BOOK IV

Treatise on Government

by Aristotle

BOOK IV, TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT by Aristotle




CHAPTER I


In every art and science which is not conversant in parts but in some
one genus in which it is complete, it is the business of that art
alone to determine what is fitted to its particular genus; as what
particular exercise is fitted to a certain particular body, and suits
it best: for that body which is formed by nature the most perfect and
superior to others necessarily requires the best exercise-and also of
what one kind that must be which will suit the generality; and this is
the business of the gymnastic arts: and although any one should not
desire to acquire an exact knowledge and skill in these exercises, yet
it is not, on that account, the less necessary that he who professes
to be a master and instruct the youth in them should be perfect
therein: and we see that this is what equally befalls the healing,
shipbuilding, cloth-making, and indeed all other arts; so that it
evidently belongs to the same art to find out what kind of government
is best, and would of all others be most correspondent to our wish,
while it received no molestation from without: and what particular
species of it is adapted to particular persons; for there are many who
probably are incapable of enjoying the best form: so that the
legislator, and he who is truly a politician, ought to be acquainted
not only with that which is most perfect imaginable, but also that
which is the best suited to any given circumstances. There is,
moreover, a third sort, an imaginary one, and he ought, if such a one
should be presented to his consideration, to be able to discern what
sort of one it would be at the beginning; and, when once established,
what would be the proper means to preserve it a long time. I mean, for
instance, if a state should happen not to have the best form of
government, or be deficient in what was necessary, or not receive
every advantage possible, but something less. And, besides all this,
it is necessary to know what sort of government is best fitting for
all cities: for most of those writers who have treated this subject,
however speciously they may handle other parts of it, have failed in
describing the practical parts: for it is not enough to be able to
perceive what is best without it is what can be put in practice. It
should also be simple, and easy for all to attain to. But some seek
only the most subtile forms of government. Others again, choosing
[1289a] rather to treat of what is common, censure those under which
they live, and extol the excellence of a particular state, as the
Lacedaemonian, or some other: but every legislator ought to establish
such a form of government as from the present state and disposition of
the people who are to receive it they will most readily submit to and
persuade the community to partake of: for it is not a business of less
trouble to correct the mistakes of an established government than to
form a new one; as it is as difficult to recover what we have forgot
as to learn anything afresh. He, therefore, who aspires to the
character of a legislator, ought, besides all we have already said, to
be able to correct the mistakes of a government already established,
as we have before mentioned. But this is impossible to be done by him
who does not know how many different forms of government there are:
some persons think that there is only one species both of democracy
and oligarchy; but this is not true: so that every one should be
acquainted with the difference of these governments, how great they
are, and whence they arise; and should have equal knowledge to
perceive what laws are best, and what are most suitable to each
particular government: for all laws are, and ought to be, framed
agreeable to the state that is to be governed by them, and not the
state to the laws: for government is a certain ordering in a state
which particularly respects the magistrates in what manner they shall
be regulated, and where the supreme power shall be placed; and what
shall be the final object which each community shall have in view; but
the laws are something different from what regulates and expresses the
form of the constitution-it is their office to direct the conduct of
the magistrate in the execution of his office and the punishment of
offenders. From whence it is evident, that the founders of laws should
attend both to the number and the different sorts of government; for
it is impossible that the same laws should be calculated for all sorts
of oligarchies and all sorts of democracies, for of both these
governments there are many species, not one only.




CHAPTER II


Since, then, according to our first method in treating of the
different forms of government, we have divided those which are regular
into three sorts, the kingly, the aristocratical, the free states,
and shown the three excesses which these are liable to: the kingly, of
becoming tyrannical; the aristocratical, oligarchical; and the free
state, democratical: and as we have already treated of the
aristocratical and kingly; for to enter into an inquiry what sort of
government is best is the same thing as to treat of these two
expressly; for each of them desires to be established upon the
principles of virtue: and as, moreover, we have already determined
wherein a kingly power and an aristocracy differ from each other, and
when a state may be said to be governed by a king, it now remains that
we examine into a free state, and also these other governments, an
oligarchy, a democracy, and a [1289b] tyranny; and it is evident of
these three excesses which must be the worst of all, and which next to
it; for, of course, the excesses of the best and most holy must be the
worst; for it must necessarily happen either that the name of king
only will remain, or else that the king will assume more power than
belongs to him, from whence tyranny will arise, the worst excess
imaginable, a government the most contrary possible to a free state.
The excess next hurtful is an oligarchy; for an aristocracy differs
much from this sort of government: that which is least so is a
democracy. This subject has been already treated of by one of those
writers who have gone before me, though his sentiments are not the
same as mine: for he thought, that of all excellent constitutions, as
a good oligarchy or the like, a democracy was the worst, but of all
bad ones, the best.

Now I affirm, that all these states have, without exception, fallen
into excess; and also that he should not have said that one oligarchy
was better than another, but that it was not quite so bad. But this
question we shall not enter into at present. We shall first inquire
how many different sorts of free states there are; since there are
many species of democracies and oligarchies; and which of them is the
most comprehensive, and most desirable after the best form of
government; or if there is any other like an aristocracy, well
established; and also which of these is best adapted to most cities,
and which of them is preferable for particular persons: for, probably,
some may suit better with an oligarchy than a democracy, and others
better with a democracy than an oligarchy; and afterwards in what
manner any one ought to proceed who desires to establish either of
these states, I mean every species of democracy, and also of
oligarchy. And to conclude, when we shall have briefly gone through
everything that is necessary, we will endeavour to point out the
sources of corruption, and stability, in government, as well those
which are common to all as those which are peculiar to each state, and
from what causes they chiefly arise.




CHAPTER III


The reason for there being many different sorts of governments is
this, that each state consists of a great number of parts; for, in the
first place, we see that all cities are made up of families: and
again, of the multitude of these some must be rich, some poor, and
others in the middle station; and that, both of the rich and poor,
some will be used to arms, others not. We see also, that some of the
common people are husbandmen, others attend the market, and others are
artificers. There is also a difference between the nobles in their
wealth, and the dignity in which they live: for instance, in the
number of horses they breed; for this cannot be supported without a
large fortune: for which reason, in former times, those cities whose
strength consisted in horse became by that means oligarchies; and they
used horse in their expeditions against the neighbouring cities; as
the Eretrians the Chalcidians, the Magnetians, who lived near the
river Meander, and many others in Asia. Moreover, besides the
difference of fortune, there is that which arises from family and
merit; or, if there are any other distinctions [1290a] which make part
of the city, they have been already mentioned in treating of an
aristocracy, for there we considered how many parts each city must
necessarily be composed of; and sometimes each of these have a share
in the government, sometimes a few, sometimes more.

