BOOK III

Treatise on Government

by Aristotle

BOOK III, TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT by Aristotle




CHAPTER I


Every one who inquires into the nature of government, and what are its
different forms, should make this almost his first question, What is a
city? For upon this there is a dispute: for some persons say the city
did this or that, while others say, not the city, but the oligarchy,
or the tyranny. We see that the city is the only object which both the
politician and legislator have in view in all they do: but government
is a certain ordering of those who inhabit a city. As a city is a
collective body, and, like other wholes, composed of many parts, it is
evident our first inquiry must be, what a citizen is: for a city is a
certain number of citizens. So that we must consider whom we ought to
call citizen, and who is one; for this is often doubtful: for every
one will not allow that this character is applicable to the same
person; for that man who would be a citizen in a republic would very
often not be one in an oligarchy. We do not include in this inquiry
many of those who acquire this appellation out of the ordinary way, as
honorary persons, for instance, but those only who have a natural
right to it.

Now it is not residence which constitutes a man a citizen; for in this
sojourners and slaves are upon an equality with him; nor will it be
sufficient for this purpose, that you have the privilege of the laws,
and may plead or be impleaded, for this all those of different
nations, between whom there is a mutual agreement for that purpose,
are allowed; although it very often happens, that sojourners have not
a perfect right therein without the protection of a patron, to whom
they are obliged to apply, which shows that their share in the
community is incomplete. In like manner, with respect to boys who are
not yet enrolled, or old men who are past war, we admit that they are
in some respects citizens, but not completely so, but with some
exceptions, for these are not yet arrived to years of maturity, and
those are past service; nor is there any difference between them. But
what we mean is sufficiently intelligible and clear, we want a
complete citizen, one in whom there is no deficiency to be corrected
to make him so. As to those who are banished, or infamous, there may
be the same objections made and the same answer given. There is
nothing that more characterises a complete citizen than having a share
in the judicial and executive part of the government.

With respect to offices, some are fixed to a particular time, so that
no person is, on any account, permitted to fill them twice; or else
not till some certain period has intervened; others are not fixed, as
a juryman's, and a member of the general assembly: but probably some
one may say these are not offices, nor have the citizens in these
capacities any share in the government; though surely it is ridiculous
to say that those who have the principal power in the state bear no
office in it. But this objection is of no weight, for it is only a
dispute about words; as there is no general term which can be applied
both to the office of a juryman and a member of the assembly. For the
sake of distinction, suppose we call it an indeterminate office: but I
lay it down as a maxim, that those are citizens who could exercise it.
Such then is the description of a citizen who comes nearest to what
all those who are called citizens are. Every one also should know,
that of the component parts of those things which differ from each
other in species, after the first or second remove, those which follow
have either nothing at all or very little common to each.

Now we see that governments differ from each other in their form, and
that some of them are defective, others [1275b] as excellent as
possible: for it is evident, that those which have many deficiencies
and degeneracies in them must be far inferior to those which are
without such faults. What I mean by degeneracies will be hereafter
explained. Hence it is clear that the office of a citizen must differ
as governments do from each other: for which reason he who is called a
citizen has, in a democracy, every privilege which that station
supposes. In other forms of government he may enjoy them; but not
necessarily: for in some states the people have no power; nor have
they any general assembly, but a few select men.

The trial also of different causes is allotted to different persons;
as at Lacedaemon all disputes concerning contracts are brought before
some of the ephori: the senate are the judges in cases of murder, and
so on; some being to be heard by one magistrate, others by another:
and thus at Carthage certain magistrates determine all causes. But our
former description of a citizen will admit of correction; for in some
governments the office of a juryman and a member of the general
assembly is not an indeterminate one; but there are particular persons
appointed for these purposes, some or all of the citizens being
appointed jurymen or members of the general assembly, and this either
for all causes and all public business whatsoever, or else for some
particular one: and this may be sufficient to show what a citizen is;
for he who has a right to a share in the judicial and executive part
of government in any city, him we call a citizen of that place; and a
city, in one word, is a collective body of such persons sufficient in
themselves to all the purposes of life.




