BOOK VI

Treatise on Government

by Aristotle

BOOK VI, TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT by Aristotle




CHAPTER I


We have already shown what is the nature of the supreme council in the
state, and wherein one may differ from another, and how the different
magistrates should be regulated; and also the judicial department, and
what is best suited to what state; and also to what causes both the
destruction and preservation of governments are owing.

As there are very many species of democracies, as well as of other
states, it will not be amiss to consider at the same time anything
which we may have omitted to mention concerning either of them, and to
allot to each that mode of conduct which is peculiar to and
advantageous for them; and also to inquire into the combinations of
all these different modes of government which we [1317a] have
mentioned; for as these are blended together the government is
altered, as from an aristocracy to be an oligarchy, and from a free
state to be a democracy. Now, I mean by those combinations of
government (which I ought to examine into, but have not yet done),
namely, whether the deliberative department and the election of
magistrates is regulated in a manner correspondent to an oligarchy, or
the judicial to an aristocracy, or the deliberative part only to an
oligarchy, and the election of magistrates to an aristocracy, or
whether, in any other manner, everything is not regulated according to
the nature of the government. But we will first consider what
particular sort of democracy is fitted to a particular city, and also
what particular oligarchy to a particular people; and of other states,
what is advantageous to what. It is also necessary to show clearly,
not only which of these governments is best for a state, but also how
it ought to be established there, and other things we will treat of
briefly.

And first, we will speak of a democracy; and this will at the same
time show clearly the nature of its opposite which some persons call
an oligarchy; and in doing this we must examine into all the parts of
a democracy, and everything that is connected therewith; for from the
manner in which these are compounded together different species of
democracies arise: and hence it is that they are more than one, and of
various natures. Now, there are two causes which occasion there being
so many democracies; one of which is that which we have already
mentioned; namely, there being different sorts of people; for in one
country the majority are husbandmen, in another mechanics, and hired
servants; if the first of these is added to the second, and the third
to both of them, the democracy will not only differ in the particular
of better or worse, but in this, that it will be no longer the same
government; the other is that which we will now speak of. The
different things which are connected with democracies and seem to make
part of these states, do, from their being joined to them, render them
different from others: this attending a few, that more, and another
all. It is necessary that he who would found any state which he may
happen to approve of, or correct one, should be acquainted with all
these particulars. All founders of states endeavour to comprehend
within their own plan everything of nearly the same kind with it; but
in doing this they err, in the manner I have already described in
treating of the preservation and destruction of governments. I will
now speak of these first principles and manners, and whatever else a
democratical state requires.




CHAPTER II


Now the foundation of a democratical state is liberty, and people have
been accustomed to say this as if here only liberty was to be found;
for they affirm that this is the end proposed by every democracy. But
one part of liberty is to govern and be governed alternately; for,
according to democratical justice, equality is measured by numbers,
and not by worth: and this being just, it is necessary that the
supreme power should be vested in the people at large; and that what
the majority determine should be final: so that in a democracy the
poor ought to have more power than the rich, as being the greater
number; for this is one mark of liberty which all framers of a
democracy lay down as a criterion of that state; another is, to live
as every one likes; for this, they say, is a right which liberty
gives, since he is a slave who must live as he likes not. This, then,
is another criterion of a democracy. Hence arises the claim to be
under no command whatsoever to any one, upon any account, any
otherwise than by rotation, and that just as far only as that person
is, in his turn, under his also. This also is conducive to that
equality which liberty demands. These things being premised, and such
being the government, it follows that such rules as the following
should be observed in it, that all the magistrates should be chosen
out of all the people, and all to command each, and each in his turn
all: that all the magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those
offices only which required some particular knowledge and skill: that
no census, or a very small one, should be required to qualify a man
for any office: that none should be in the same employment twice, or
very few, and very seldom, except in the army: that all their
appointments should be limited to a very short time, or at least as
many as possible: that the whole community should be qualified to
judge in all causes whatsoever, let the object be ever so extensive,
ever so interesting, or of ever so high a nature; as at Athens, where
the people at large judge the magistrates when they come out of
office, and decide concerning public affairs as well as private
contracts: that the supreme power should be in the public assembly;
and that no magistrate should be allowed any discretionary power but
in a few instances, and of no consequence to public business. Of all
magistrates a senate is best suited to a democracy, where the whole
community is not paid for giving their attendance; for in that case
it; loses its power; for then the people will bring all causes before
them, by appeal, as we have already mentioned in a former book. In the
next place, there should, if possible, be a fund to pay all the
citizens--who have any share in the management of public affairs,
either as members of the assembly, judges, and magistrates; but if
this cannot be done, at least the magistrates, the judges the
senators, and members of the supreme assembly, and also those officers
who are obliged to eat at a common table ought to be paid. Moreover,
as an oligarchy is said to be a government of men of family, fortune,
and education; so, on the contrary, a democracy is a government in the
hands of men of no birth, indigent circumstances, and mechanical
employments. In this state also no office [1318a] should be for life;
and, if any such should remain after the government has been long
changed into a democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to diminish
the power; and also elect by lot instead of vote. These things, then,
appertain to all democracies; namely, to be established on that
principle of justice which is homogeneous to those governments; that
is, that all the members of the state, by number, should enjoy an
equality, which seems chiefly to constitute a democracy, or government
of the people: for it seems perfectly equal that the rich should have
no more share in the government than the poor, nor be alone in power;
but that all should be equal, according to number; for thus, they
think, the equality and liberty of the state best preserved.




