BOOK VII

Treatise on Government

by Aristotle

BOOK VII, TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT by Aristotle




CHAPTER I


He who proposes to make that inquiry which is necessary concerning
what government is best, ought first to determine what manner of
living is most eligible; for while this remains uncertain it will also
be equally uncertain what government is best: for, provided no
unexpected accidents interfere, it is highly probable, that those who
enjoy the best government will live the most happily according to
their circumstances; he ought, therefore, first to know what manner of
life is most desirable for all; and afterwards whether this life is
the same to the man and the citizen, or different. As I imagine that I
have already sufficiently shown what sort of life is best in my
popular discourses on that subject, I think I may very properly repeat
the same here; as most certainly no one ever called in question the
propriety of one of the divisions; namely, that as what is good,
relative to man, may be divided into three sorts, what is external,
what appertains to the body, and what to the soul, it is evident that
all these must conspire to make a man happy: for no one would say that
a man was happy who had no fortitude, no temperance, no justice, no
prudence; but was afraid of the flies that flew round him: nor would
abstain from the meanest theft if he was either hungry or dry, or
would murder his dearest friend for a farthing; and also was in every
particular as wanting in his understanding as an infant or an idiot.
These truths are so evident that all must agree to them; though some
may dispute about the quantity and the degree: for they may think,
that a very little virtue is sufficient for happiness; but for riches,
property, power, honour, and all such things, they endeavour to
increase them without bounds: but to such we reply, that it is easy to
prove from what experience teaches us in these cases, that these
external goods produce not virtue, but virtue them. As to a happy
life, whether it is to be found in pleasure or virtue or both, certain
it is, that those whose morals are most pure, and whose understandings
are best cultivated, will enjoy more of it, although their fortune is
but moderate than those do who own an exuberance of wealth, are
deficient in those; and this utility any one who reflects may easily
convince himself of; for whatsoever is external has its boundary, as a
machine, and whatsoever is useful in its excess is either necessarily
hurtful, or at best useless to the possessor; but every good quality
of the soul the higher it is in degree, so much the more useful it is,
if it is permitted on this subject to use the word useful as well as
noble. It is also very evident, that the accidents of each subject
take place of each other, as the subjects themselves, of which we
allow they are accidents, differ from each other in value; so that if
the soul is more noble than any outward possession, as the body, both
in itself and with respect to us, it must be admitted of course that
the best accidents of each must follow the same analogy. Besides, it
is for the sake of the soul that these things are desirable; and it is
on this account that wise men should desire them, not the soul for
them. Let us therefore be well assured, that every one enjoys as much
happiness as he possesses virtue and wisdom, and acts according to
their dictates; since for this we have the example of GOD Himself, WHO
IS COMPLETELY HAPPY, NOT FROM ANY EXTERNAL GOOD; BUT IN HlMSELF, AND
BECAUSE SUCH IS HIS NATURE. For good fortune is something different
from happiness, as every good which depends not on the mind is owing
to chance or fortune; but it is not from fortune that any one is wise
and just: hence it follows, that that city is happiest which is the
best and acts best: for no one can do well who acts not well; nor can
the deeds either of man or city be praiseworthy without virtue and
wisdom; for whatsoever is just, or wise, or prudent in a man, the same
things are just, wise, and prudent in a city.

Thus much by way of introduction; for I could not but just touch upon
this subject, though I could not go through a complete investigation
of it, as it properly belongs to another question: let us at present
suppose so much, that a man's happiest life, both as an individual and
as a citizen, is a life of virtue, accompanied with those enjoyments
which virtue usually procures. If [1324a] there are any who are not
convinced by what I have said, their doubts shall be answered
hereafter, at present we shall proceed according to our intended
method.




CHAPTER II


It now remains for us to say whether the happiness of any individual
man and the city is the same or different: but this also is evident;
for whosoever supposes that riches will make a person happy, must
place the happiness of the city in riches if it possesses them; those
who prefer a life which enjoys a tyrannic power over others will also
think, that the city which has many others under its command is most
happy: thus also if any one approves a man for his virtue, he will
think the most worthy city the happiest: but here there are two
particulars which require consideration, one of which is, whether it
is the most eligible life to be a member of the community and enjoy
the rights of a citizen, or whether to live as a stranger, without
interfering in public affairs; and also what form of government is to
be preferred, and what disposition of the state is best; whether the
whole community should be eligible to a share in the administration,
or only the greater part, and some only: as this, therefore, is a
subject of political examination and speculation, and not what
concerns the individual, and the first of these is what we are at
present engaged in, the one of these I am not obliged to speak to, the
other is the proper business of my present design. It is evident that
government must be the best which is so established, that every one
therein may have it in his power to act virtuously and live happily:
but some, who admit that a life o! virtue is most eligible, still
doubt which is preferable a public life of active virtue, or one
entirely disengaged from what is without and spent in contemplation;
which some say is the only one worthy of a philosopher; and one of
these two different modes of life both now and formerly seem to have
been chosen by all those who were the most virtuous men; I mean the
public or philosophic. And yet it is of no little consequence on which
side the truth lies; for a man of sense must naturally incline to the
better choice; both as an individual and a citizen. Some think that a
tyrannic government over those near us is the greatest injustice; but
that a political one is not unjust: but that still is a restraint on
the pleasures and tranquillity of life. Others hold the quite
contrary opinion, and think that a public and active life is the only
life for man: for that private persons have no opportunity of
practising any one virtue, more than they have who are engaged in
public life the management of the [1324b] state. These are their
sentiments; others say, that a tyrannical and despotical mode of
government is the only happy one; for even amongst some free states
the object of their laws seems to be to tyrannise over their
neighbours: so that the generality of political institutions,
wheresoever dispersed, if they have any one common object in view,
have all of them this, to conquer and govern. It is evident, both from
the laws of the Lacedaemonians and Cretans, as well as by the manner
in which they educated their children, that all which they had in view
was to make them soldiers: besides, among all nations, those who have
power enough and reduce others to servitude are honoured on that
account; as were the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Gauls: with
some there are laws to heighten the virtue of courage; thus they tell
us that at Carthage they allowed every person to wear as many rings
for distinction as he had served campaigns. There was also a law in
Macedonia, that a man who had not himself killed an enemy should be
obliged to wear a halter; among the Scythians, at a festival, none
were permitted to drink out of the cup was carried about who had not
done the same thing. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, they fixed
as many columns upon a man's tomb as he had slain enemies: and among
different nations different things of this sort prevail, some of them
established by law, others by custom. Probably it may seem too absurd
to those who are willing to take this subject into their consideration
to inquire whether it is the business of a legislator to be able to
point out by what means a state may govern and tyrannise over its
neighbours, whether they will, or will not: for how can that belong
either to the politician or legislator which is unlawful? for that
cannot be lawful which is done not only justly, but unjustly also: for
a conquest may be unjustly made. But we see nothing of this in the
arts: for it is the business neither of the physician nor the pilot to
use either persuasion or force, the one to his patients, the other to
his passengers: and yet many seem to think a despotic government is a
political one, and what they would not allow to be just or proper, if
exercised over themselves, they will not blush to exercise over
others; for they endeavour to be wisely governed themselves, but think
it of no consequence whether others are so or not: but a despotic
power is absurd, except only where nature has framed the one party for
dominion, the other for subordination; and therefore no one ought to
assume it over all in general, but those only which are the proper
objects thereof: thus no one should hunt men either for food or
sacrifice, but what is fit for those purposes, and these are wild
animals which are eatable.