It is evident then, that there must be many forms of government,
differing from each other in their particular constitution: for the
parts of which they are composed each differ from the other. For
government is the ordering of the magistracies of the state; and these
the community share between themselves, either as they can attain them
by force, or according to some common equality which there is amongst
them, as poverty, wealth, or something which they both partake of.
There must therefore necessarily be as many different forms of
governments as there are different ranks in the society, arising from
the superiority of some over others, and their different situations.
And these seem chiefly to be two, as they say, of the winds: namely,
the north and the south; and all the others are declinations from
these. And thus in politics, there is the government of the many and
the government of the few; or a democracy and an oligarchy: for an
aristocracy may be considered as a species of oligarchy, as being also
a government of the few; and what we call a free state may be
considered as a democracy: as in the winds they consider the west as
part of the north, and the east as part of the south: and thus it is
in music, according to some, who say there are only two species of it,
the Doric and the Phrygian, and all other species of composition they
call after one of these names; and many people are accustomed to
consider the nature of government in the same light; but it is both
more convenient and more correspondent to truth to distinguish
governments as I have done, into two species: one, of those which are
established upon proper principles; of which there may be one or two
sorts: the other, which includes all the different excesses of these;
so that we may compare the best form of government to the most
harmonious piece of music; the oligarchic and despotic to the more
violent tunes; and the democratic to the soft and gentle airs.




CHAPTER IV


We ought not to define a democracy as some do, who say simply, that it
is a government where the supreme power is lodged in the people; for
even in oligarchies the supreme power is in the majority. Nor should
they define an oligarchy a government where the supreme power is in
the hands of a few: for let us suppose the number of a people to be
thirteen hundred, and that of these one thousand were rich, who would
not permit the three hundred poor to have any share in the government,
although they were free, and their equal in everything else; no one
would say, that this government was a democracy. In like manner, if
the poor, when few in number, should acquire the power over the rich,
though more than themselves, no one would say, that this was an
oligarchy; nor this, when the rest who are rich have no share in the
administration. We should rather say, that a democracy is when the
supreme power is in the [1290b] hands of the freemen; an oligarchy,
when it is in the hands of the rich: it happens indeed that in the one
case the many will possess it, in the other the few; because there are
many poor and few rich. And if the power of the state was to be
distributed according to the size of the citizens, as they say it is
in Ethiopia, or according to their beauty, it would be an oligarchy:
for the number of those who are large and beautiful is small.

Nor are those things which we have already mentioned alone sufficient
to describe these states; for since there are many species both of a
democracy and an oligarchy, the matter requires further consideration;
as we cannot admit, that if a few persons who are free possess the
supreme power over the many who are not free, that this government is
a democracy: as in Apollonia, in Ionia, and in Thera: for in each of
these cities the honours of the state belong to some few particular
families, who first founded the colonies. Nor would the rich, because
they are superior in numbers, form a democracy, as formerly at
Colophon; for there the majority had large possessions before the
Lydian war: but a democracy is a state where the freemen and the poor,
being the majority, are invested with the power of the state. An
oligarchy is a state where the rich and those of noble families, being
few, possess it.

We have now proved that there are various forms of government and have
assigned a reason for it; and shall proceed to show that there are
even more than these, and what they are, and why; setting out with the
principle we have already laid down. We admit that every city consists
not of one, but many parts: thus, if we should endeavour to comprehend
the different species of animals we should first of all note those
parts which every animal must have, as a certain sensorium, and also
what is necessary to acquire and retain food, as a mouth and a belly;
besides certain parts to enable it to move from place to place. If,
then, these are the only parts of an animal and there are differences
between them; namely, in their various sorts of stomachs, bellies, and
sensoriums: to which we must add their motive powers; the number of
the combinations of all these must necessarily make up the different
species of animals. For it is not possible that the same kind of
animal should have any very great difference in its mouth or ears; so
that when all these are collected, who happen to have these things
similar in all, they make up a species of animals of which there are
as many as there are of these general combinations of necessary parts.

The same thing is true of what are called states; for a city is not
made of one but many parts, as has already been often said; one of
which is those who supply it with provisions, called husbandmen,
another called mechanics, [1291a] whose employment is in the manual
arts, without which the city could not be inhabited; of these some are
busied about what is absolutely necessary, others in what contribute
to the elegancies and pleasures of life; the third sort are your
exchange-men, I mean by these your buyers, sellers, merchants, and
victuallers; the fourth are your hired labourers or workmen; the fifth
are the men-at-arms, a rank not less useful than the other, without
you would have the community slaves to every invader; but what cannot
defend itself is unworthy of the name of a city; for a city is
self-sufficient, a slave not. So that when Socrates, in Plato's
Republic, says that a city is necessarily composed of four sorts of
people, he speaks elegantly but not correctly, and these are,
according to him, weavers, husbandmen, shoe-makers, and builders; he
then adds, as if these were not sufficient, smiths, herdsmen for what
cattle are necessary, and also merchants and victuallers, and these
are by way of appendix to his first list; as if a city was established
for necessity, and not happiness, or as if a shoe-maker and a
husbandman were equally useful. He reckons not the military a part
before the increase of territory and joining to the borders of the
neighbouring powers will make war necessary: and even amongst them who
compose his four divisions, or whoever have any connection with each
other, it will be necessary to have some one to distribute justice,
and determine between man and man. If, then, the mind is a more
valuable part of man than the body, every one would wish to have those
things more regarded in his city which tend to the advantage of these
than common matters, such are war and justice; to which may be added
council, which is the business of civil wisdom (nor is it of any
consequence whether these different employments are filled by
different persons or one, as the same man is oftentimes both a soldier
and a husbandman): so that if both the judge and the senator are parts
of the city, it necessarily follows that the soldier must be so also.
The seventh sort are those who serve the public in expensive
employments at their own charge: these are called the rich. The eighth
are those who execute the different offices of the state, and without
these it could not possibly subsist: it is therefore necessary that
there should be some persons capable of governing and filling the
places in the city; and this either for life or in rotation: the
office of senator, and judge, of which we have already sufficiently
treated, are the only ones remaining. If, then, these things are
necessary for a state, that it may be happy and just, it follows that
the citizens who engage in public affairs should be men of abilities
therein. [1291b] Several persons think, that different employments may
be allotted to the same person; as a soldier's, a husbandman's, and an
artificer's; as also that others may be both senators and judges.

Besides, every one supposes himself a man of political abilities, and
that he is qualified for almost every department in the state. But the
same person cannot at once be poor and rich: for which reason the most
obvious division of the city is into two parts, the poor and rich;
moreover, since for the generality the one are few, the other many,
they seem of all the parts of a city most contrary to each other; so
that as the one or the other prevail they form different states; and
these are the democracy and the oligarchy.