CHAPTER III


In the next place we must inquire how this equality is to be procured.
Shall the qualifications be divided so that five hundred rich should
be equal to a thousand poor, or shall the thousand have equal power
with the five hundred? or shall we not establish our equality in this
manner? but divide indeed thus, and afterwards taking an equal number
both out of the five hundred and the thousand, invest them with the
power of creating the magistrates and judges. Is this state then
established according to perfect democratical justice, or rather that
which is guided by numbers only? For the defenders of a democracy say,
that that is just which the majority approve of: but the favourers of
an oligarchy say, that that is just which those who have most approve
of; and that we ought to be directed by the value of property. Both
the propositions are unjust; for if we agree with what the few propose
we erect a tyranny: for if it should happen that an individual should
have more than the rest who are rich, according to oligarchical
justice, this man alone has a right to the supreme power; but if
superiority of numbers is to prevail, injustice will then be done by
confiscating the property of the rich, who are few, as we have already
said. What then that equality is, which both parties will admit, must
be collected from the definition of right which is common to them
both; for they both say that what the majority of the state approves
of ought to be established. Be it so; but not entirely: but since a
city happens to be made up of two different ranks of people, the rich
and the poor, let that be established which is approved of by both
these, or the greater part: but should there be opposite sentiments,
let that be established which shall be approved of by the greater
part: but let this be according to the census; for instance, if there
should be ten of the rich and twenty of the poor, and six of the first
and fifteen of the last should agree upon any measure, and the
remaining four of the rich should join with the remaining five of the
poor in opposing it, that party whose census when added together
should determine which opinion should be law, and should these happen
to be equal, it should be regarded as a case similar to an assembly or
court of justice dividing equally upon any question that comes before
them, who either determine it by lot or some such method. But
although, with [1318b] respect to what is equal and just, it may be
very difficult to establish the truth, yet it is much easier to do
than to persuade those who have it in their power to encroach upon
others to be guided thereby; for the weak always desire what is equal
and just, but the powerful pay no regard thereunto.