Now a city which is well governed might be very [1325a] happy in
itself while it enjoyed a good system of laws, although it should
happen to be so situated as to have no connection with any other
state, though its constitution should not be framed for war or
conquest; for it would then have no occasion for these. It is evident
therefore that the business of war is to be considered as commendable,
not as a final end, but as the means of procuring it. It is the duty
of a good legislator to examine carefully into his state; and the
nature of the people, and how they may partake of every intercourse,
of a good life, and of the happiness which results from it: and in
this respect some laws and customs differ from others. It is also the
duty of a legislator, if he has any neighbouring states to consider in
what manner he shall oppose each of them' or what good offices he
shall show them. But what should be the final end of the best
governments will be considered hereafter.




CHAPTER III


We will now speak to those who, while they agree that a life of virtue
is most eligible, yet differ in the use of it addressing ourselves to
both these parties; for there are some who disapprove of all political
governments, and think that the life of one who is really free is
different from the life of a citizen, and of all others most eligible:
others again think that the citizen is the best; and that it is
impossible for him who does nothing to be well employed; but that
virtuous activity and happiness are the same thing. Now both parties
in some particulars say what is right, in others what is wrong, thus,
that the life of a freeman is better than the life of a slave is true,
for a slave, as a slave, is employed in nothing honourable; for the
common servile employments which he is commanded to perform have
nothing virtuous in them; but, on the other hand, it is not true that
a submission to all sorts of governments is slavery; for the
government of freemen differs not more from the government of slaves
than slavery and freedom differ from each other in their nature; and
how they do has been already mentioned. To prefer doing of nothing to
virtuous activity is also wrong, for happiness consists in action, and
many noble ends are produced by the actions of the just and wise. From
what we have already determined on this subject, some one probably may
think, that supreme power is of all things best, as that will enable a
man to command very many useful services from others; so that he who
can obtain this ought not to give it up to another, but rather to
seize it: and, for this purpose, the father should have no attention
or regard for the son, or the son for the father, or friend for
friend; for what is best is most eligible: but to be a member of the
community and be in felicity is best. What these persons advance might
probably be true, if the supreme good was certainly theirs who plunder
and use violence to others: but it is [1325b] most unlikely that it
should be so; for it is a mere supposition: for it does not follow
that their actions are honourable who thus assume the supreme power
over others, without they were by nature as superior to them as a man
to a woman, a father to a child, a master to a slave: so that he who
so far forsakes the paths of virtue can never return back from whence
he departed from them: for amongst equals whatever is fair and just
ought to be reciprocal; for this is equal and right; but that equals
should not partake of what is equal, or like to like, is contrary to
nature: but whatever is contrary to nature is not right; therefore, if
there is any one superior to the rest of the community in virtue and
abilities for active life, him it is proper to follow, him it is right
to obey, but the one alone will not do, but must be joined to the
other also: and, if we are right in what we have now said, it follows
that happiness consists in virtuous activity, and that both with
respect to the community as well as the individual an active life is
the happiest: not that an active life must necessarily refer to other
persons, as some think, or that those studies alone are practical
which are pursued to teach others what to do; for those are much more
so whose final object is in themselves, and to improve the judgment
and understanding of the man; for virtuous activity has an end,
therefore is something practical; nay, those who contrive the plan
which others follow are more particularly said to act, and are
superior to the workmen who execute their designs. But it is not
necessary that states which choose to have no intercourse with others
should remain inactive; for the several members thereof may have
mutual intercourse with each other; for there are many opportunities
for this among the different citizens; the same thing is true of every
individual: for, was it otherwise, neither could the Deity nor the
universe be perfect; to neither of whom can anything external
separately exist. Hence it is evident that that very same life which
is happy for each individual is happy also for the state and every
member of it.




CHAPTER IV


As I have now finished what was introductory to this subject, and
considered at large the nature of other states, it now remains that I
should first say what ought to be the establishment of a city which
one should form according to one's wish; for no good state can exist
without a moderate proportion of what is necessary. Many things
therefore ought to be forethought of as desirable, but none of them
such as are impossible: I mean relative to the number of citizens and
the extent of the territory: for as other artificers, such as the
weaver and the shipwright, ought to have such materials as are fit for
their work, since so much the better they are, by so much [1326a]
superior will the work itself necessarily be; so also ought the
legislator and politician endeavour to procure proper materials for
the business they have in hand. Now the first and principal instrument
of the politician is the number of the people; he should therefore
know how many, and what they naturally ought to be: in like manner the
country, how large, and what it is. Most persons think that it is
necessary for a city to be large to be happy: but, should this be
true, they cannot tell what is a large one and what a small one; for
according to the multitude of the inhabitants they estimate the
greatness of it; but they ought rather to consider its strength than
its numbers; for a state has a certain object in view, and from the
power which it has in itself of accomplishing it, its greatness ought
to be estimated; as a person might say, that Hippocrates was a greater
physician, though not a greater man, than one that exceeded him in the
size of his body: but if it was proper to determine the strength of
the city from the number of the inhabitants, it should never be
collected from the multitude in general who may happen to be in it;
for in a city there must necessarily be many slaves, sojourners, and
foreigners; but from those who are really part of the city and
properly constitute its members; a multitude of these is indeed a
proof of a large city, but in a state where a large number of
mechanics inhabit, and but few soldiers, such a state cannot be great;
for the greatness of the city, and the number of men in it, are not
the same thing. This too is evident from fact, that it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to govern properly a very numerous body
of men; for of all the states which appear well governed we find not
one where the rights of a citizen are open to an indiscriminate
multitude. And this is also evident from the nature of the thing; for
as law is a certain order, so good law is of course a certain good
order: but too large a multitude are incapable of this, unless under
the government of that DIVINE POWER which comprehends the universe.
Not but that, as quantity and variety are usually essential to beauty,
the perfection of a city consists in the largeness of it as far as
that largeness is consistent with that order already mentioned: but
still there is a determinate size to all cities, as well as everything
else, whether animals, plants, or machines, for each of these, if they
are neither too little nor too big, have their proper powers; but when
they have not their due growth, or are badly constructed, as a ship a
span long is not properly a ship, nor one of two furlongs length, but
when it is of a fit size; for either from its smallness or from its
largeness it may be quite useless: so is it with a city; one that is
too small has not [1326b] in itself the power of self-defence, but
this is essential to a city: one that is too large is capable of
self-defence in what is necessary; but then it is a nation and not a
city: for it will be very difficult to accommodate a form of
government to it: for who would choose to be the general of such an
unwieldy multitude, or who could be their herald but a stentor? The
first thing therefore necessary is, that a city should consist of such
numbers as will be sufficient to enable the inhabitants to live
happily in their political community: and it follows, that the more
the inhabitants exceed that necessary number the greater will the city
be: but this must not be, as we have already said, without bounds; but
what is its proper limit experience will easily show, and this
experience is to be collected from the actions both of the governors
and the governed. Now, as it belongs to the first to direct the
inferior magistrates and to act as judges, it follows that they can
neither determine causes with justice nor issue their orders with
propriety without they know the characters of their fellow-citizens:
so that whenever this happens not to be done in these two particulars,
the state must of necessity be badly managed; for in both of them it
is not right to determine too hastily and without proper knowledge,
which must evidently be the case where the number of the citizens is
too many: besides, it is more easy for strangers and sojourners to
assume the rights of citizens, as they will easily escape detection in
so great a multitude. It is evident, then, that the best boundary for
a city is that wherein the numbers are the greatest possible, that
they may be the better able to be sufficient in themselves, while at
the same time they are not too large to be under the eye and
government of the magistrates. And thus let us determine the extent of
a city.