But that there are many different states, and from what causes they
arise, has been already mentioned: and that there are also different
species both of democracies and oligarchies we will now show. Though
this indeed is evident from what we have already said: there are also
many different sorts of common people, and also of those who are
called gentlemen. Of the different sorts of the first are husbandmen,
artificers, exchange-men, who are employed in buying and selling,
seamen, of which some are engaged in war, some in traffic, some in
carrying goods and passengers from place to place, others in fishing,
and of each of these there are often many, as fishermen at Tarentum
and Byzantium, masters of galleys at Athens, merchants at AEgina and
Chios, those who let ships on freight at Tenedos; we may add to these
those who live by their manual labour and have but little property; so
that they cannot live without some employ: and also those who are not
free-born on both sides, and whatever other sort of common people
there may be. As for gentlemen, they are such as are distinguished
either by their fortune, their birth, their abilities, or their
education, or any such-like excellence which is attributed to them.

The most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from
that equality which prevails in it: for this is what the law in that
state directs; that the poor shall be in no greater subjection than
the rich; nor that the supreme power shall be lodged with either of
these, but that both shall share it. For if liberty and equality, as
some persons suppose, are chiefly to be found in a democracy, it must
be most so by every department of government being alike open to all;
but as the people are the majority, and what they vote is law, it
follows that such a state must be a democracy. This, then, is one
species thereof. Another is, when the magistrates are elected by a
certain census; but this should be but small, and every one who was
included in it should be eligible, but as soon as he was below it
should lose that right. [1292a] Another sort is, in which every
citizen who is not infamous has a share in the government, but where
the government is in the laws. Another, where every citizen without
exception has this right. Another is like these in other particulars,
but there the people govern, and not the law: and this takes place
when everything is determined by a majority of votes, and not by a
law; which happens when the people are influenced by the demagogues:
for where a democracy is governed by stated laws there is no room for
them, but men of worth fill the first offices in the state: but where
the power is not vested in the laws, there demagogues abound: for
there the people rule with kingly power: the whole composing one body;
for they are supreme, not as individuals but in their collective
capacity.

Homer also discommends the government of many; but whether he means
this we are speaking of, or where each person exercises his power
separately, is uncertain. When the people possess this power they
desire to be altogether absolute, that they may not be under the
control of the law, and this is the time when flatterers are held in
repute. Nor is there any difference between such a people and monarchs
in a tyranny: for their manners are the same, and they both hold a
despotic power over better persons than themselves. For their decrees
are like the others' edicts; their demagogues like the others'
flatterers: but their greatest resemblance consists in the mutual
support they give to each other, the flatterer to the tyrant, the
demagogue to the people: and to them it is owing that the supreme
power is lodged in the votes of the people, and not in the laws; for
they bring everything before them, as their influence is owing to
their being supreme whose opinions they entirely direct; for these are
they whom the multitude obey. Besides, those who accuse the
magistrates insist upon it, that the right of determining on their
conduct lies in the people, who gladly receive their complaints as the
means of destroying all their offices.

Any one, therefore, may with great justice blame such a government as
being a democracy, and not a free state; for where the government is
not in the laws, then there is no free state, for the law ought to be
supreme over all things; and particular incidents which arise should
be determined by the magistrates or the state. If, therefore, a
democracy is to be reckoned a free state, it is evident that any such
establishment which centres all power in the votes of the people
cannot, properly speaking, be a democracy: for their decrees cannot be
general in their extent. Thus, then, we may describe the several
species of democracies.




CHAPTER V


Of the different species of oligarchies one is, when the right to the
offices is regulated by a certain census; so that the poor, although
the majority, have no share in it; while all those who are included
therein take part in the management of public affairs. Another sort
is, when [1292b] the magistrates are men of very small fortune, who
upon any vacancy do themselves fill it up: and if they do this out of
the community at large, the state approaches to an aristocracy; if out
of any particular class of people, it will be an oligarchy. Another
sort of oligarchy is, when the power is an hereditary nobility. The
fourth is, when the power is in the same hands as the other, but not
under the control of law; and this sort of oligarchy exactly
corresponds to a tyranny in monarchies, and to that particular species
of democracies which I last mentioned in treating of that state: this
has the particular name of a dynasty. These are the different sorts of
oligarchies and democracies.

It should also be known, that it often happens that a free state,
where the supreme power is in the laws, may not be democratic, and yet
in consequence of the established manners and customs of the people,
may be governed as if it was; so, on the other hand, where the laws
may countenance a more democratic form of government, these may make
the state inclining to an oligarchy; and this chiefly happens when
there has been any alteration in the government; for the people do not
easily change, but love their own ancient customs; and it is by small
degrees only that one thing takes place of another; so that the
ancient laws will remain, while the power will be in the hands of
those who have brought about a revolution in the state.




CHAPTER VI


It is evident from what has been said, that there are as many
different sorts of democracies and oligarchies as I have reckoned up:
for, of necessity, either all ranks of the people which I have
enumerated must have a share in the government, or some only, and
others not; for when the husbandmen, and those only who possess
moderate fortunes, have the supreme power, they will govern according
to law; for as they must get their livings by their employs, they have
but little leisure for public business: they will therefore establish
proper laws, and never call public assemblies but when there is a
necessity for them; and they will readily let every one partake with
them in the administration of public affairs as soon as they possess
that fortune which the law requires for their qualification: every
one, therefore, who is qualified will have his share in the
government: for to exclude any would be to make the government an
oligarchy, and for all to have leisure to attend without they had a
subsistence would be impossible: for these reasons, therefore, this
government is a species of democracy. Another species is distinguished
by the mode of electing their magistrates, in which every one is
eligible, to whose birth there are no objections, provided he is
supposed to have leisure to attend: for which reason in such a
democracy the supreme power will be vested in the laws, as there will
be nothing paid to those who go to the public assemblies. A third
species is where every freeman has a right to a share in the
government, which he will not accept for the cause already assigned;
for which reason here also the supreme power will be in the law. The
fourth species [1293a] of democracy, the last which was established in
order of time, arose when cities were greatly enlarged to what they
were at first, and when the public revenue became something
considerable; for then the populace, on account of their numbers, were
admitted to share in the management of public affairs, for then even
the poorest people were at leisure to attend to them, as they received
wages for so doing; nay, they were more so than others, as they were
not hindered by having anything of their own to mind, as the rich had;
for which reason these last very often did not frequent the public
assemblies and the courts of justice: thus the supreme power was
lodged in the poor, and not in the laws. These are the different sorts
of democracies, and such are the causes which necessarily gave birth
to them.

The first species of oligarchy is, when the generality of the state
are men of moderate and not too large property; for this gives them
leisure for the management of public affairs: and, as they are a
numerous body, it necessarily follows that the supreme power must be
in the laws, and not in men; for as they are far removed from a
monarchical government, and have not sufficient fortune to neglect
their private affairs, while they are too many to be supported by the
public, they will of course determine to be governed by the laws, and
not by each other. But if the men of property in the state are but
few, and their property is large, then an oligarchy of the second sort
will take place; for those who have most power will think that they
have a right to lord it over the others; and, to accomplish this, they
will associate to themselves some who have an inclination for public
affairs, and as they are not powerful enough to govern without law,
they will make a law for that purpose. And if those few who have large
fortunes should acquire still greater power, the oligarchy will then
alter into one of the third sort; for they will get all the offices of
the state into their own hands by a law which directs the son to
succeed upon the death of his father; and, after that, when, by means
of their increasing wealth and powerful connections, they extend still
further their oppression, a monarchical dynasty will directly succeed
wherein men will be supreme, and not the law; and this is the fourth
species of an oligarchy correspondent to the last-mentioned class of
democracies.