CHAPTER IV


There are four kinds of democracies. The best is that which is
composed of those first in order, as we have already said, and this
also is the most ancient of any. I call that the first which every one
would place so, was he to divide the people; for the best part of
these are the husbandmen. We see, then, that a democracy may be framed
where the majority live by tillage or pasturage; for, as their
property is but small, they will not be at leisure perpetually to hold
public assemblies, but will be continually employed in following their
own business, not having otherwise the means of living; nor will they
be desirous of what another enjoys, but will rather like to follow
their own business than meddle with state affairs and accept the
offices of government, which will be attended with no great profit;
for the major part of mankind are rather desirous of riches than
honour (a proof of this is, that they submitted to the tyrannies in
ancient times, and do now submit to the oligarchies, if no one hinders
them in their usual occupations, or deprives them of their property;
for some of them soon get rich, others are removed from poverty);
besides, their having the right of election and calling their
magistrates to account for their conduct when they come out of office,
will satisfy their desire of honours, if any of them entertain that
passion: for in some states, though the commonalty have not the right
of electing the magistrates, yet it is vested in part of that body
chosen to represent them: and it is sufficient for the people at large
to possess the deliberative power: and this ought to be considered as
a species of democracy; such was that formerly at Mantinsea: for which
reason it is proper for the democracy we have been now treating of to
have a power (and it has been usual for them to have it) of censuring
their magistrates when out of office, and sitting in judgment upon all
causes: but that the chief magistrates should be elected, and
according to a certain census, which should vary with the rank of
their office, or else not by a census, but according to their
abilities for their respective appointments. A state thus constituted
must be well constituted; for the magistracies will be always filled
with the best men with the approbation of the people; who will not
envy their superiors: and these and the nobles should be content with
this part in the administration; for they will not be governed by
their inferiors. They will be also careful to use their power with
moderation, as there are others to whom full power is delegated to
censure their conduct; for it is very serviceable to the state to have
them dependent upon others, and not to be permitted to do whatsoever
they choose; for with such a liberty there would be no check to that
evil particle there is in every one: therefore it is [1319a] necessary
and most for the benefit of the state that the offices thereof should
be filled by the principal persons in it, whose characters are
unblemished, and that the people are not oppressed. It is now evident
that this is the best species of democracy, and on what account;
because the people are such and have such powers as they ought to
have. To establish a democracy of husbandmen some of those laws which
were observed in many ancient states are universally useful; as, for
instance, on no account to permit any one to possess more than a
certain quantity of land, or within a certain distance from the city.
Formerly also, in some states, no one was allowed to sell their
original lot of land. They also mention a law of one Oxylus, which
forbade any one to add to their patrimony by usury. We ought also to
follow the law of the Aphutaeans, as useful to direct us in this
particular we are now speaking of; for they having but very little
ground, while they were a numerous people, and at the same time were
all husbandmen, did not include all their lands within the census, but
divided them in such a manner that, according to the census, the poor
had more power than the rich. Next to the commonalty of husbandmen is
one of shepherds and herdsmen; for they have many things in common
with them, and, by their way of life, are excellently qualified to
make good soldiers, stout in body, and able to continue in the open
air all night. The generality of the people of whom other democracies
are composed are much worse than these; for their lives are wretched
nor have they any business with virtue in anything they do; these are
your mechanics, your exchange-men, and hired servants; as all these
sorts of men frequent the exchange and the citadel, they can readily
attend the public assembly; whereas the husbandmen, being more
dispersed in the country, cannot so easily meet together-nor are they
equally desirous of doing it with these others! When a country happens
to be so situated that a great part of the land lies at a distance
from the city, there it is easy to establish a good democracy or a
free state for the people in general will be obliged to live in the
country; so that it will be necessary in such a democracy, though
there may be an exchange-mob at hand, never to allow a legal assembly
without the inhabitants of the country attend. We have shown in what
manner the first and best democracy ought to be established, and it
will be equally evident as to the rest, for from these we [1319b]
should proceed as a guide, and always separate the meanest of the
people from the rest. But the last and worst, which gives to every
citizen without distinction a share in every part of the
administration, is what few citizens can bear, nor is it easy to
preserve for any long time, unless well supported by laws and manners.
We have already noticed almost every cause that can destroy either
this or any other state. Those who have taken the lead in such a
democracy have endeavoured to support it, and make the people powerful
by collecting together as many persons as they could and giving them
their freedom, not only legitimately but naturally born, and also if
either of their parents were citizens, that is to say, if either their
father or mother; and this method is better suited to this state than
any other: and thus the demagogues have usually managed. They ought,
however, to take care, and do this no longer than the common people
are superior to the nobles and those of the middle rank, and then
stop; for, if they proceed still further, they will make the state
disorderly, and the nobles will ill brook the power of the common
people, and be full of resentment against it; which was the cause of
an insurrection at Cyrene: for a little evil is overlooked, but when
it becomes a great one it strikes the eye. It is, moreover,
very-useful in such a state to do as Clisthenes did at Athens, when he
was desirous of increasing the power of the people, and as those did
who established the democracy in Cyrene; that is, to institute many
tribes and fraternities, and to make the religious rites of private
persons few, and those common; and every means is to be contrived to
associate and blend the people together as much as possible; and that
all former customs be broken through. Moreover, whatsoever is
practised in a tyranny seems adapted to a democracy of this species;
as, for instance, the licentiousness of the slaves, the women, and the
children; for this to a certain degree is useful in such a state; and
also to overlook every one's living as they choose; for many will
support such a government: for it is more agreeable to many to live
without any control than as prudence would direct.