CHAPTER V


What we have said concerning a city may nearly be applied to a
country; for as to what soil it should be, every one evidently will
commend it if it is such as is sufficient in itself to furnish what
will make the inhabitants happy; for which purpose it must be able to
supply them with all the necessaries of life; for it is the having
these in plenty, without any want, which makes them content. As to its
extent, it should be such as may enable the inhabitants to live at
their ease with freedom and temperance. Whether we have done right or
wrong in fixing this limit to the territory shall be considered more
minutely hereafter, when we come particularly to inquire into
property, and what fortune is requisite for a man to live on, and how
and in what manner they ought to employ it; for there are many doubts
upon this question, while each party insists upon their own plan of
life being carried to an excess, the one of severity, the other of
indulgence. What the situation of the country should be it is not
difficult to determine, in some particulars respecting that we ought
to be advised by those who are skilful in military affairs. It should
be difficult of access to an enemy, but easy to the inhabitants: and
as we said, that the number of [1327a] inhabitants ought to be such as
can come under the eye of the magistrate, so should it be with the
country; for then it is easily defended. As to the position of the
city, if one could place it to one's wish, it is convenient to fix it
on the seaside: with respect to the country, one situation which it
ought to have has been already mentioned, namely, that it should be so
placed as easily to give assistance to all places, and also to receive
the necessaries of life from all parts, and also wood, or any other
materials which may happen to be in the country.




CHAPTER VI


But with respect to placing a city in the neighbourhood of the sea,
there are some who have many doubts whether it is serviceable or
hurtful to a well-regulated state; for they say, that the resort of
persons brought up under a different system of government is
disserviceable to the state, as well by impeding the laws as by their
numbers; for a multitude of merchants must necessarily arise from
their trafficking backward and forward upon the seas, which will
hinder the well-governing of the city: but if this inconvenience
should not arise, it is evident that it is better, both on account of
safety and also for the easier acquisition of the necessaries of life,
that both the city and the country should be near the sea; for it is
necessary that those who are to sustain the attack of the enemy should
be ready with their assistance both by land and by sea, and to oppose
any inroad, both ways if possible but if not, at least where they are
most powerful, which they may do while they possess both. A maritime
situation is also useful for receiving from others what your own
country will not produce, and exporting those necessaries of your own
growth which are more than you have occasion for; but a city ought to
traffic to supply its own wants, and not the wants of others; for
those who themselves furnish an open market for every one, do it for
the sake of gain; which it is not proper for a well-established state
to do, neither should they encourage such a commerce. Now, as we see
that many places and cities have docks and harbours lying very
convenient for the city, while those who frequent them have no
communication with the citadel, and yet they are not too far off, but
are surrounded by walls and such-like fortifications, it is evident,
that if any good arises from such an intercourse the city will receive
it, but if anything hurtful, it will be easy to restrain it by a law
declaring and deputing whom the state will allow to have an
intercourse with each other, and whom not. As to a naval power, it is
by no means doubtful that it is necessary to have one to a certain
degree; and this not only for the sake of the [1327b] city itself, but
also because it may be necessary to appear formidable to some of the
neighbouring states, or to be able to assist them as well by sea as by
land; but to know how great that force should be, the health of the
state should be inquired into, and if that appears vigorous and
enables her to take the lead of other communities, it is necessary
that her force should correspond with her actions. As for that
multitude of people which a maritime power creates, they are by no
means necessary to a state, nor ought they to make a part of the
citizens; for the mariners and infantry, who have the command, are
freemen, and upon these depends a naval engagement: but when there are
many servants and husbandmen, there they will always have a number of
sailors, as we now see happens to some states, as in Heraclea, where
they man many triremes, though the extent of their city is much
inferior to some others. And thus we determine concerning the country,
the port, the city, the sea, and a maritime power: as to the number of
the citizens, what that ought to be we have already said.




CHAPTER VII


We now proceed to point out what natural disposition the members of
the community ought to be of: but this any one will easily perceive
who will cast his eye over the states of Greece, of all others the
most celebrated, and also the other different nations of this
habitable world. Those who live in cold countries, as the north of
Europe, are full of courage, but wanting in understanding and the
arts: therefore they are very tenacious of their liberty; but, not
being politicians, they cannot reduce their neighbours under their
power: but the Asiatics, whose understandings are quick, and who are
conversant in the arts, are deficient in courage; and therefore are
always conquered and the slaves of others: but the Grecians, placed as
it were between these two boundaries, so partake of them both as to be
at the same time both courageous and sensible; for which reason Greece
continues free, and governed in the best manner possible, and capable
of commanding the whole world, could they agree upon one system of
policy. Now this is the difference between the Grecians and other
nations, that the latter have but one of these qualities, whereas in
the former they are both happily blended together. Hence it is
evident, that those persons ought to be both sensible and courageous
who will readily obey a legislator, the object of whose laws is
virtue.-As to what some persons say, that the military must be mild
and tender to those they know, but severe and cruel to those they know
not, it is courage which [1328a] makes any one lovely; for that is the
faculty of the soul which we most admire: as a proof of this, our
resentment rises higher against our friends and acquaintance than
against those we know not: for which reason Archilaus accusing his
friends says very properly to himself, Shall my friends insult me? The
spirit of freedom and command also is what all inherit who are of this
disposition for courage is commanding and invincible. It also is not
right for any one to say, that you should be severe to those you know
not; for this behaviour is proper for no one: nor are those who are of
a noble disposition harsh in their manners, excepting only to the
wicked; and when they are particularly so, it is, as has been already
said, against their friends, when they think they have injured them;
which is agreeable to reason: for when those who think they ought to
receive a favour from any one do not receive it, beside the injury
done them, they consider what they are deprived of: hence the saying,
"Cruel are the wars of brothers;" and this, "Those who have greatly
loved do greatly hate." And thus we have nearly determined how many
the inhabitants of a city ought to be, and what their natural
disposition, and also the country how large, and of what sort is
necessary; I say nearly, because it is needless to endeavour at as
great accuracy in those things which are the objects of the senses as
in those which are inquired into by the understanding only.