CHAPTER II


In common use they define a citizen to be one who is sprung from
citizens on both sides, not on the father's or the mother's only.
Others carry the matter still further, and inquire how many of his
ancestors have been citizens, as his grandfather, great-grandfather,
etc., but some persons have questioned how the first of the family
could prove themselves citizens, according to this popular and
careless definition. Gorgias of Leontium, partly entertaining the same
doubt, and partly in jest, says, that as a mortar is made by a
mortar-maker, so a citizen is made by a citizen-maker, and a
Larisssean by a Larisssean-maker. This is indeed a very simple account
of the matter; for if citizens are so, according to this definition,
it will be impossible to apply it to the first founders or first
inhabitants of states, who cannot possibly claim in right either of
their father or mother. It is probably a matter of still more
difficulty to determine their rights as citizens who are admitted to
their freedom after any revolution in the state. As, for instance, at
Athens, after the expulsion of the tyrants, when Clisthenes enrolled
many foreigners and city-slaves amongst the tribes; and the doubt with
respect to them was, not whether they were citizens or no, but whether
they were legally so or not. Though indeed some persons may have this
further [1276a] doubt, whether a citizen can be a citizen when he is
illegally made; as if an illegal citizen, and one who is no citizen at
all, were in the same predicament: but since we see some persons
govern unjustly, whom yet we admit to govern, though not justly, and
the definition of a citizen is one who exercises certain offices, for
such a one we have defined a citizen to be, it is evident, that a
citizen illegally created yet continues to be a citizen, but whether
justly or unjustly so belongs to the former inquiry.




CHAPTER III


It has also been doubted what was and what was not the act of the
city; as, for instance, when a democracy arises out of an aristocracy
or a tyranny; for some persons then refuse to fulfil their contracts;
as if the right to receive the money was in the tyrant and not in the
state, and many other things of the same nature; as if any covenant
was founded for violence and not for the common good. So in like
manner, if anything is done by those who have the management of public
affairs where a democracy is established, their actions are to be
considered as the actions of the state, as well as in the oligarchy or
tyranny.

And here it seems very proper to consider this question, When shall we
say that a city is the same, and when shall we say that it is
different?

It is but a superficial mode of examining into this question to begin
with the place and the people; for it may happen that these may be
divided from that, or that some one of them may live in one place, and
some in another (but this question may be regarded as no very knotty
one; for, as a city may acquire that appellation on many accounts, it
may be solved many ways); and in like manner, when men inhabit one
common place, when shall we say that they inhabit the same city, or
that the city is the same? for it does not depend upon the walls; for
I can suppose Peloponnesus itself surrounded with a wall, as Babylon
was, and every other place, which rather encircles many nations than
one city, and that they say was taken three days when some of the
inhabitants knew nothing of it: but we shall find a proper time to
determine this question; for the extent of a city, how large it should
be, and whether it should consist of more than one people, these are
particulars that the politician should by no means be unacquainted
with. This, too, is a matter of inquiry, whether we shall say that a
city is the same while it is inhabited by the same race of men, though
some of them are perpetually dying, others coming into the world, as
we say that a river or a fountain is the same, though the waters are
continually changing; or when a revolution takes place shall we
[1276b] say the men are the same, but the city is different: for if a
city is a community, it is a community of citizens; but if the mode of
government should alter, and become of another sort, it would seem a
necessary consequence that the city is not the same; as we regard the
tragic chorus as different from the comic, though it may probably
consist of the same performers: thus every other community or
composition is said to be different if the species of composition is
different; as in music the same hands produce different harmony, as
the Doric and Phrygian. If this is true, it is evident, that when we
speak of a city as being the same we refer to the government there
established; and this, whether it is called by the same name or any
other, or inhabited by the same men or different. But whether or no it
is right to dissolve the community when the constitution is altered is
another question.