CHAPTER VII


There are besides two other states, a democracy and an oligarchy, one
of which all speak of, and it is always esteemed a species of the four
sorts; and thus they reckon them up; a monarchy, an oligarchy, a
democracy, and this fourth which they call an aristocracy. There is
also a fifth, which bears a name that is also common to the other
four, namely, a state: but as this is seldom to be met with, it has
escaped those who have endeavoured to enumerate the different sorts of
governments, which [1293b] they fix at four only, as does Plato in his
Republic.

An aristocracy, of which I have already treated in the first book, is
rightly called so; for a state governed by the best men, upon the most
virtuous principles, and not upon any hypothesis, which even good men
may propose, has alone a right to be called an aristocracy, for it is
there only that a man is at once a good man and a good citizen; while
in other states men are good only relative to those states. Moreover,
there are some other states which are called by the same name, that
differ both from oligarchies and free states, wherein not only the
rich but also the virtuous have a share in the administration; and
have therefore acquired the name of aristocracies; for in those
governments wherein virtue is not their common care, there are still
men of worth and approved goodness. Whatever state, then, like the
Carthaginians, favours the rich, the virtuous, and the citizens at
large, is a sort of aristocracy: when only the two latter are held in
esteem, as at Lacedaemon, and the state is jointly composed of these,
it is a virtuous democracy. These are the two species of aristocracies
after the first, which is the best of all governments. There is also a
third, which is, whenever a free state inclines to the dominion of a
few.




CHAPTER VIII


It now remains for us to treat of that government which is
particularly called a free state, and also of a tyranny; and the
reason for my choosing to place that free state here is, because this,
as well as those aristocracies already mentioned, although they do not
seem excesses, yet, to speak true, they have all departed from what a
perfect government is. Nay, they are deviations both of them equally
from other forms, as I said at the beginning. It is proper to mention
a tyranny the last of all governments, for it is of all others the
least like one: but as my intention is to treat of all governments in
general, for this reason that also, as I have said, will be taken into
consideration in its proper place.

I shall now inquire into a free state and show what it is; and we
shall the better understand its positive nature as we have already
described an oligarchy and a democracy; for a free state is indeed
nothing more than a mixture of them, and it has been usual to call
those which incline most to a democracy, a free state; those which
incline most to an oligarchy, an aristocracy, because those who are
rich are generally men of family and education; besides, they enjoy
those things which others are often guilty of crimes to procure: for
which reason they are regarded as men of worth and honour and note.

Since, then, it is the genius of an aristocracy to allot the larger
part of the government to the best citizens, they therefore say, that
an oligarchy is chiefly composed of those men who are worthy and
honourable: now it [1294a] seems impossible that where the government
is in the hands of the good, there the laws should not be good, but
bad; or, on the contrary, that where the government is in the hands of
the bad, there the laws should be good; nor is a government well
constituted because the laws are, without at the same time care is
taken that they are observed; for to enforce obedience to the laws
which it makes is one proof of a good constitution in the
state-another is, to have laws well calculated for those who are to
abide by them; for if they are improper they must be obeyed: and this
may be done two ways, either by their being the best relative to the
particular state, or the best absolutely. An aristocracy seems most
likely to confer the honours of the state on the virtuous; for virtue
is the object of an aristocracy, riches of an oligarchy, and liberty
of a democracy; for what is approved of by the majority will prevail
in all or in each of these three different states; and that which
seems good to most of those who compose the community will prevail:
for what is called a state prevails in many communities, which aim at
a mixture of rich and poor, riches and liberty: as for the rich, they
are usually supposed to take the place of the worthy and honourable.
As there are three things which claim an equal rank in the state,
freedom, riches, and virtue (for as for the fourth, rank, it is an
attendant on two of the others, for virtue and riches are the origin
of family), it is evident, that the conjuncture of the rich and the
poor make up a free state; but that all three tend to an aristocracy
more than any other, except that which is truly so, which holds the
first rank.

We have already seen that there are governments different from a
monarchy, a democracy, and an oligarchy; and what they are, and
wherein they differ from each other; and also aristocracies and states
properly so called, which are derived from them; and it is evident
that these are not much unlike each other.




CHAPTER IX


We shall next proceed to show how that government which is peculiarly
called a state arises alongside of democracy and oligarchy, and how it
ought to be established; and this will at the same time show what are
the proper boundaries of both these governments, for we must mark out
wherein they differ from one another, and then from both these compose
a state of such parts of each of them as will show from whence they
were taken.

There are three different ways in which two states may be blended and
joined together; for, in the first place, all those rules may be
adopted which the laws of each of them have ordered; as for instance
in the judicial department, for in an oligarchy the rich are fined if
they do not come to the court as jurymen, but the poor are not paid
for their attendance; but in democracies they are, while the rich are
not fined for their neglect. Now these things, as being common to
both, are fit to be observed in a free [1294b] state which is composed
of both. This, then, is one way in which they may be joined together.
In the second place, a medium may be taken between the different
methods which each state observes; for instance, in a democracy the
right to vote in the public assembly is either confined by no census
at all, or limited by a very small one; in an oligarchy none enjoy it
but those whose census is high: therefore, as these two practices are
contrary to each other, a census between each may be established in
such a state. In the third place, different laws of each community may
be adopted; as, for instance, as it seems correspondent to the nature
of a democracy, that the magistrates should be chosen by lot, but an
aristocracy by vote, and in the one state according to a census, but
not in the other: let, then, an aristocracy and a free state copy
something from each of them; let them follow an oligarchy in choosing
their magistrates by vote, but a democracy in not admitting of any
census, and thus blend together the different customs of the two
governments. But the best proof of a happy mixture of a democracy and
an oligarchy is this, when a person may properly call the same state a
democracy and an oligarchy. It is evident that those who speak of it
in this manner are induced to it because both these governments are
there well blended together: and indeed this is common to all mediums,
that the extremes of each side should be discerned therein, as at
Lacedaemon; for many affirm that it is a democracy from the many
particulars in which it follows that form of government; as for
instance, in the first place, in the bringing up of their children,
for the rich and poor are brought up in the same manner; and their
education is such that the children of the poor may partake of it; and
the same rules are observed when they are youths and men, there is no
distinction between a rich person and a poor one; and in their public
tables the same provision is served to all. The rich also wear only
such clothes as the poorest man is able to purchase. Moreover, with
respect to two magistracies of the highest rank, one they have a right
to elect to, the other to fill; namely, the senate and the ephori.
Others consider it as an oligarchy, the principles of which it follows
in many things, as in choosing all their officers by vote, and not by
lot; in there being but a few who have a right to sit in judgment on
capital causes and the like. Indeed, a state which is well composed of
two others ought to resemble them both, and neither, Such a state
ought to have its means of preservation in itself, and not without;
and when I say in itself, I do not mean that it should owe this to the
forbearance of their neighbours, for this may happen to a bad
government, but to every member of the community's not being willing
that there should be the least alteration in their constitution. Such
is the method in which a free state or aristocracy ought to be
established.