CHAPTER VIII


As in natural bodies those things are not admitted to be parts of them
without which the whole would not exist, so also it is evident that in
a political state everything that is necessary thereunto is not to be
considered as a part of it, nor any other community from whence one
whole is made; for one thing ought to be common and the same to the
community, whether they partake of it equally or unequally, as, for
instance, food, land, or the like; but when one thing is for the
benefit of one person, and another for the benefit of another, in this
there is nothing like a community, excepting that one makes it and the
other uses it; as, for instance, between any instrument employed in
making any work, and the workmen, as there is nothing common between
the house and the builder, but the art of the builder is employed on
the house. Thus property is necessary for states, but property is no
part of the state, though many species of it have life; but a city is
a community of equals, for the purpose of enjoying the best life
possible: but the happiest life is the best which consists in the
perfect practice of virtuous energies: as therefore some persons have
great, others little or no opportunity of being employed in these, it
is evident that this is the cause of the difference there is between
the different cities and communities there are to be found; for while
each of these endeavour to acquire what is best by various and
different means, they give [1328b] rise to different modes of living
and different forms of government. We are now to consider what those
things are without which a city cannot possibly exist; for what we
call parts of the city must of necessity inhere in it: and this we
shall plainly understand, if we know the number of things necessary to
a city: first, the inhabitants must have food: secondly, arts, for
many instruments are necessary in life: thirdly, arms, for it is
necessary that the community should have an armed force within
themselves, both to support their government against those of their
own body who might refuse obedience to it, and also to defend it from
those who might attempt to attack it from without: fourthly, a certain
revenue, as well for the internal necessities of the state as for the
business of war: fifthly, which is indeed the chief concern, a
religious establishment: sixthly in order, but first of all in
necessity, a court to determine both criminal and civil causes. These
things are absolutely necessary, so to speak, in every state; for a
city is a number of people not accidentally met together, but with a
purpose of ensuring to themselves sufficient independency and
self-protection; and if anything necessary for these purposes is
wanting, it is impossible that in such a situation these ends can be
obtained. It is necessary therefore that a city should be capable of
acquiring all these things: for this purpose a proper number of
husbandmen are necessary to procure food, also artificers and
soldiers, and rich men, and priests and judges, to determine what is
right and proper.




CHAPTER IX


Having determined thus far, it remains that we consider whether all
these different employments shall be open to all; for it is possible
to continue the same persons always husbandmen, artificers, judges, or
counsellors; or shall we appoint different persons to each of those
employments which we have already mentioned; or shall some of them be
appropriated to particulars, and others of course common to all? but
this does not take place in every state, for, as we have already said,
it is possible that all may be common to all, or not, but only common
to some; and this is the difference between one government and
another: for in democracies the whole community partakes of
everything, but in oligarchies it is different.

Since we are inquiring what is the best government possible, and it is
admitted to be that in which the citizens are happy; and that, as we
have already said, it is impossible to obtain happiness without
virtue; it follows, that in the best-governed states, where the
citizens are really men of intrinsic and not relative goodness, none
of them should be permitted to exercise any mechanic employment or
follow merchandise, as being ignoble and destructive to virtue;
neither should they be husband-[1329a] men, that they may be at
leisure to improve in virtue and perform the duty they owe to the
state. With respect to the employments of a soldier, a senator, and a
judge, which are evidently necessary to the community, shall they be
allotted to different persons, or shall the same person execute both?
This question, too, is easily answered: for in some cases the same
persons may execute them, in others they should be different, where
the different employments require different abilities, as when courage
is wanting for one, judgment for the other, there they should be
allotted to different persons; but when it is evident, that it is
impossible to oblige those who have arms in their hands, and can
insist on their own terms, to be always under command; there these
different employments should be trusted to one person; for those who
have arms in their hands have it in their option whether they will or
will not assume the supreme power: to these two (namely, those who
have courage and judgment) the government must be entrusted; but not
in the same manner, but as nature directs; what requires courage to
the young, what requires judgment to the old; for with the young is
courage, with the old is wisdom: thus each will be allotted the part
they are fit for according to their different merits. It is also
necessary that the landed property should belong to these men; for it
is necessary that the citizens should be rich, and these are the men
proper for citizens; for no mechanic ought to be admitted to the
rights of a citizen, nor any other sort of people whose employment is
not entirely noble, honourable, and virtuous; this is evident from the
principle we at first set out with; for to be happy it is necessary to
be virtuous; and no one should say that a city is happy while he
considers only one part of its citizens, but for that purpose he ought
to examine into all of them. It is evident, therefore, that the landed
property should belong to these, though it may be necessary for them
to have husbandmen, either slaves, barbarians, or servants. There
remains of the different classes of the people whom we have
enumerated, the priests, for these evidently compose a rank by
themselves; for neither are they to be reckoned amongst the husbandmen
nor the mechanics; for reverence to the gods is highly becoming every
state: and since the citizens have been divided into orders, the
military and the council, and it is proper to offer due worship to the
gods, and since it is necessary that those who are employed in their
service should have nothing else to do, let the business of the
priesthood be allotted to those who are in years. We have now shown
what is necessary to the existence of a city, and of what parts it
consists, and that husbandmen, mechanic, and mercenary servants are
necessary to a city; but that the parts of it are soldiers and
sailors, and that these are always different from those, but from each
other only occasionally.