CHAPTER IV


What has been said, it follows that we should consider whether the
same virtues which constitute a good man make a valuable citizen, or
different; and if a particular inquiry is necessary for this matter we
must first give a general description of the virtues of a good
citizen; for as a sailor is one of those who make up a community, so
is a citizen, although the province of one sailor may be different
from another's (for one is a rower, another a steersman, a third a
boatswain, and so on, each having their several appointments), it is
evident that the most accurate description of any one good sailor must
refer to his peculiar abilities, yet there are some things in which
the same description may be applied to the whole crew, as the safety
of the ship is the common business of all of them, for this is the
general centre of all their cares: so also with respect to citizens,
although they may in a few particulars be very different, yet there is
one care common to them all, the safety of the community, for the
community of the citizens composes the state; for which reason the
virtue of a citizen has necessarily a reference to the state. But if
there are different sorts of governments, it is evident that those
actions which constitute the virtue of an excellent citizen in one
community will not constitute it in another; wherefore the virtue of
such a one cannot be perfect: but we say, a man is good when his
virtues are perfect; from whence it follows, that an excellent citizen
does not possess that virtue which constitutes a good man. Those who
are any ways doubtful concerning this question may be convinced of the
truth of it by examining into the best formed states: for, if it is
impossible that a city should consist entirely of excellent citizens
(while it is necessary that every one should do well in his calling,
in which consists his excellence, as it is impossible that all the
citizens should have the same [1277a] qualifications) it is impossible
that the virtue of a citizen and a good man should be the same; for
all should possess the virtue of an excellent citizen: for from hence
necessarily arise the perfection of the city: but that every one
should possess the virtue of a good man is impossible without all the
citizens in a well-regulated state were necessarily virtuous. Besides,
as a city is composed of dissimilar parts, as an animal is of life and
body; the soul of reason and appetite; a family of a man and his
wife--property of a master and a slave; in the same manner, as a city
is composed of all these and many other very different parts, it
necessarily follows that the virtue of all the citizens cannot be the
same; as the business of him who leads the band is different from the
other dancers. From all which proofs it is evident that the virtues of
a citizen cannot be one and the same. But do we never find those
virtues united which constitute a good man and excellent citizen? for
we say, such a one is an excellent magistrate and a prudent and good
man; but prudence is a necessary qualification for all those who
engage in public affairs. Nay, some persons affirm that the education
of those who are intended to command should, from the beginning, be
different from other citizens, as the children of kings are generally
instructed in riding and warlike exercises; and thus Euripides says:

"... No showy arts Be mine, but teach me what the state requires."

As if those who are to rule were to have an education peculiar to
themselves. But if we allow, that the virtues of a good man and a good
magistrate may be the same, and a citizen is one who obeys the
magistrate, it follows that the virtue of the one cannot in general be
the same as the virtue of the other, although it may be true of some
particular citizen; for the virtue of the magistrate must be different
from the virtue of the citizen. For which reason Jason declared that
was he deprived of his kingdom he should pine away with regret, as not
knowing how to live a private man. But it is a great recommendation to
know how to command as well as to obey; and to do both these things
well is the virtue of an accomplished citizen. If then the virtue of a
good man consists only in being able to command, but the virtue of a
good citizen renders him equally fit for the one as well as the other,
the commendation of both of them is not the same. It appears, then,
that both he who commands and he who obeys should each of them learn
their separate business: but that the citizen should be master of and
take part in both these, as any one may easily perceive; in a family
government there is no occasion for the master to know how to perform
the necessary offices, but rather to enjoy the labour of others; for
to do the other is a servile part. I mean by the other, the common
family business of the slave.