CHAPTER V


It is also the business of the legislator and all those who would
support a government of this sort not to make it too great a work, or
too perfect; but to aim only to render it stable: for, let a state be
constituted ever so badly, there is no difficulty in its continuing a
few days: they should therefore endeavour to procure its safety by all
those ways which we have described in assigning the causes of the
preservation and destruction of governments; avoiding what is hurtful,
and by framing such laws, written and unwritten, as contain those
things which chiefly tend to the preservation of the state; nor to
suppose that that is useful either for a democratic or [1320a] an
oligarchic form of government which contributes to make them more
purely so, but what will contribute to their duration: but our
demagogues at present, to flatter the people, occasion frequent
confiscations in the courts; for which reason those who have the
welfare of the state really at heart should act directly opposite to
what they do, and enact a law to prevent forfeitures from being
divided amongst the people or paid into the treasury, but to have them
set apart for sacred uses: for those who are of a bad disposition
would not then be the less cautious, as their punishment would be the
same; and the community would not be so ready to condemn those whom
they sat in judgment on when they were to get nothing by it: they
should also take care that the causes which are brought before the
public should be as few as possible, and punish with the utmost
severity those who rashly brought an action against any one; for it is
not the commons but the nobles who are generally prosecuted: for in
all things the citizens of the same state ought to be affectionate to
each other, at least not to treat those who have the chief power in it
as their enemies. Now, as the democracies which have been lately
established are very numerous, and it is difficult to get the common
people to attend the public assemblies without they are paid for it,
this, when there is not a sufficient public revenue, is fatal to the
nobles; for the deficiencies therein must be necessarily made up by
taxes, confiscations, and fines imposed by corrupt courts of justice:
which things have already destroyed many democracies. Whenever, then,
the revenues of the state are small, there should be but few public
assemblies and but few courts of justice: these, however, should have
very extensive jurisdictions, but should continue sitting a few days
only, for by this means the rich would not fear the expense, although
they should receive nothing for their attendance, though the poor did;
and judgment also would be given much better; for the rich will not
choose to be long absent from their own affairs, but will willingly be
so for a short time: and, when there are sufficient revenues, a
different conduct ought to be pursued from what the demagogues at
present follow; for now they divide the surplus of the public money
amongst the poor; these receive it and again want the same supply,
while the giving it is like pouring water into a sieve: but the true
patriot in a democracy ought to take care that the majority of the
community are not too poor, for this is the cause of rapacity in that
government; he therefore should endeavour that they may enjoy
perpetual plenty; and as this also is advantageous to the rich, what
can be saved out of the public money should be put by, and then
divided at once amongst the poor, if possible, in such a quantity as
may enable every one of them to purchase a little field, and, if that
cannot be done, at least to give each of them enough to procure the
implements [1320b] of trade and husbandry; and if there is not enough
for all to receive so much at once, then to divide it according to
tribes or any other allotment. In the meantime let the rich pay them
for necessary services, but not be obliged to find them in useless
amusements. And something like this was the manner in which they
managed at Carthage, and preserved the affections of the people; for
by continually sending some of their community into colonies they
procured plenty. It is also worthy of a sensible and generous nobility
to divide the poor amongst them, and supplying them with what is
necessary, induce them to work; or to imitate the conduct of the
people at Tarentum: for they, permitting the poor to partake in common
of everything which is needful for them, gain the affections of the
commonalty. They have also two different ways of electing their
magistrates; for some are chosen by vote, others by lot; by the last,
that the people at large may have some share in the administration; by
the former, that the state may be well governed: the same may be
accomplished if of the same magistrates you choose some by vote,
others by lot. And thus much for the manner in which democracies ought
to be established.




CHAPTER VI


What has been already said will almost of itself sufficiently show how
an oligarchy ought to be founded; for he who would frame such a state
should have in his view a democracy to oppose it; for every species of
oligarchy should be founded on principles diametrically opposite to
some species of democracy.

The first and best-framed oligarchy is that which approaches near to
what we call a free state; in which there ought to be two different
census, the one high, the other low: from those who are within the
latter the ordinary officers of the state ought to be chosen; from the
former the supreme magistrates: nor should any one be excluded from a
part of the administration who was within the census; which should be
so regulated that the commonalty who are included in it should by
means thereof be superior to those who have no share in the
government; for those who are to have the management of public affairs
ought always to be chosen out of the better sort of the people. Much
in the same manner ought that oligarchy to be established which is
next in order: but as to that which is most opposite to a pure
democracy, and approaches nearest to a dynasty and a tyranny, as it is
of all others the worst, so it requires the greatest care and caution
to preserve it: for as bodies of sound and healthy constitutions and
ships which are well manned and well found for sailing can bear many
injuries without perishing, while a diseased body or a leaky ship with
an indifferent crew cannot support the [1321a] least shock; so the
worst-established governments want most looking after. A number of
citizens is the preservation of a democracy; for these are opposed to
those rights which are founded in rank: on the contrary, the
preservation of an oligarchy depends upon the due regulation of the
different orders in the society.




