattern of conflict within humanity?s mind (or spirit) through numerous hardships to gain a ?higher union with God? (Hodges, par. 10). God, also known as the ?Absolute Spirit? lends a hand to the inner battling creature (man) by taking the form of humanity itself, to join us in our fight to defeat the restricted state of our existence. The Absolute Spirit also shares with us the journey toward the last phases of full terms with self-consciousness---?as part of the history of creation? (Hodges, par. 10). Hegel uses the dialectical method to demonstrate the manner in which God created life with pure intentions, but how it is destroyed by human consciousness. The dialectic is what essentially draws them apart and reunites them again on a higher plane of understanding (Hodges, par. 11).
His final, full-length publication, Philosophy of Right (published 1821; translated 1896) (Turner, par. 3), as it is also known, emulates the structure of Phenomenology and Logic in a three-volume work. Here, Hegel highlights the proper ingredients for developing self-consciousness on the social level, outlining the legislative branches in relation to civilians (Redding, par, 43-44). The effects of the economy on the system are noted, and he infused the ideas of Adam Smith in relation to the overall scheme (Redding, par. 45). While society bases itself on rules enforced for the purpose of life?s stability, humans contain independent thoughts and the need to implement this mentality as a show of pride. The ?just society? (Hodges, par. 12) transpires from within the conflict of required, lawful peace seeking to reach the middle ground within the domain of accountable, personal liberty. The synthesis of the two inclinations is not the hazard, but instead, the triumph of one inclination over the other: ?a legal tyranny or anarchy of human willfulness? (Hodges, par. 12).
Hegel died at the height of his glory, Ron Turner referring to him as ?the most prominent philosopher in Germany? whose outlook was ?widely taught? and ?his students were highly regarded? (Turner, par. 9). His followers split into two groups known as ?right-wing? and ?left-wing? Hegelians; right, ?theoretically and politically offered conservative interpretation of his work? (Turner, par. 9). They stressed continuity between Hegel?s philosophy and Christianity, seen as orthodox in politics. The left side of his following ?eventually moved to an atheistic position? (Turner, par. 9). In politics, they were known as ?revolutionaries? (Turner, par. 9), Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx were specifically influenced by ?Hegel?s idea that history moves dialectically, but replaced his philosophical idealism with materialism? (Turner, par. 9).
Seen dominantly throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries were his thoughts on ?metaphysical idealism? (Turner, par. 9), giving the lead to the ideas of British philosopher, Francis Herbert Bradley and the existentialist mind of S?ren Kierkegaard. Some even credit Hegel for the coining of the term, ?phenomenology? (Turner, par. 9), but his most seedy and scandalous influences seem to be upon the Order of the Skull and Bones society at Yale University. The controversial group who supposedly is the ?government within the government? seems to share the affinity for what is referred to as ?constructive chaos? (Sutton, p. 56). Nonetheless, Hegel is remembered for his ?extensive and diverse impact on subsequent philosophical ideas? (Turner, par. 9), and we still see the ?evidence of his remarkable range and extraordinary depth of thought? (Turner, par. 9).

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