There are many sorts of slaves; for their employments are various: of
these the handicraftsmen are one, who, as their name imports, get
their living by the labour of their hands, and amongst these all
mechanics are included; [1277b] for which reasons such workmen, in
some states, were not formerly admitted into any share in the
government; till at length democracies were established: it is not
therefore proper for any man of honour, or any citizen, or any one who
engages in public affairs, to learn these servile employments without
they have occasion for them for their own use; for without this was
observed the distinction between a master and a slave would be lost.
But there is a government of another sort, in which men govern those
who are their equals in rank, and freemen, which we call a political
government, in which men learn to command by first submitting to obey,
as a good general of horse, or a commander-in-chief, must acquire a
knowledge of their duty by having been long under the command of
another, and the like in every appointment in the army: for well is it
said, no one knows how to command who has not himself been under
command of another. The virtues of those are indeed different, but a
good citizen must necessarily be endowed with them; he ought also to
know in what manner freemen ought to govern, as well as be governed:
and this, too, is the duty of a good man. And if the temperance and
justice of him who commands is different from his who, though a
freeman, is under command, it is evident that the virtues of a good
citizen cannot be the same as justice, for instance but must be of a
different species in these two different situations, as the temperance
and courage of a man and a woman are different from each other; for a
man would appear a coward who had only that courage which would be
graceful in a woman, and a woman would be thought a talker who should
take as large a part in the conversation as would become a man of
consequence.

The domestic employments of each of them are also different; it is the
man's business to acquire subsistence, the woman's to take care of it.
But direction and knowledge of public affairs is a virtue peculiar to
those who govern, while all others seem to be equally requisite for
both parties; but with this the governed have no concern, it is theirs
to entertain just notions: they indeed are like flute-makers, while
those who govern are the musicians who play on them. And thus much to
show whether the virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is the
same, or if it is different, and also how far it is the same, and how
far different.




CHAPTER V


But with respect to citizens there is a doubt remaining, whether those
only are truly so who are allowed to share in the government, or
whether the mechanics also are to be considered as such? for if those
who are not permitted to rule are to be reckoned among them, it is
impossible that the virtue of all the citizens should be the same, for
these also are citizens; and if none of them are admitted to be
citizens, where shall they be ranked? for they are neither [1278a]
sojourners nor foreigners? or shall we say that there will no
inconvenience arise from their not being citizens, as they are neither
slaves nor freedmen: for this is certainly true, that all those are
not citizens who are necessary to the existence of a city, as boys are
not citizens in the same manner that men are, for those are perfectly
so, the others under some conditions; for they are citizens, though
imperfect ones: for in former times among some people the mechanics
were either slaves or foreigners, for which reason many of them are so
now: and indeed the best regulated states will not permit a mechanic
to be a citizen; but if it be allowed them, we cannot then attribute
the virtue we have described to every citizen or freeman, but to those
only who are disengaged from servile offices. Now those who are
employed by one person in them are slaves; those who do them for money
are mechanics and hired servants: hence it is evident on the least
reflection what is their situation, for what I have said is fully
explained by appearances. Since the number of communities is very
great, it follows necessarily that there will be many different sorts
of citizens, particularly of those who are governed by others, so that
in one state it may be necessary to admit mechanics and hired servants
to be citizens, but in others it may be impossible; as particularly in
an aristocracy, where honours are bestowed on virtue and dignity: for
it is impossible for one who lives the life of a mechanic or hired
servant to acquire the practice of virtue. In an oligarchy also hired
servants are not admitted to be citizens; because there a man's right
to bear any office is regulated by his fortune; but mechanics are, for
many citizens are very rich.

There was a law at Thebes that no one could have a share in the
government till he had been ten years out of trade. In many states the
law invites strangers to accept the freedom of the city; and in some
democracies the son of a free-woman is himself free. The same is also
observed in many others with respect to natural children; but it is
through want of citizens regularly born that they admit such: for
these laws are always made in consequence of a scarcity of
inhabitants; so, as their numbers increase, they first deprive the
children of a male or female slave of this privilege, next the child
of a free-woman, and last of all they will admit none but those whose
fathers and mothers were both free.

That there are many sorts of citizens, and that he may be said to be
as completely who shares the honours of the state, is evident from
what has been already said. Thus Achilles, in Homer, complains of
Agamemnon's treating him like an unhonoured stranger; for a stranger
or sojourner is one who does not partake of the honours of the state:
and whenever the right to the freedom of the city is kept obscure, it
is for the sake of the inhabitants. [1278b] From what has been said it
is plain whether the virtue of a good man and an excellent citizen is
the same or different: and we find that in some states it is the
same, in others not; and also that this is not true of each citizen,
but of those only who take the lead, or are capable of taking the
lead, in public affairs, either alone or in conjunction with others.