CHAPTER VII


As the greater part of the community are divided into four sorts of
people; husbandmen, mechanics, traders, and hired servants; and as
those who are employed in war may likewise be divided into four; the
horsemen, the heavy-armed soldier, the light-armed, and the sailor,
where the nature of the country can admit a great number of horse;
there a powerful oligarchy may be easily established: for the safety
of the inhabitants depends upon a force of that sort; but those who
can support the expense of horsemen must be persons of some
considerable fortune. Where the troops are chiefly heavy-armed, there
an oligarchy, inferior in power to the other, may be established; for
the heavy-armed are rather made up of men of substance than the poor:
but the light-armed and the sailors always contribute to support a
democracy: but where the number of these is very great and a sedition
arises, the other parts of the community fight at a disadvantage; but
a remedy for this evil is to be learned from skilful generals, who
always mix a proper number of light-armed soldiers with their horse
and heavy-armed: for it is with those that the populace get the better
of the men of fortune in an insurrection; for these being lighter are
easily a match for the horse and the heavy-armed: so that for an
oligarchy to form a body of troops from these is to form it against
itself: but as a city is composed of persons of different ages, some
young and some old, the fathers should teach their sons, while they
were very young, a light and easy exercise; but, when they are grown
up, they should be perfect in every warlike exercise. Now, the
admission of the people to any share in the government should either
be (as I said before) regulated by a census, or else, as at Thebes,
allowed to those who for a certain time have ceased from any mechanic
employment, or as at Massalia, where they are chosen according to
their worth, whether citizens or foreigners. With respect to the
magistrates of the highest rank which it may be necessary to have in a
state, the services they are bound to do the public should be
expressly laid down, to prevent the common people from being desirous
of accepting their employments, and also to induce them to regard
their magistrates with favour when they know what a price they pay for
their honours. It is also necessary that the magistrates, upon
entering into their offices, should make magnificent sacrifices and
erect some public structure, that the people partaking of the
entertainment, and seeing the city ornamented with votive gifts in
their temples and public structures, may see with pleasure the
stability of the government: add to this also, that the nobles will
have their generosity recorded: but now this is not the conduct which
those who are at present at the head of an oligarchy pursue, but the
contrary; for they are not more desirous of honour than of gain; for
which reason such oligarchies may more properly be called little
democracies. Thus [1321b] we have explained on what principles a
democracy and an oligarchy ought to be established.