CHAPTER X


It now remains to treat of a tyranny; not that there is [1295a] much
to be said on that subject, but as it makes part of our plan, since we
enumerated it amongst our different sorts of governments. In the
beginning of this work we inquired into the nature of kingly
government, and entered into a particular examination of what was most
properly called so, and whether it was advantageous to a state or not,
and what it should be, and how established; and we divided a tyranny
into two pieces when we were upon this subject, because there is
something analogous between this and a kingly government, for they are
both of them established by law; for among some of the barbarians
they elect a monarch with absolute power, and formerly among the
Greeks there were some such, whom they called sesumnetes. Now
these differ from each other; for some possess only kingly power
regulated by law, and rule those who voluntarily submit to their
government; others rule despotically according to their own will.
There is a third species of tyranny, most properly so called, which is
the very opposite to kingly power; for this is the government of one
who rules over his equals and superiors without being accountable for
his conduct, and whose object is his own advantage, and not the
advantage of those he governs; for which reason he rules by
compulsion, for no freemen will ever willingly submit to such a
government. These are the different species of tyrannies, their
principles, and their causes.




CHAPTER XI


We proceed now to inquire what form of government and what manner of
life is best for communities in general, not adapting it to that
superior virtue which is above the reach of the vulgar, or that
education which every advantage of nature and fortune only can
furnish, nor to those imaginary plans which may be formed at pleasure;
but to that mode of life which the greater part of mankind can attain
to, and that government which most cities may establish: for as to
those aristocracies which we have now mentioned, they are either too
perfect for a state to support, or one so nearly alike to that state
we now going to inquire into, that we shall treat of them both as one.

The opinions which we form upon these subjects must depend upon one
common principle: for if what I have said in my treatise on Morals
is true, a happy life must arise from an uninterrupted course of
virtue; and if virtue consists in a certain medium, the middle life
must certainly be the happiest; which medium is attainable [1295b] by
every one. The boundaries of virtue and vice in the state must also
necessarily be the same as in a private person; for the form of
government is the life of the city. In every city the people are
divided into three sorts; the very rich, the very poor, and those who
are between them. If this is universally admitted, that the mean is
best, it is evident that even in point of fortune mediocrity is to be
preferred; for that state is most submissive to reason; for those who
are very handsome, or very strong, or very noble, or very rich; or, on
the contrary; those who are very poor, or very weak, or very mean,
with difficulty obey it; for the one are capricious and greatly
flagitious, the other rascally and mean, the crimes of each arising
from their different excesses: nor will they go through the different
offices of the state; which is detrimental to it: besides, those who
excel in strength, in riches, or friends, or the like, neither know
how nor are willing to submit to command: and this begins at home when
they are boys; for there they are brought up too delicately to be
accustomed to obey their preceptors: as for the very poor, their
general and excessive want of what the rich enjoy reduces them to a
state too mean: so that the one know not how to command, but to be
commanded as slaves, the others know not how to submit to any command,
nor to command themselves but with despotic power.

A city composed of such men must therefore consist of slaves and
masters, not freemen; where one party must hate, and the other
despise, where there could be no possibility of friendship or
political community: for community supposes affection; for we do not
even on the road associate with our enemies. It is also the genius of
a city to be composed as much as possible of equals; which will be
most so when the inhabitants are in the middle state: from whence it
follows, that that city must be best framed which is composed of those
whom we say are naturally its proper members. It is men of this
station also who will be best assured of safety and protection; for
they will neither covet what belongs to others, as the poor do; nor
will others covet what is theirs, as the poor do what belongs to the
rich; and thus, without plotting against any one, or having any one
plot against them, they will live free from danger: for which reason
Phocylides wisely wishes for the middle state, as being most
productive of happiness. It is plain, then, that the most perfect
political community must be amongst those who are in the middle rank,
and those states are best instituted wherein these are a larger and
more respectable part, if possible, than both the other; or, if that
cannot be, at least than either of them separate; so that being thrown
into the balance it may prevent either scale from preponderating.

It is therefore the greatest happiness which the citizens can enjoy to
possess a moderate and convenient fortune; for when some possess too
much, and others nothing at [1296a] all, the government must either be
in the hands of the meanest rabble or else a pure oligarchy; or, from
the excesses of both, a tyranny; for this arises from a headstrong
democracy or an oligarchy, but very seldom when the members of the
community are nearly on an equality with each other. We will assign a
reason for this when we come to treat of the alterations which
different states are likely to undergo. The middle state is therefore
best, as being least liable to those seditions and insurrections which
disturb the community; and for the same reason extensive governments
are least liable to these inconveniences; for there those in a middle
state are very numerous, whereas in small ones it is easy to pass to
the two extremes, so as hardly to have any in a medium remaining, but
the one half rich, the other poor: and from the same principle it is
that democracies are more firmly established and of longer continuance
than oligarchies; but even in those when there is a want of a proper
number of men of middling fortune, the poor extend their power too
far, abuses arise, and the government is soon at an end.

We ought to consider as a proof of what I now advance, that the best
lawgivers themselves were those in the middle rank of life, amongst
whom was Solon, as is evident from his poems, and Lycurgus, for he was
not a king, and Charondas, and indeed most others. What has been said
will show us why of so many free states some have changed to
democracies, others to oligarchies: for whenever the number of those
in the middle state has been too small, those who were the more
numerous, whether the rich or the poor, always overpowered them and
assumed to themselves the administration of public affairs; from hence
arose either a democracy or an oligarchy. Moreover, when in
consequence of their disputes and quarrels with each other, either the
rich get the better of the poor, or the poor of the rich, neither of
them will establish a free state; but, as the record of their victory,
one which inclines to their own principles, and form either a
democracy or an oligarchy.

Those who made conquests in Greece, having all of them an eye to the
respective forms of government in their own cities, established either
democracies or oligarchies, not considering what was serviceable to
the state, but what was similar to their own; for which reason a
government has never been established where the supreme power has been
placed amongst those of the middling rank, or very seldom; and,
amongst a few, one man only of those who have yet been conquerors has
been persuaded to give the preference to this order of [1296b] men: it
is indeed an established custom with the inhabitants of most cities
not to desire an equality, but either to aspire to govern, or when
they are conquered, to submit.