CHAPTER VI


Having established these points, we proceed next to consider whether
one form of government only should be established, or more than one;
and if more, how many, and of what sort, and what are the differences
between them. The form of government is the ordering and regulating of
the city, and all the offices in it, particularly those wherein the
supreme power is lodged; and this power is always possessed by the
administration; but the administration itself is that particular form
of government which is established in any state: thus in a democracy
the supreme power is lodged in the whole people; on the contrary, in
an oligarchy it is in the hands of a few. We say then, that the form
of government in these states is different, and we shall find the same
thing hold good in others. Let us first determine for whose sake a
city is established; and point out the different species of rule which
man may submit to in social life.

I have already mentioned in my treatise on the management of a family,
and the power of the master, that man is an animal naturally formed
for society, and that therefore, when he does not want any foreign
assistance, he will of his own accord desire to live with others; not
but that mutual advantage induces them to it, as far as it enables
each person to live more agreeably; and this is indeed the great
object not only to all in general, but also to each individual: but it
is not merely matter of choice, but they join in society also, even
that they may be able to live, which probably is not without some
share of merit, and they also support civil society, even for the sake
of preserving life, without they are grievously overwhelmed with the
miseries of it: for it is very evident that men will endure many
calamities for the sake of living, as being something naturally sweet
and desirable. It is easy to point out the different modes of
government, and we have already settled them in our exoteric
discourses. The power of the master, though by nature equally
serviceable, both to the master and to the slave, yet nevertheless has
for its object the benefit of the master, while the benefit of the
slave arises accidentally; for if the slave is destroyed, the power of
the master is at an end: but the authority which a man has over his
wife, and children, and his family, which we call domestic government,
is either for the benefit of those who are under subjection, or else
for the common benefit of the whole: but its particular object is the
benefit of the governed, as we see in other arts; in physic, for
instance, and the gymnastic exercises, wherein, if any benefit [1279a]
arise to the master, it is accidental; for nothing forbids the master
of the exercises from sometimes being himself one of those who
exercises, as the steersman is always one of the sailors; but both the
master of the exercises and the steersman consider the good of those
who are under their government. Whatever good may happen to the
steersman when he is a sailor, or to the master of the exercises when
he himself makes one at the games, is not intentional, or the object
of their power; thus in all political governments which are
established to preserve and defend the equality of the citizens it is
held right to rule by turns. Formerly, as was natural, every one
expected that each of his fellow-citizens should in his turn serve the
public, and thus administer to his private good, as he himself when in
office had done for others; but now every one is desirous of being
continually in power, that he may enjoy the advantage which he makes
of public business and being in office; as if places were a
never-failing remedy for every complaint, and were on that account so
eagerly sought after.

It is evident, then, that all those governments which have a common
good in view are rightly established and strictly just, but those who
have in view only the good of the rulers are all founded on wrong
principles, and are widely different from what a government ought to
be, for they are tyranny over slaves, whereas a city is a community of
freemen.




CHAPTER VII


Having established these particulars, we come to consider next the
different number of governments which there are, and what they are;
and first, what are their excellencies: for when we have determined
this, their defects will be evident enough.

It is evident that every form of government or administration, for the
words are of the same import, must contain a supreme power over the
whole state, and this supreme power must necessarily be in the hands
of one person, or a few, or many; and when either of these apply their
power for the common good, such states are well governed; but when the
interest of the one, the few, or the many who enjoy this power is
alone consulted, then ill; for you must either affirm that those who
make up the community are not citizens, or else let these share in the
advantages of government. We usually call a state which is governed by
one person for the common good, a kingdom; one that is governed by
more than one, but by a few only, an aristocracy; either because the
government is in the hands of the most worthy citizens, or because it
is the best form for the city and its inhabitants. When the citizens
at large govern for the public good, it is called a state; which is
also a common name for all other governments, and these distinctions
are consonant to reason; for it will not be difficult to find one
person, or a very few, of very distinguished abilities, but almost
impossible to meet with the majority [1279b] of a people eminent for
every virtue; but if there is one common to a whole nation it is
valour; for this is created and supported by numbers: for which reason
in such a state the profession of arms will always have the greatest
share in the government.