CHAPTER X


It seems neither now nor very lately to have been known [1329b] to
those philosophers who have made politics their study, that a city
ought to be divided by families into different orders of men; and that
the husbandmen and soldiers should be kept separate from each other;
which custom is even to this day preserved in Egypt and in Crete; also
Sesostris having founded it in Egypt, Minos in Crete. Common meals
seem also to have been an ancient regulation, and to have been
established in Crete during the reign of Minos, and in a still more
remote period in Italy; for those who are the best judges in that
country say that one Italus being king of AEnotria., from whom the
people, changing their names, were called Italians instead of
AEnotrians, and that part of Europe was called Italy which is bounded
by the Scylletic Gulf on the one side and the Lametic on the other,
the distance between which is about half a day's journey. This Italus,
they relate, made the AEnotrians, who were formerly shepherds,
husbandmen, and gave them different laws from what they had before,
and to have been the first who established common meals, for which
reason some of his descendants still use them, and observe some of his
laws. The Opici inhabit that part which lies towards the Tyrrhenian
Sea, who both now are and formerly were called Ausonians. The Chones
inhabited the part toward Iapigia and the Ionian Sea which is called
Syrtis. These Chones were descended from the AEnotrians. Hence arose
the custom of common meals, but the separation of the citizens into
different families from Egypt: for the reign of Sesostris is of much
higher antiquity than that of Minos. As we ought to think that most
other things were found out in a long, nay, even in a boundless time
(reason teaching us that want would make us first invent that which
was necessary, and, when that was obtained, then those things which
were requisite for the conveniences and ornament of life), so should
we conclude the same with respect to a political state; now everything
in Egypt bears the marks of the most remote antiquity, for these
people seem to be the most ancient of all others, and to have acquired
laws and political order; we should therefore make a proper use of
what is told us of them, and endeavour to find out what they have
omitted. We have already said, that the landed property ought to
belong to the military and those who partake of the government of the
state; and that therefore the husbandmen should be a separate order of
people; and how large and of what nature the country ought to be: we
will first treat of the division of the land, and of the husbandmen,
how many and of what sort they ought to be; since we by no means hold
that property ought to be common, as some persons have said, only thus
far, in friendship, it [1330a] should be their custom to let no
citizen want subsistence. As to common meals, it is in general agreed
that they are proper in well-regulated cities; my reasons for
approving of them shall be mentioned hereafter: they are what all the:
citizens ought to partake of; but it will not be easy for the poor,
out of what is their own, to furnish as much as they are ordered to
do, and supply their own house besides. The expense also of religious
worship should be defrayed by the whole state. Of necessity therefore
the land ought to be divided into two parts, one of which should
belong to the community in general, the other to the individuals
separately; and each of these parts should again be subdivided into
two: half of that which belongs to the public should be appropriated
to maintain the worship of the gods, the other half to support the
common meals. Half of that which belongs to the individuals should be
at the extremity of the country, the other half near the city, so that
these two portions being allotted to each person, all would partake of
land in both places, which would be both equal and right; and induce
them to act in concert with greater harmony in any war with their
neighbours: for when the land is not divided in this manner, one party
neglects the inroads of the enemy on the borders, the other makes it a
matter of too much consequence and more than is necessary; for which
reason in some places there is a law which forbids the inhabitants of
the borders to have any vote in the council when they are debating
upon a war which is made against them as their private interest might
prevent their voting impartially. Thus therefore the country ought to
be divided and for the reasons before mentioned. Could one have one's
choice, the husbandmen should by all means be slaves, not of the same
nation, or men of any spirit; for thus they would be laborious in
their business, and safe from attempting any novelties: next to these
barbarian servants are to be preferred, similar in natural disposition
to these we have already mentioned. Of these, let those who are to
cultivate the private property of the individual belong to that
individual, and those who are to cultivate the public territory belong
to the public. In what manner these slaves ought to be used, and for
what reason it is very proper that they should have the promise of
their liberty made them, as a reward for their services, shall be
mentioned hereafter.




CHAPTER XI


We have already mentioned, that both the city and all the country
should communicate both with the sea and the continent as much as
possible. There are these four things which we should be particularly
desirous of in the position of the city with respect to itself: in the
first place, health is to be consulted as the first thing necessary:
now a city which fronts the east and receives the winds which blow
from thence is esteemed most healthful; next to this that which has a
northern position is to be preferred, as best in winter. It should
next be contrived that it may have a proper situation for the business
of government and for defence in war: that in war the citizens may
[1330b] have easy access to it; but that it may be difficult of access
to, and hardly to be taken by, the enemy. In the next place
particularly, that there may be plenty of water, and rivers near at
hand: but if those cannot be found, very large cisterns must be
prepared to save rain-water, so that there may be no want of it in
case they should be driven into the town in time of war. And as great
care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, the first thing
to be attended to is, that the city should have a good situation and a
good position; the second is, that they may have good water to drink;
and this not be negligently taken care of; for what we chiefly and
most frequently use for the support of the body must principally
influence the health of it; and this influence is what the air and
water naturally have: for which reason in all wise governments the
waters ought to be appropriated to different purposes, and if they are
not equally good, and if there is not a plenty of necessary water,
that which is to drink should be separated from that which is for
other uses. As to fortified places, what is proper for some
governments is not proper for all; as, for instance, a lofty citadel
is proper for a monarchy and an oligarchy; a city built upon a plain
suits a democracy; neither of these for an aristocracy, but rather
many strong places. As to the form of private houses, those are
thought to be best and most useful for their different purposes which
are distinct and separate from each other, and built in the modern
manner, after the plan of Hippodamus: but for safety in time of war,
on the contrary, they should be built as they formerly were; for they
were such that strangers could not easily find their way out of them,
and the method of access to them such as an enemy could with
difficulty find out if he proposed to besiege them. A city therefore
should have both these sorts of buildings, which may easily be
contrived if any one will so regulate them as the planters do their
rows of vines; not that the buildings throughout the city should be
detached from each other, only in some parts of it; thus elegance and
safety will be equally consulted. With respect to walls, those who say
that a courageous people ought not to have any, pay too much respect
to obsolete notions; particularly as we may see those who pride
themselves therein continually confuted by facts. It is indeed
disreputable for those who are equal, or nearly so, to the enemy, to
endeavour to take refuge within their walls--but since it very often
happens, that those who make the attack are too powerful for the
bravery and courage of those few who oppose them to resist, if you
would not suffer the calamities of war and the insolence of the enemy,
it must be thought the part of a good soldier to seek for safety under
the shelter and protection of walls more especially since so many
missile weapons and machines have been most ingeniously invented to
besiege cities with. Indeed to neglect surrounding a city with a wall
would be similar to choosing a country which is easy of access to an
enemy, or levelling the eminences of it; or as if an individual should
not have a wall to his house lest it should be thought that the owner
of it was a coward: nor should this be left unconsidered, that those
who have a city surrounded with walls may act both ways, either as if
it had or as if it had not; but where it has not they cannot do this.
If this is true, it is not only necessary to have walls, but care must
be taken that they may be a proper ornament to the city, as well as a
defence in time of war; not only according to the old methods, but the
modern improvements also: for as those who make offensive war
endeavour by every way possible to gain advantages over their
adversaries, so should those who are upon the defensive employ all the
means already known, and such new ones as philosophy can invent, to
defend themselves: for those who are well prepared are seldom first
attacked.




CHAPTER XII


As the citizens in general are to eat at public tables in certain
companies, and it is necessary that the walls should have bulwarks and
towers in proper places and at proper distances, it is evident that it
will be very necessary to have some of these in the towers; let the
buildings for this purpose be made the ornaments of the walls. As to
temples for public worship, and the hall for the public tables of the
chief magistrates, they ought to be built in proper places, and
contiguous to each other, except those temples which the law or the
oracle orders to be separate from all other buildings; and let these
be in such a conspicuous eminence, that they may have every advantage
of situation, and in the neighbourhood of that part of the city which
is best fortified. Adjoining to this place there ought to be a large
square, like that which they call in Thessaly The Square of Freedom,
in which nothing is permitted to be bought or sold; into which no
mechanic nor husbandman, nor any such person, should be permitted to
enter, unless commanded by the magistrates. It will also be an
ornament to this place if the gymnastic exercises of the elders are
performed in it. It is also proper, that for performing these
exercises the citizens should be divided into distinct classes,
according to their ages, and that the young persons should have proper
officers to be with them, and that the seniors should be with the
magistrates; for having them before their eyes would greatly inspire
true modesty and ingenuous fear. There ought to be another square
[1331b] separate from this for buying and selling, which should be so
situated as to be commodious for the reception of goods both by sea
and land. As the citizens may be divided into magistrates and priests,
it is proper that the public tables of the priests should be in
buildings near the temples. Those of the magistrates who preside over
contracts, indictments, and such-like, and also over the markets, and
the public streets near the square, or some public way, I mean the
square where things are bought and sold; for I intended the other for
those who are at leisure, and this for necessary business. The same
order which I have directed here should be observed also in the
country; for there also their magistrates such as the surveyors of the
woods and overseers of the grounds, must necessarily have their common
tables and their towers, for the purpose of protection against an
enemy. There ought also to be temples erected at proper places, both
to the gods and the heroes; but it is unnecessary to dwell longer and
most minutely on these particulars--for it is by no means difficult to
plan these things, it is rather so to carry them into execution; for
the theory is the child of our wishes, but the practical part must
depend upon fortune; for which reason we shall decline saying anything
farther upon these subjects.