Thus we have shown what the best state is, and why. It will not be
difficult to perceive of the many states which there are, for we have
seen that there are various forms both of democracies and oligarchies,
to which we should give the first place, to which the second, and in
the same manner the next also; and to observe what are the particular
excellences and defects of each, after we have first described the
best possible; for that must be the best which is nearest to this,
that worst which is most distant from the medium, without any one has
a particular plan of his own which he judges by. I mean by this, that
it may happen, that although one form of government may be better than
another, yet there is no reason to prevent another from being
preferable thereunto in particular circumstances and for particular
purposes.




CHAPTER XII


After what has been said, it follows that we should now show what
particular form of government is most suitable for particular persons;
first laying this down as a general maxim, that that party which
desires to support the actual administration of the state ought always
to be superior to that which would alter it. Every city is made up of
quality and quantity: by quality I mean liberty, riches, education,
and family, and by quantity its relative populousness: now it may
happen that quality may exist in one of those parts of which the city
is composed, and quantity in another; thus the number of the ignoble
may be greater than the number of those of family, the number of the
poor than that of the rich; but not so that the quantity of the one
shall overbalance the quality of the other; those must be properly
adjusted to each other; for where the number of the poor exceeds the
proportion we have mentioned, there a democracy will rise up, and if
the husbandry should have more power than others, it will be a
democracy of husbandmen; and the democracy will be a particular
species according to that class of men which may happen to be most
numerous: thus, should these be the husbandmen, it will be of these,
and the best; if of mechanics and those who hire themselves out, the
worst possible: in the same manner it may be of any other set between
these two. But when the rich and the noble prevail more by their
quality than they are deficient in quantity, there an oligarchy
ensues; and this oligarchy may be of different species, according to
the nature of the prevailing party. Every legislator in framing his
constitution ought to have a particular regard to those in the middle
rank of life; and if he intends an oligarchy, these should be the
object of his laws; if a democracy, to these they should be entrusted;
and whenever their number exceeds that of the two others, or at least
one of them, they give [1297a] stability to the constitution; for
there is no fear that the rich and the poor should agree to conspire
together against them, for neither of these will choose to serve the
other. If any one would choose to fix the administration on the widest
basis, he will find none preferable to this; for to rule by turns is
what the rich and the poor will not submit to, on account of their
hatred to each other. It is, moreover, allowed that an arbitrator is
the most proper person for both parties to trust to; now this
arbitrator is the middle rank.

Those who would establish aristocratical governments are mistaken not
only in giving too much power to the rich, but also in deceiving the
common people; for at last, instead of an imaginary good, they must
feel a real evil, for the encroachments of the rich are more
destructive to the state than those of the poor.




CHAPTER XIII


There are five particulars in which, under fair pretences, the rich
craftily endeavour to undermine the rights of the people, these are
their public assemblies, their offices of state, their courts of
justice, their military power, and their gymnastic exercises. With
respect to their public assemblies, in having them open to all, but in
fining the rich only, or others very little, for not attending; with
respect to offices, in permitting the poor to swear off, but not
granting this indulgence to those who are within the census; with
respect to their courts of justice, in fining the rich for
non-attendance, but the poor not at all, or those a great deal, and
these very little, as was done by the laws of Charondas. In some
places every citizen who was enrolled had a right to attend the public
assemblies and to try causes; which if they did not do, a very heavy
fine was laid upon them; that through fear of the fine they might
avoid being enrolled, as they were then obliged to do neither the one
nor the other. The same spirit of legislation prevailed with respect
to their bearing arms and their gymnastic exercises; for the poor are
excused if they have no arms, but the rich are fined; the same method
takes place if they do not attend their gymnastic exercises, there is
no penalty on one, but there is on the other: the consequence of which
is, that the fear of this penalty induces the rich to keep the one and
attend the other, while the poor do neither. These are the deceitful
contrivances of oligarchical legislators.

The contrary prevails in a democracy; for there they make the poor a
proper allowance for attending the assemblies and the courts, but give
the rich nothing for doing it: whence it is evident, that if any one
would properly blend these customs together, they must extend both the
pay and the fine to every member of the community, and then every one
would share in it, whereas part only now do. The citizens of a free
state ought to [1297b] consist of those only who bear arms: with
respect to their census it is not easy to determine exactly what it
ought to be, but the rule that should direct upon this subject should
be to make it as extensive as possible, so that those who are enrolled
in it make up a greater part of the people than those who are not; for
those who are poor, although they partake not of the offices of the
state, are willing to live quiet, provided that no one disturbs them
in their property: but this is not an easy matter; for it may not
always happen, that those who are at the head of public affairs are of
a humane behaviour. In time of war the poor are accustomed to show no
alacrity without they have provisions found them; when they have, then
indeed they are willing to fight.

In some governments the power is vested not only in those who bear
arms, but also in those who have borne them. Among the Malienses the
state was composed of these latter only, for all the officers were
soldiers who had served their time. And the first states in Greece
which succeeded those where kingly power was established, were
governed by the military. First of all the horse, for at that time the
strength and excellence of the army depended on the horse, for as to
the heavy-armed foot they were useless without proper discipline; but
the art of tactics was not known to the ancients, for which reason
their strength lay in their horse: but when cities grew larger, and
they depended more on their foot, greater numbers partook of the
freedom of the city; for which reason what we call republics were
formerly called democracies. The ancient governments were properly
oligarchies or kingdoms; for on account of the few persons in each
state, it would have been impossible to have found a sufficient number
of the middle rank; so these being but few, and those used to
subordination, they more easily submitted to be governed.

We have now shown why there are many sorts of governments, and others
different from those we have treated of: for there are more species of
democracies than one, and the like is true of other forms, and what
are their differences, and whence they arise; and also of all others
which is the best, at least in general; and which is best suited for
particular people.




CHAPTER XIV


We will now proceed to make some general reflections upon the
governments next in order, and also to consider each of them in
particular; beginning with those principles which appertain to each:
now there are three things in all states which a careful legislator
ought well to consider, which are of great consequence to all, and
which properly attended to the state must necessarily be happy; and
according to the variation of which the one will differ from the
other. The first of these is the [1298a] public assembly; the second
the officers of the state, that is, who they ought to be, and with
what power they should be entrusted, and in what manner they should be
appointed; the third, the judicial department.