Now the corruptions attending each of these governments are these; a
kingdom may degenerate into a tyranny, an aristocracy into an
oligarchy, and a state into a democracy. Now a tyranny is a monarchy
where the good of one man only is the object of government, an
oligarchy considers only the rich, and a democracy only the poor; but
neither of them have a common good in view.




CHAPTER VIII


It will be necessary to enlarge a little more upon the nature of each
of these states, which is not without some difficulty, for he who
would enter into a philosophical inquiry into the principles of them,
and not content himself with a superficial view of their outward
conduct, must pass over and omit nothing, but explain the true spirit
of each of them. A tyranny then is, as has been said, a monarchy,
where one person has an absolute and despotic power over the whole
community and every member therein: an oligarchy, where the supreme
power of the state is lodged with the rich: a democracy, on the
contrary, is where those have it who are worth little or nothing. But
the first difficulty that arises from the distinctions which we have
laid down is this, should it happen that the majority of the
inhabitants who possess the power of the state (for this is a
democracy) should be rich, the question is, how does this agree with
what we have said? The same difficulty occurs, should it ever happen
that the poor compose a smaller part of the people than the rich, but
from their superior abilities acquire the supreme power; for this is
what they call an oligarchy; it should seem then that our definition
of the different states was not correct: nay, moreover, could any one
suppose that the majority of the people were poor, and the minority
rich, and then describe the state in this manner, that an oligarchy
was a government in which the rich, being few in number, possessed the
supreme power, and that a democracy was a state in which the poor,
being many in number, possessed it, still there will be another
difficulty; for what name shall we give to those states we have been
describing? I mean, that b which the greater number are rich, and that
in which the lesser number are poor (where each of these possess the
supreme power), if there are no other states than those we have
described. It seems therefore evident to reason, that whether the
supreme power is vested in the hands of many or few may be a matter of
accident; but that it is clear enough, that when it is in the hands of
the few, it will be a government of the rich; when in the hands of the
many, it will be a government of the poor; since in all countries
there are many poor and few rich: it is not therefore the cause that
has been already assigned (namely, the number of people in power) that
makes the difference between the two governments; but an oligarchy and
democracy differ in this from each other, in the poverty of those who
govern in the one, and the riches I28oa of those who govern in the
other; for when the government is in the hands of the rich, be they
few or be they more, it is an oligarchy; when it is in the hands of
the poor, it is a democracy: but, as we have already said, the one
will be always few, the other numerous, but both will enjoy liberty;
and from the claims of wealth and liberty will arise continual
disputes with each other for the lead in public affairs.




CHAPTER IX


Let us first determine what are the proper limits of an oligarchy and
a democracy, and what is just in each of these states; for all men
have some natural inclination to justice; but they proceed therein
only to a certain degree; nor can they universally point out what is
absolutely just; as, for instance, what is equal appears just, and is
so; but not to all; only among those who are equals: and what is
unequal appears just, and is so; but not to all, only amongst those
who are unequals; which circumstance some people neglect, and
therefore judge ill; the reason for which is, they judge for
themselves, and every one almost is the worst judge in his own cause.
Since then justice has reference to persons, the same distinctions
must be made with respect to persons which are made with respect to
things, in the manner that I have already described in my Ethics.

As to the equality of the things, these they agree in; but their
dispute is concerning the equality of the persons, and chiefly for the
reason above assigned; because they judge ill in their own cause; and
also because each party thinks, that if they admit what is right in
some particulars, they have done justice on the whole: thus, for
instance, if some persons are unequal in riches, they suppose them
unequal in the whole; or, on the contrary, if they are equal in
liberty, they suppose them equal in the whole: but what is absolutely
just they omit; for if civil society was founded for the sake of
preserving and increasing property, every one's right in the city
would be equal to his fortune; and then the reasoning of those who
insist upon an oligarchy would be valid; for it would not be right
that he who contributed one mina should have an equal share in the
hundred along with him who brought in all the rest, either of the
original money or what was afterwards acquired.