CHAPTER XIII


We will now show of what numbers and of what sort of people a
government ought to consist, that the state may be happy and well
administered. As there are two particulars on which the excellence and
perfection of everything depend, one of these is, that the object and
end proposed should be proper; the other, that the means to accomplish
it should be adapted to that purpose; for it may happen that these may
either agree or disagree with each other; for the end we propose may
be good, but in taking the means to obtain it we may err; at other
times we may have the right and proper means in our power, but the end
may be bad, and sometimes we may mistake in both; as in the art of
medicine the physician does not sometimes know in what situation the
body ought to be, to be healthy; nor what to do to procure the end he
aims at. In every art and science, therefore, we should be master of
this knowledge, namely, the proper end, and the means to obtain it.
Now it is evident that all persons are desirous to live well and be
happy; but that some have the means thereof in their own power, others
not; and this either through nature [1332a] or fortune; for many
ingredients are necessary to a happy life; but fewer to those who are
of a good than to those who are of a bad disposition. There are others
who continually have the means of happiness in their own power, but do
not rightly apply them. Since we propose to inquire what government is
best, namely, that by which a state may be best administered, and that
state is best administered where the people are the happiest, it is
evident that happiness is a thing we should not be unacquainted with.
Now, I have already said in my treatise on Morals (if I may here make
any use of what I have there shown), that happiness consists in the
energy and perfect practice of virtue; and this not relatively, but
simply; I mean by relatively, what is necessary in some certain
circumstances; by simply, what is good and fair in itself: of the
first sort are just punishments, and restraints in a just cause; for
they arise from virtue and are necessary, and on that account are
virtuous; though it is more desirable that neither any state nor any
individual should stand in need of them; but those actions which are
intended either to procure honour or wealth are simply good; the
others eligible only to remove an evil; these, on the contrary, are
the foundation and means of relative good. A worthy man indeed will
bear poverty, disease, and other unfortunate accidents with a noble
mind; but happiness consists in the contrary to these (now we have
already determined in our treatise on Morals, that he is a man of
worth who considers what is good because it is virtuous as what is
simply good; it is evident, therefore, that all the actions of such a
one must be worthy and simply good): this has led some persons to
conclude, that the cause of happiness was external goods; which would
be as if any one should suppose that the playing well upon the lyre
was owing to the instrument, and not to the art. It necessarily
follows from what has been said, that some things should be ready at
hand and others procured by the legislator; for which reason in
founding a city we earnestly wish that there may be plenty of those
things which are supposed to be under the dominion of fortune (for
some things we admit her to be mistress over); but for a state to be
worthy and great is not only the work of fortune but of knowledge and
judgment also. But for a state to be worthy it is necessary that those
citizens which are in the administration should be worthy also; but as
in our city every citizen is to be so, we must consider how this may
be accomplished; for if this is what every one could be, and not some
individuals only, it would be more desirable; for then it would
follow, that what might be done by one might be done by all. Men are
worthy and good three ways; by nature, by custom, by reason. In the
first place, a man ought to be born a man, and not any other animal;
that is to say, he ought to have both a body and soul; but it avails
not to be only born [1332b] with some things, for custom makes great
alterations; for there are some things in nature capable of alteration
either way which are fixed by custom, either for the better or the
worse. Now, other animals live chiefly a life of nature; and in very
few things according to custom; but man lives according to reason
also, which he alone is endowed with; wherefore he ought to make all
these accord with each other; for if men followed reason, and were
persuaded that it was best to obey her, they would act in many
respects contrary to nature and custom. What men ought naturally to
be, to make good members of a community, I have already determined;
the rest of this discourse therefore shall be upon education; for some
things are acquired by habit, others by hearing them.




CHAPTER XIV


As every political community consists of those who govern and of those
who are governed, let us consider whether during the continuance of
their lives they ought to be the same persons or different; for it is
evident that the mode of education should be adapted to this
distinction. Now, if one man differed from another as much, as we
believe, the gods and heroes differ from men: in the first place,
being far their superiors in body; and, secondly, in the soul: so that
the superiority of the governors over the governed might be evident
beyond a doubt, it is certain that it would be better for the one
always to govern, the other always to be governed: but, as this is not
easy to obtain, and kings are not so superior to those they govern as
Scylax informs us they are in India, it is evident that for many
reasons it is necessary that all in their turns should both govern and
be governed: for it is just that those who are equal should have
everything alike; and it is difficult for a state to continue which is
founded in injustice; for all those in the country who are desirous of
innovation will apply themselves to those who are under the government
of the rest, and such will be their numbers in the state, that it will
be impossible for the magistrates to get the better of them. But that
the governors ought to excel the governed is beyond a doubt; the
legislator therefore ought to consider how this shall be, and how it
may be contrived that all shall have their equal share in the
administration. Now, with respect to this it will be first said, that
nature herself has directed us in our choice, laying down the selfsame
thing when she has made some young, others old: the first of whom it
becomes to obey, the latter to command; for no one when he is young is
offended at his being under government, or thinks himself too good for
it; more especially when he considers that he himself shall receive
the same honours which he pays when he shall arrive at a proper age.
In some respects it must be acknowledged that the governors and the
governed are the same, in others they are different; it is therefore
necessary that their education should be in [1333a] some respect the
same, in others different: as they say, that he will be a good
governor who has first learnt to obey. Now of governments, as we have
already said, some are instituted for the sake of him who commands;
others for him who obeys: of the first sort is that of the master over
the servant; of the latter, that of freemen over each other. Now some
things which are commanded differ from others; not in the business,
but in the end proposed thereby: for which reason many works, even of
a servile nature, are not disgraceful for young freemen to perform;
for many things which are ordered to be done are not honourable or
dishonourable so much in their own nature as in the end which is
proposed, and the reason for which they are undertaken. Since then we
have determined, that the virtue of a good citizen and good governor
is the same as of a good man; and that every one before he commands
should have first obeyed, it is the business of the legislator to
consider how his citizens may be good men, what education is necessary
to that purpose, and what is the final object of a good life. The soul
of man may be divided into two parts; that which has reason in itself,
and that which hath not, but is capable of obeying its dictates: and
according to the virtues of these two parts a man is said to be good:
but of those virtues which are the ends, it will not be difficult for
those to determine who adopt the division I have already given; for
the inferior is always for the sake of the superior; and this is
equally evident both in the works of art as well as in those of
nature; but that is superior which has reason. Reason itself also is
divided into two parts, in the manner we usually divide it; the
theoretic and the practical; which division therefore seems necessary
for this part also: the same analogy holds good with respect to
actions; of which those which are of a superior nature ought always to
be chosen by those who have it in their power; for that is always most
eligible to every one which will procure the best ends. Now life is
divided into labour and rest, war and peace; and of what we do the
objects are partly necessary and useful, partly noble: and we should
give the same preference to these that we do to the different parts of
the soul and its actions, as war to procure peace; labour, rest; and
the useful, the noble. The politician, therefore, who composes a body
of laws ought to extend his views to everything; the different parts
of the soul and their actions; more particularly to those things which
are of a superior nature and ends; and, in the same manner, to the
lives of men and their different actions.