Now it is the proper business of the public assembly to determine
concerning war and peace, making or breaking off alliances, to enact
laws, to sentence to death, banishment, or confiscation of goods, and
to call the magistrates to account for their behaviour when in office.
Now these powers must necessarily be entrusted to the citizens in
general, or all of them to some; either to one magistrate or more; or
some to one, and some to another, or some to all, but others to some:
to entrust all to all is in the spirit of a democracy, for the people
aim at equality. There are many methods of delegating these powers to
the citizens at large, one of which is to let them execute them by
turn, and not altogether, as was done by Tellecles, the Milesian, in
his state. In others the supreme council is composed of the different
magistrates, and they succeed to the offices of the community by
proper divisions of tribes, wards, and other very small proportions,
till every one in his turn goes through them: nor does the whole
community ever meet together, without it is when new laws are enacted,
or some national affair is debated, or to hear what the magistrates
have to propose to them. Another method is for the people to meet in a
collective body, but only for the purpose of holding the comitia,
making laws, determining concerning war or peace, and inquiring into
the conduct of their magistrates, while the remaining part of the
public business is conducted by the magistrates, who have their
separate departments, and are chosen out of the whole community either
by vote or ballot. Another method is for the people in general to meet
for the choice of the magistrates, and to examine into their conduct;
and also to deliberate concerning war and alliances, and to leave
other things to the magistrates, whoever happen to be chosen, whose
particular employments are such as necessarily require persons well
skilled therein. A fourth method is for every person to deliberate
upon every subject in public assembly, where the magistrates can
determine nothing of themselves, and have only the privilege of giving
their opinions first; and this is the method of the most pure
democracy, which is analogous to the proceedings in a dynastic
oligarchy and a tyrannic monarchy.

These, then, are the methods in which public business is conducted in
a democracy. When the power is in the hands of part of the community
only, it is an oligarchy and this also admits of different customs;
for whenever the officers of the state are chosen out of those who
have a moderate fortune, and these from that circumstance are many,
and when they depart not from that line which the law has laid down,
but carefully follow it, and when all within the census are eligible,
certainly it is then an oligarchy, but founded on true principles of
government [1298b] from its moderation. When the people in general do
not partake of the deliberative power, but certain persons chosen for
that purpose, who govern according to law; this also, like the first,
is an oligarchy. When those who have the deliberative power elect each
other, and the son succeeds to the father, and when they can supersede
the laws, such a government is of necessity a strict oligarchy. When
some persons determine on one thing, and others on another, as war and
peace, and when all inquire into the conduct of their magistrates, and
other things are left to different officers, elected either by vote or
lot, then the government is an aristocracy or a free state. When some
are chosen by vote and others by lot, and these either from the people
in general, or from a certain number elected for that purpose, or if
both the votes and the lots are open to all, such a state is partly an
aristocracy, partly a free government itself. These are the different
methods in which the deliberative power is vested in different states,
all of whom follow some regulation here laid down. It is advantageous
to a democracy, in the present sense of the word, by which I mean a
state wherein the people at large have a supreme power, even over the
laws, to hold frequent public assemblies; and it will be best in this
particular to imitate the example of oligarchies in their courts of
justice; for they fine those who are appointed to try causes if they
do not attend, so should they reward the poor for coming to the public
assemblies: and their counsels will be best when all advise with each
other, the citizens with the nobles, the nobles with the citizens. It
is also advisable when the council is to be composed of part of the
citizens, to elect, either by vote or lot, an equal number of both
ranks. It is also proper, if the common people in the state are very
numerous, either not to pay every one for his attendance, but such a
number only as will make them equal to the nobles, or to reject many
of them by lot.

In an oligarchy they should either call up some of the common people
to the council, or else establish a court, as is done in some other
states, whom they call pre-advisers or guardians of the laws, whose
business should be to propose first what they should afterwards enact.
By this means the people would have a place in the administration of
public affairs, without having it in their power to occasion any
disorder in the government. Moreover, the people may be allowed to
have a vote in whatever bill is proposed, but may not themselves
propose anything contrary thereto; or they may give their advice,
while the power of determining may be with the magistrates only. It is
also necessary to follow a contrary practice to what is established in
democracies, for the people should be allowed the power of pardoning,
but not of condemning, for the cause should be referred back again to
the magistrates: whereas the contrary takes place in republics; for
the power of pardoning is with the few, but not of condemning, which
is always referred [1299a] to the people at large. And thus we
determine concerning the deliberative power in any state, and in whose
hands it shall be.




CHAPTER XV


We now proceed to consider the choice of magistrates; for this branch
of public business contains many different Parts, as how many there
shall be, what shall be their particular office, and with respect to
time how long each of them shall continue in place; for some make it
six months, others shorter, others for a year, others for a much
longer time; or whether they should be perpetual or for a long time,
or neither; for the same person may fill the same office several
times, or he may not be allowed to enjoy it even twice, but only once:
and also with respect to the appointment of magistrates, who are to be
eligible, who is to choose them, and in what manner; for in all these
particulars we ought properly to distinguish the different ways which
may be followed; and then to show which of these is best suited to
such and such governments.

Now it is not easy to determine to whom we ought properly to give the
name of magistrate, for a government requires many persons in office;
but every one of those who is either chosen by vote or lot is not to
be reckoned a magistrate. The priests, for instance, in the first
place; for these are to be considered as very different from civil
magistrates: to these we may add the choregi and heralds; nay, even
ambassadors are elected: there are some civil employments which belong
to the citizens; and these are either when they are all engaged in one
thing, as when as soldiers they obey their general, or when part of
them only are, as in governing the women or educating the youth; and
also some economic, for they often elect corn-meters: others are
servile, and in which, if they are rich, they employ slaves. But
indeed they are most properly called magistrates, who are members of
the deliberative council, or decide causes, or are in some command,
the last more especially, for to command is peculiar to magistrates.
But to speak truth, this question is of no great consequence, nor is
it the province of the judges to decide between those who dispute
about words; it may indeed be an object of speculative inquiry; but to
inquire what officers are necessary in a state, and how many, and
what, though not most necessary, may yet be advantageous in a
well-established government, is a much more useful employment, and
this with respect to all states in general, as well as to small
cities.

In extensive governments it is proper to allot one employment to one
person, as there are many to serve the public in so numerous a
society, where some may be passed over for a long time, and others
never be in office but once; and indeed everything is better done
which has the whole attention of one person, than when that [1299b]
attention is divided amongst many; but in small states it is necessary
that a few of the citizens should execute many employments; for their
numbers are so small it will not be convenient to have many of them in
office at the same time; for where shall we find others to succeed
them in turn? Small states will sometimes want the same magistrates
and the same laws as large ones; but the one will not want to employ
them so often as the other; so that different charges may be intrusted
to the same person without any inconvenience, for they will not
interfere with each other, and for want of sufficient members in the
community it will be necessary. If we could tell how many magistrates
are necessary in every city, and how many, though not necessary, it is
yet proper to have, we could then the better know how many different
offices one might assign to one magistrate. It is also necessary to
know what tribunals in different places should have different things
under their jurisdiction, and also what things should always come
under the cognisance of the same magistrate; as, for instance, decency
of manners, shall the clerk of the market take cognisance of that if
the cause arises in the market, and another magistrate in another
place, or the same magistrate everywhere: or shall there be a
distinction made of the fact, or the parties? as, for instance, in
decency of manners, shall it be one cause when it relates to a man,
another when it relates to a woman?