Nor was civil society founded merely to preserve the lives of its
members; but that they might live well: for otherwise a state might
be composed of slaves, or the animal creation: but this is not so; for
these have no share in the happiness of it; nor do they live after
their own choice; nor is it an alliance mutually to defend each other
from injuries, or for a commercial intercourse: for then the
Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians, and all other nations between whom
treaties of commerce subsist, would be citizens of one city; for they
have articles to regulate their exports and imports, and engagements
for mutual protection, and alliances for mutual defence; but [1280b]
yet they have not all the same magistrates established among them, but
they are different among the different people; nor does the one take
any care, that the morals of the other should be as they ought, or
that none of those who have entered into the common agreements should
be unjust, or in any degree vicious, only that they do not injure any
member of the confederacy. But whosoever endeavours to establish
wholesome laws in a state, attends to the virtues and the vices of
each individual who composes it; from whence it is evident, that the
first care of him who would found a city, truly deserving that name,
and not nominally so, must be to have his citizens virtuous; for
otherwise it is merely an alliance for self-defence; differing from
those of the same cast which are made between different people only in
place: for law is an agreement and a pledge, as the sophist Lycophron
says, between the citizens of their intending to do justice to each
other, though not sufficient to make all the citizens just and good:
and that this is fiact is evident, for could any one bring different
places together, as, for instance, enclose Megara and Corinth in a
wall, yet they would not be one city, not even if the inhabitants
intermarried with each other, though this inter-community contributes
much to make a place one city. Besides, could we suppose a set of
people to live separate from each other, but within such a distance as
would admit of an intercourse, and that there were laws subsisting
between each party, to prevent their injuring one another in their
mutual dealings, supposing one a carpenter, another a husbandman,
shoemaker, and the like, and that their numbers were ten thousand,
still all that they would have together in common would be a tariff
for trade, or an alliance for mutual defence, but not the same city.
And why? not because their mutual intercourse is not near enough, for
even if persons so situated should come to one place, and every one
should live in his own house as in his native city, and there should
be alliances subsisting between each party to mutually assist and
prevent any injury being done to the other, still they would not be
admitted to be a city by those who think correctly, if they preserved
the same customs when they were together as when they were separate.

It is evident, then, that a city is not a community of place; nor
established for the sake of mutual safety or traffic with each other;
but that these things are the necessary consequences of a city,
although they may all exist where there is no city: but a city is a
society of people joining together with their families and their
children to live agreeably for the sake of having their lives as happy
and as independent as possible: and for this purpose it is necessary
that they should live in one place and intermarry with each other:
hence in ail cities there are family-meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and
public entertainments to promote friendship; for a love of sociability
is friendship itself; so that the end then for which a city is
established is, that the inhabitants of it may live happy, and these
things are conducive to that end: for it is a community of families
and villages for the sake of a perfect independent life; that is, as
we have already said, for the sake of living well and happily. It is
not therefore founded for the purpose of men's merely [1281a] living
together, but for their living as men ought; for which reason those
who contribute most to this end deserve to have greater power in the
city than those who are their equals in family and freedom, but their
inferiors in civil virtue, or those who excel them in wealth but are
below them in worth. It is evident from what has been said, that in
all disputes upon government each party says something that is just.




CHAPTER X


It may also be a doubt where the supreme power ought to be lodged.
Shall it be with the majority, or the wealthy, with a number of proper
persons, or one better than the rest, or with a tyrant? But whichever
of these we prefer some difficulty will arise. For what? shall the
poor have it because they are the majority? they may then divide among
themselves, what belongs to the rich: nor is this unjust; because
truly it has been so judged by the supreme power. But what avails it
to point out what is the height of injustice if this is not? Again, if
the many seize into their own hands everything which belongs to the
few, it is evident that the city will be at an end. But virtue will
never destroy what is virtuous; nor can what is right be the ruin of
the state: therefore such a law can never be right, nor can the acts
of a tyrant ever be wrong, for of necessity they must all be just; for
he, from his unlimited power, compels every one to obey his command,
as the multitude oppress the rich. Is it right then that the rich, the
few, should have the supreme power? and what if they be guilty of the
same rapine and plunder the possessions of the majority, that will be
as right as the other: but that all things of this sort are wrong and
unjust is evident. Well then, these of the better sort shall have it:
but must not then all the other citizens live unhonoured, without
sharing the offices of the city; for the offices of a city are its
honours, and if one set of men are always in power, it is evident that
the rest must be without honour. Well then, let it be with one person
of all others the fittest for it: but by this means the power will be
still more contracted, and a greater number than before continue
unhonoured. But some one may say, that it is wrong to let man have the
supreme power and not the law, as his soul is subject to so many
passions. But if this law appoints an aristocracy, or a democracy, how
will it help us in our present doubts? for those things will happen
which we have already mentioned.