They ought to be fitted both for labour and war, but rather [1333b]
for rest and peace; and also to do what is necessary and useful, but
rather what is fair and noble. It is to those objects that the
education of the children ought to tend, and of all the youths who
want instruction. All the Grecian states which now seem best governed,
and the legislators who founded those states, appear not to have
framed their polity with a view to the best end, or to every virtue,
in their laws and education; but eagerly to have attended to what is
useful and productive of gain: and nearly of the same opinion with
these are some persons who have written lately, who, by praising the
Lacedaemonian state, show they approve of the intention of the
legislator in making war and victory the end of his government. But
how contrary to reason this is, is easily proved by argument, and has
already been proved by facts (but as the generality of men desire to
have an extensive command, that they may have everything desirable in
the greater abundance; so Thibron and others who have written on that
state seem to approve of their legislator for having procured them an
extensive command by continually enuring them to all sorts of dangers
and hardships): for it is evident, since the Lacedemonians have now no
hope that the supreme power will be in their own hand, that neither
are they happy nor was their legislator wise. This also is ridiculous,
that while they preserved an obedience to their laws, and no one
opposed their being governed by them, they lost the means of being
honourable: but these people understand not rightly what sort of
government it is which ought to reflect honour on the legislator; for
a government of freemen is nobler than despotic power, and more
consonant to virtue. Moreover, neither should a city be thought happy,
nor should a legislator be commended, because he has so trained the
people as to conquer their neighbours; for in this there is a great
inconvenience: since it is evident that upon this principle every
citizen who can will endeavour to procure the supreme power in his own
city; which crime the Lacedaemonians accuse Pausanias of, though he
enjoyed such great honours.

Such reasoning and such laws are neither political, useful nor true:
but a legislator ought to instil those laws on the minds of men which
are most useful for them, both in their public and private capacities.
The rendering a people fit for war, that they may enslave their
inferiors ought not to be the care of the legislator; but that they
may not themselves be reduced to slavery by others. In [1334a] the
next place, he should take care that the object of his government is
the safety of those who are under it, and not a despotism over all: in
the third place, that those only are slaves who are fit to be only so.
Reason indeed concurs with experience in showing that all the
attention which the legislator pays to the business of war, and all
other rules which he lays down, should have for their object rest and
peace; since most of those states (which we usually see) are preserved
by war; but, after they have acquired a supreme power over those
around them, are ruined; for during peace, like a sword, they lose
their brightness: the fault of which lies in the legislator, who never
taught them how to be at rest.




CHAPTER XV


As there is one end common to a man both as an individual and a
citizen, it is evident that a good man and a good citizen must have
the same object in view; it is evident that all the virtues which lead
to rest are necessary; for, as we have often said, the end of war is
peace, of labour, rest; but those virtues whose object is rest, and
those also whose object is labour, are necessary for a liberal life
and rest; for we want a supply of many necessary things that we may be
at rest. A city therefore ought to be temperate, brave, and patient;
for, according to the proverb, "Rest is not for slaves;" but those who
cannot bravely face danger are the slaves of those who attack them.
Bravery, therefore, and patience are necessary for labour, philosophy
for rest, and temperance and justice in both; but these chiefly in
time of peace and rest; for war obliges men to be just and temperate;
but the enjoyment of pleasure, with the rest of peace, is more apt to
produce insolence; those indeed who are easy in their circumstances,
and enjoy everything that can make them happy, have great occasion for
the virtues of temperance and justice. Thus if there are, as the poets
tell us, any inhabitants in the happy isles, to these a higher degree
of philosophy, temperance, and justice will be necessary, as they live
at their ease in the full plenty of every sensual pleasure. It is
evident, therefore, that these virtues are necessary in every state
that would be happy or worthy; for he who is worthless can never enjoy
real good, much less is he qualified to be at rest; but can appear
good only by labour and being at war, but in peace and at rest the
meanest of creatures. For which reason virtue should not be cultivated
as the Lacedaemonians did; for they did not differ from others in
their opinion concerning the supreme good, but in [1334b] imagining
this good was to be procured by a particular virtue; but since there
are greater goods than those of war, it is evident that the enjoyment
of those which are valuable in themselves should be desired, rather
than those virtues which are useful in war; but how and by what means
this is to be acquired is now to be considered. We have already
assigned three causes on which it will depend; nature, custom, and
reason, arid shown what sort of men nature must produce for this
purpose; it remains then that we determine which we shall first begin
by in education, reason or custom, for these ought always to preserve
the most entire harmony with each other; for it may happen that reason
may err from the end proposed, and be corrected by custom. In the
first place, it is evident that in this as in other things, its
beginning or production arises from some principle, and its end also
arises from another principle, which is itself an end. Now, with us,
reason and intelligence are the end of nature; our production,
therefore, and our manners ought to be accommodated to both these. In
the next place, as the soul and the body are two distinct things, so
also we see that the soul is divided into two parts, the reasoning and
not-reasoning, with their habits which are two in number, one
belonging to each, namely appetite and intelligence; and as the body
is in production before the soul, so is the not-reasoning part of the
soul before the reasoning; and this is evident; for anger, will and
desire are to be seen in children nearly as soon as they are born; but
reason and intelligence spring up as they grow to maturity. The body,
therefore, necessarily demands our care before the soul; next the
appetites for the sake of the mind; the body for the sake of the soul.