In different states shall the magistrates be different or the same? I
mean, whether in a democracy, an oligarchy, an aristocracy, and a
monarchy, the same persons shall have the same power? or shall it vary
according to the different formation of the government? as in an
aristocracy the offices of the state are allotted to those who are
well educated; in an oligarchy to those who are rich; in a democracy
to the freemen? Or shall the magistrates differ as the communities
differ? For it may happen that the very same may be sometimes proper,
sometimes otherwise: in this state it may be necessary that the
magistrate have great powers, in that but small. There are also
certain magistrates peculiar to certain states--as the pre-advisers
are not proper in a democracy, but a senate is; for one such order is
necessary, whose business shall be to consider beforehand and prepare
those bills which shall be brought before the people that they may
have leisure to attend to their own affairs; and when these are few in
number the state inclines to an oligarchy. The pre-advisers indeed
must always be few for they are peculiar to an oligarchy: and where
there are both these offices in the same state, the pre-adviser's is
superior to the senator's, the one having only a democratical power,
the other an oligarchical: and indeed the [1300a] power of the senate
is lost in those democracies, in which the people, meeting in one
public assembly, take all the business into their own hands; and this
is likely to happen either when the community in general are in easy
circumstances, or when they are paid for their attendance; for they
are then at leisure often to meet together and determine everything
for themselves. A magistrate whose business is to control the manners
of the boys, or women, or who takes any department similar to this, is
to be found in an aristocracy, not in a democracy; for who can forbid
the wives of the poor from appearing in public? neither is such a one
to be met with in an oligarchy; for the women there are too delicate
to bear control. And thus much for this subject. Let us endeavour to
treat at large of the establishment of magistrates, beginning from
first principles. Now, they differ from each other in three ways, from
which, blended together, all the varieties which can be imagined
arise. The first of these differences is in those who appoint the
magistrates, the second consists in those who are appointed, the third
in the mode of appointment; and each of these three differ in three
manners; for either all the citizens may appoint collectively, or some
out of their whole body, or some out of a particular order in it,
according to fortune, family, or virtue, or some other rule (as at
Megara, where the right of election was amongst those who had returned
together to their country, and had reinstated themselves by force of
arms) and this either by vote or lot. Again, these several modes may
be differently formed together, as some magistrates may be chosen by
part of the community, others by the whole; some out of part, others
out of the whole; some by vote, others by lot: and each of these
different modes admit of a four-fold subdivision; for either all may
elect all by vote or by lot; and when all elect, they may either
proceed without any distinction, or they may elect by a certain
division of tribes, wards, or companies, till they have gone through
the whole community: and some magistrates may be elected one way, and
others another. Again, if some magistrates are elected either by vote
or lot of all the citizens, or by the vote of some and the lot of
some, or some one way and some another; that is to say, some by the
vote of all, others by the lot of all, there will then be twelve
different methods of electing the magistrates, without blending the
two together. Of these there are two adapted to a democracy; namely,
to have all the magistrates chosen out of all the people, either by
vote or lot, or both; that is to say, some of them by lot, some by
vote. In a free state the whole community should not elect at the same
time, but some out of the whole, or out of some particular rank; and
this either by lot, or vote, or both: and they should elect either out
of the whole community, or out of some particular persons in it, and
this both by lot and vote. In an oligarchy it is proper to choose some
magistrates out of the whole body of the citizens, some by vote, some
by lot, others by both: by lot is most correspondent to that form of
government. In a free aristocracy, some magistrates [1300b] should be
chosen out of the community in general, others out of a particular
rank, or these by choice, those by lot. In a pure oligarchy, the
magistrates should be chosen out of certain ranks, and by certain
persons, and some of those by lot, others by both methods; but to
choose them out of the whole community is not correspondent to the
nature of this government. It is proper in an aristocracy for the
whole community to elect their magistrates out of particular persons,
and this by vote. These then are all the different ways of electing of
magistrates; and they have been allotted according to the nature of
the different communities; but what mode of proceeding is proper for
different communities, or how the offices ought to be established, or
with what powers shall be particularly explained. I mean by the powers
of a magistrate, what should be his particular province, as the
management of the finances or the laws of the state; for different
magistrates have different powers, as that of the general of the army
differs from the clerk of the market.




CHAPTER XVI


Of the three parts of which a government is formed, we now come to
consider the judicial; and this also we shall divide in the same
manner as we did the magisterial, into three parts. Of whom the judges
shall consist, and for what causes, and how. When I say of whom, I
mean whether they shall be the whole people, or some particulars; by
for what causes I mean, how many different courts shall be appointed;
by how, whether they shall be elected by vote or lot. Let us first
determine how many different courts there ought to be. Now these are
eight. The first of these is the court of inspection over the
behaviour of the magistrates when they have quitted their office; the
second is to punish those who have injured the public; the third is to
take cognisance of those causes in which the state is a party; the
fourth is to decide between magistrates and private persons, who
appeal from a fine laid upon them; the fifth is to determine disputes
which may arise concerning contracts of great value; the sixth is to
judge between foreigners, and of murders, of which there are different
species; and these may all be tried by the same judges or by different
ones; for there are murders of malice prepense and of chance-medley;
there is also justifiable homicide, where the fact is admitted, and
the legality of it disputed.

There is also another court called at Athens the Court of Phreattae,
which determines points relating to a murder committed by one who has
run away, to decide whether he shall return; though such an affair
happens but seldom, and in very large cities; the seventh, to
determine causes wherein strangers are concerned, and this whether
they are between stranger and stranger or between a stranger and a
citizen. The eighth and last is for small actions, from one to five
drachma's, or a little more; for these ought also to be legally
determined, but not to be brought before the whole body of the judges.
But without entering into any particulars concerning actions for
murder, and those wherein strangers are the parties, let us
particularly treat of those courts which have the jurisdiction of
those matters which more particularly relate to the affairs of the
community and which if not well conducted occasion seditions and
commotions in the state. Now, of necessity, either all persons must
have a right to judge of all these different causes, appointed for
that purpose, either by vote or lot, or all of all, some of them by
vote, and others by lot, or in some causes by vote, in others by lot.
Thus there will be four sorts of judges. There [1301a] will be just
the same number also if they are chosen out of part of the people
only; for either all the judges must be chosen out of that part either
by vote or lot, or some by lot and some by vote, or the judges in
particular causes must be chosen some by vote, others by lot; by which
means there will be the same number of them also as was mentioned.
Besides, different judges may be joined together; I mean those who are
chosen out of the whole people or part of them or both; so that all
three may sit together in the same court, and this either by vote,
lot, or both. And thus much for the different sorts of judges. Of
these appointments that which admits all the community to be judges in
all causes is most suitable to a democracy; the second, which appoints
that certain persons shall judge all causes, to an oligarchy; the
third, which appoints the whole community to be judges in some causes,
but particular persons in others, to an aristocracy or free state.