CHAPTER VIII


After what has been said I proceed next to treat particularly of the
magistrates; of what nature they should be, how many, and for what
purpose, as I have already mentioned: for without necessary
magistrates no state can exist, nor without those which contribute to
its dignity and good order can exist happily: now it is necessary that
in small states the magistrates should be few; in a large one, many:
also to know well what offices may be joined together, and what ought
to be separated. The first thing necessary is to establish proper
regulators in the markets; for which purpose a certain magistrate
should be appointed to inspect their contracts and preserve good
order; for of necessity, in almost every city there must be both
buyers and sellers to supply each other's mutual wants: and this is
what is most productive of the comforts of life; for the sake of which
men seem to have joined together in one community. A second care, and
nearly related to the first, is to have an eye both to the public and
private edifices in the city, that they may be an ornament; and also
to take care of all buildings which are likely to fall: and to see
that the highways are kept in proper repair; and also that the
landmarks between different estates are preserved, that there may be
no disputes on that account; and all other business of the same
nature. Now, this business may be divided into several branches, over
each of which in populous cities they appoint a separate person; one
to inspect the buildings, another the fountains, another the harbours;
and they are called the inspectors of the city. A third, which is
very like the last, and conversant nearly about the same objects, only
in the country, is to take care of what is done out of the city. The
officers who have this employment we call inspectors of the lands, or
inspectors of the woods; but the business of all three of them is the
same. There must also be other officers appointed to receive the
public revenue and to deliver it out to those who are in the different
departments of the state: these are called receivers or quaestors.
There must also be another, before whom all private contracts and
sentences of courts should be enrolled, as well as proceedings and
declarations. Sometimes this employment is divided amongst many, but
there is one supreme over the rest; these are called proctors,
notaries, and the like. Next to these is an officer whose business is
of all others the most necessary, and yet most difficult; namely, to
take care that sentence is executed upon those who are condemned; and
that every one pays the fines laid on him; and also to have the charge
of those who are in prison. [1322a] This office is very disagreeable
on account of the odium attending it, so that no one will engage
therein without it is made very profitable, or, if they do, will they
be willing to execute it according to law; but it is most necessary,
as it is of no service to pass judgment in any cause without that
judgment is carried into execution: for without this human society
could not subsist: for which reason it is best that this office should
not be executed by one person, but by some of the magistrates of the
other courts. In like manner, the taking care that those fines which
are ordered by the judges are levied should be divided amongst
different persons. And as different magistrates judge different
causes, let the causes of the young be heard by the young: and as to
those which are already brought to a hearing, let one person pass
sentence, and another see it executed: as, for instance, let the
magistrates who have the care of the public buildings execute the
sentence which the inspectors of the markets have passed, and the like
in other cases: for by so much the less odium attends those who carry
the laws into execution, by so much the easier will they be properly
put in force: therefore for the same persons to pass the sentence and
to execute it will subject them to general hatred; and if they pass it
upon all, they will be considered as the enemies of all. Thus one
person has often the custody of the prisoner's body, while another
sees the sentence against him executed, as the eleven did at Athens:
for which reason it is prudent to separate these offices, and to give
great attention thereunto as equally necessary with anything we have
already mentioned; for it will certainly happen that men of character
will decline accepting this office, and worthless persons cannot
properly be entrusted with it, as having themselves rather an occasion
for a guard than being qualified to guard others. This, therefore,
ought by no means to be a separate office from others; nor should it
be continually allotted to any individuals, but the young men; where
there is a city-guard, the youths ought in turns to take these offices
upon them. These, then, as the most necessary magistrates, ought to be
first mentioned: next to these are others no less necessary, but of
much higher rank, for they ought to be men of great skill and
fidelity. These are they who have the guard of the city, and provide
everything that is necessary for war; whose business it is, both in
war and peace, to defend the walls and the gates, and to take care to
muster and marshal the citizens. Over all these there are sometimes
more officers, sometimes fewer: thus in little cities there is only
one whom they call either general or polemarch; but where there are
horse and light-armed troops, and bowmen, and sailors, they sometimes
put distinct commanders over each of these; who again have others
under them, according to their different divisions; all of which join
together to make one military body: and thus much for this department.
Since some of the magistrates, if not all, have business with the
public money, it is necessary that there should be other officers,
whose employment should be nothing else than to take an account of
what they have, and correct any mismanagement therein. But besides all
these magistrates there is one who is supreme over them all, who very
often has in his own power the disposal of the public revenue and
taxes; who presides over the people when the supreme power is in them;
for there must be some magistrate who has a power to summon them
together, and to preside as head of the state. These are sometimes
called preadvisers; but where there are many, more properly a council.
These are nearly the civil magistrates which are requisite to a
government: but there are other persons whose business is confined to
religion; as the priests, and those who are to take care of the
temples, that they are kept in proper repair, or, if they fall down,
that they may be rebuilt; and whatever else belongs to public worship.
This charge is sometimes entrusted to one person, as in very small
cities: in others it is delegated to many, and these distinct from the
priesthood, as the builders or keepers of holy places, and officers of
the sacred revenue. Next to these are those who are appointed to have
the general care of all those public sacrifices to the tutelar god of
the state, which the laws do not entrust to the priests: and these in
different states have different appellations. To enumerate in few
words the different departments of all those magistrates who are
necessary: these are either religion, war, taxes, expenditures,
markets, public buildings, harbours, highways. Belonging to the courts
of justice there are scribes to enroll private contracts; and there
must also be guards set over the prisoners, others to see the law is
executed, council on either side, and also others to watch over the
conduct of those who are to decide the causes. Amongst the magistrates
also may finally be reckoned those who are to give their advice in
public affairs. But separate states, who are peculiarly happy and have
leisure to attend to more minute particulars, and are very attentive
to good order, require particular magistrates for themselves; such as
those who have the government of the women; who are to see the laws
are executed; who take care of the boys and preside over their
education. To these may be added those who have the care of their
gymnastic exercises, [1323a] their theatres, and every other public
spectacle which there may happen to be. Some of these, however, are
not of general use; as the governors of the women: for the poor are
obliged to employ their wives and children in servile offices for want
of slaves. As there are three magistrates to whom some states entrust
the supreme power; namely, guardians of the laws, preadvisers, and
senators; guardians of the laws suit best to an aristocracy,
preadvisers to an oligarchy, and a senate to a democracy. And thus
much briefly concerning all magistrates.