CHAPTER XVI


If then the legislator ought to take care that the bodies of the
children are as perfect as possible, his first attention ought to be
given to matrimony; at what time and in what situation it is proper
that the citizens should engage in the nuptial contract. Now, with
respect to this alliance, the legislator ought both to consider the
parties and their time of life, that they may grow old at the same
part of time, and that their bodily powers may not be different; that
is to say, the man being able to have children, but the woman too old
to bear them; or, on the contrary, the woman be young enough to
produce children, but the man too old to be a father; for from such a
situation discords and disputes continually arise. In the next place,
with respect to the succession of children, there ought not to be too
great an interval of time between them and their parents; for when
there is, the parent can receive no benefit from his child's
affection, or the child any advantage from his father's protection;
[1335a] neither should the difference in years be too little, as great
inconveniences may arise from it; as it prevents that proper reverence
being shown to a father by a boy who considers him as nearly his equal
in age, and also from the disputes it occasions in the economy of the
family. But, to return from this digression, care ought to be taken
that the bodies of the children may be such as will answer the
expectations of the legislator; this also will be affected by the same
means. Since season for the production of children is determined (not
exactly, but to speak in general), namely, for the man till seventy
years, and the woman till fifty, the entering into the marriage state,
as far as time is concerned, should be regulated by these periods. It
is extremely bad for the children when the father is too young; for in
all animals whatsoever the parts of the young are imperfect, and are
more likely to be productive of females than males, and diminutive
also in size; the same thing of course necessarily holds true in men;
as a proof of this you may see in those cities where the men and women
usually marry very young, the people in general are very small and ill
framed; in child-birth also the women suffer more, and many of them
die. And thus some persons tell us the oracle of Traezenium should be
explained, as if it referred to the many women who were destroyed by
too early marriages, and not their gathering their fruits too soon. It
is also conducive to temperance not to marry too soon; for women who
do so are apt to be intemperate. It also prevents the bodies of men
from acquiring their full size if they marry before their growth is
completed; for this is the determinate period, which prevents any
further increase; for which reason the proper time for a woman to
marry is eighteen, for a man thirty-seven, a little more or less; for
when they marry at that time their bodies are in perfection, and they
will also cease to have children at a proper time; and moreover with
respect to the succession of the children, if they have them at the
time which may reasonably be expected, they will be just arriving into
perfection when their parents are sinking down under the load of
seventy years. And thus much for the time which is proper for
marriage; but moreover a proper season of the year should be observed,
as many persons do now, and appropriate the winter for this business.
The married couple ought also to regard the precepts of physicians and
naturalists, each of whom have treated on these [1335b] subjects. What
is the fit disposition of the body will be better mentioned when we
come to speak of the education of the child; we will just slightly
mention a few particulars. Now, there is no occasion that any one
should have the habit of body of a wrestler to be either a good
citizen, or to enjoy a good constitution, or to be the father of
healthy children; neither should he be infirm or too much dispirited
by misfortunes, but between both these. He ought to have a habit of
labour, but not of too violent labour; nor should that be confined
to one object only, as the wrestler's is; but to such things as are
proper for freemen. These things are equally necessary both for men
and women. Women with child should also take care that their diet
is not too sparing, and that they use sufficient exercise; which it
will be easy for the legislator to effect if he commands them once
every day to repair to the worship of the gods who are supposed to
preside over matrimony. But, contrary to what is proper for the
body, the mind ought to be kept as tranquil as possible; for as plants
partake of the nature of the soil, so does the child receive much of
the disposition of the mother. With respect to the exposing or
bringing up of children, let it be a law, that nothing imperfect or
maimed shall be brought up, .......... As the proper time has been
pointed out for a man and a woman to enter into the marriage state, so
also let us determine how long it is advantageous for the community
that they should have children; for as the children of those who are
too young are imperfect both in body and mind, so also those whose
parents are too old are weak in both: while therefore the body
continues in perfection, which (as some poets say, who reckon the
different periods of life by sevens) is till fifty years, or four or
five more, the children may be equally perfect; but when the parents
are past that age it is better they should have no more. With respect
to any connection between a man and a woman, or a woman and a man,
when either of the parties are betrothed, let it be held in utter
detestation [1336a] on any pretext whatsoever; but should any one be
guilty of such a thing after the marriage is consummated, let his
infamy be as great as his guilt deserves.




CHAPTER XVII


When a child is born it must be supposed that the strength of its body
will depend greatly upon the quality of its food. Now whoever will
examine into the nature of animals, and also observe those people who
are very desirous their children should acquire a warlike habit, will
find that they feed them chiefly with milk, as being best accommodated
to their bodies, but without wine, to prevent any distempers: those
motions also which are natural to their age are very serviceable; and
to prevent any of their limbs from being crooked, on account of their
extreme ductility, some people even now use particular machines that
their bodies may not be distorted. It is also useful to enure them to
the cold when they are very little; for this is very serviceable for
their health; and also to enure them to the business of war; for which
reason it is customary with many of the barbarians to dip their
children in rivers when the water is cold; with others to clothe them
very slightly, as among the Celts; for whatever it is possible to
accustom children to, it is best to accustom them to it at first, but
to do it by degrees: besides, boys have naturally a habit of loving
the cold, on account of the heat. These, then, and such-like things
ought to be the first object of our attention: the next age to this
continues till the child is five years old; during which time it is
best to teach him nothing at all, not even necessary labour, lest it
should hinder his growth; but he should be accustomed to use so much
motion as not to acquire a lazy habit of body; which he will get by
various means and by play also: his play also ought to be neither
illiberal nor too laborious nor lazy. Their governors and preceptors
also should take care what sort of tales and stories it may be proper
for them to hear; for all these ought to pave the way for their future
instruction: for which reason the generality of their play should be
imitations of what they are afterwards to do seriously. They too do
wrong who forbid by laws the disputes between boys and their quarrels,
for they contribute to increase their growth--as they are a sort of
exercise to the body: for the struggles of the heart and the
compression of the spirits give strength to those who labour, which
happens to boys in their disputes. The preceptors also ought to have
an eye upon their manner of life, and those with whom they converse;
and to take care that they are never in the company of slaves. At this
time and till they are seven [1336b] years old it is necessary that
they should be educated at home. It is also very proper to banish,
both from their hearing and sight, everything which is illiberal and
the like. Indeed it is as much the business of the legislator as
anything else, to banish every indecent expression out of the state:
for from a permission to speak whatever is shameful, very quickly
arises the doing it, and this particularly with young people: for
which reason let them never speak nor hear any such thing: but if it
appears that any freeman has done or said anything that is forbidden
before he is of age to be thought fit to partake of the common meals,
let him be punished by disgrace and stripes; but if a person above
that age does so, let him be treated as you would a slave, on account
of his being infamous. Since we forbid his speaking everything which
is forbidden, it is necessary that he neither sees obscene stories nor
pictures; the magistrates therefore are to take care that there are no
statues or pictures of anything of this nature, except only to those
gods to whom the law permits them, and to which the law allows persons
of a certain age to pay their devotions, for themselves, their wives,
and children. It should also be illegal for young persons to be
present either at iambics or comedies before they are arrived at that
age when they are allowed to partake of the pleasures of the table:
indeed a good education will preserve them from all the evils which
attend on these things. We have at present just touched upon this
subject; it will be our business hereafter, when we properly come to
it, to determine whether this care of children is unnecessary, or, if
necessary, in what manner it must be done; at present we have only
mentioned it as necessary. Probably the saying of Theodoras, the
tragic actor, was not a bad one: That he would permit no one, not even
the meanest actor, to go upon the stage before him, that he might
first engage the ear of the audience. The same thing happens both in
our connections with men and things: what we meet with first pleases
best; for which reason children should be kept strangers to everything
which is bad, more particularly whatsoever is loose and offensive to
good manners. When five years are accomplished, the two next may be
very properly employed in being spectators of those exercises they
will afterwards have to learn. There are two periods into which
education ought to be divided, according to the age of the child; the
one is from his being seven years of age to the time of puberty; the
other from thence till he is one-and-twenty: for those who divide ages
by the number seven [1337a] are in general wrong: it is much better to
follow the division of nature; for every art and every instruction is
intended to complete what nature has left defective: we must first
consider if any regulation whatsoever is requisite for children; in
the next place, if it is advantageous to make it a common care, or
that every one should act therein as he pleases, which is the general
practice in most cities; in the third place, what it ought to be.