CHAPTER XI


Other particulars we will consider separately; but it seems proper to
prove, that the supreme power ought to be lodged with the many, rather
than with those of the better sort, who are few; and also to explain
what doubts (and probably just ones) may arise: now, though not one
individual of the many may himself be fit for the supreme power, yet
when these many are joined together, it does not follow but they may
be better qualified for it than those; and this not separately, but as
a collective body; as the public suppers exceed those which are given
at one person's private expense: for, as they are many, each person
brings in his share of virtue and wisdom; and thus, coming together,
they are like one man made up of a multitude, with many feet, many
hands, and many intelligences: thus is it with respect to the manners
and understandings of the multitude taken together; for which reason
the public are the best judges of music and poetry; for some
understand one part, some another, and all collectively the whole; and
in this particular men of consequence differ from each of the many; as
they say those who are beautiful do from those who are not so, and as
fine pictures excel any natural objects, by collecting the several
beautiful parts which were dispersed among different originals into
one, although the separate parts, as the eye or any other, might be
handsomer than in the picture.

But if this distinction is to be made between every people and every
general assembly, and some few men of consequence, it may be doubtful
whether it is true; nay, it is clear enough that, with respect to a
few, it is not; since the same conclusion might be applied even to
brutes: and indeed wherein do some men differ from brutes? Not but
that nothing prevents what I have said being true of the people in
some states. The doubt then which we have lately proposed, with all
its consequences, may be settled in this manner; it is necessary
that the freemen who compose the bulk of the people should have
absolute power in some things; but as they are neither men of
property, nor act uniformly upon principles of virtue, it is not safe
to trust them with the first offices in the state, both on account of
their iniquity and their ignorance; from the one of which they will do
what is wrong, from the other they will mistake: and yet it is
dangerous to allow them no power or share in the government; for when
there are many poor people who are incapable of acquiring the honours
of their country, the state must necessarily have many enemies in it;
let them then be permitted to vote in the public assemblies and to
determine causes; for which reason Socrates, and some other
legislators, gave them the power of electing the officers of the
state, and also of inquiring into their conduct when they came out of
office, and only prevented their being magistrates by themselves; for
the multitude when they are collected together have all of them
sufficient understanding for these purposes, and, mixing among those
of higher rank, are serviceable to the city, as some things, which
alone are improper for food, when mixed with others make the whole
more wholesome than a few of them would be.

But there is a difficulty attending this form of government, for it
seems, that the person who himself was capable of curing any one who
was then sick, must be the best judge whom to employ as a physician;
but such a one must be himself a physician; and the same holds true in
every other practice and art: and as a physician ought [1282a] to give
an account of his practice to a physician, so ought it to be in other
arts: those whose business is physic may be divided into three sorts,
the first of these is he who makes up the medicines; the second
prescribes, and is to the other as the architect is to the mason; the
third is he who understands the science, but never practises it: now
these three distinctions may be found in those who understand all
other arts; nor have we less opinion of their judgment who are only
instructed in the principles of the art than of those who practise it:
and with respect to elections the same method of proceeding seems
right; for to elect a proper person in any science is the business of
those who are skilful therein; as in geometry, of geometricians; in
steering, of steersmen: but if some individuals should know something
of particular arts and works, they do not know more than the
professors of them: so that even upon this principle neither the
election of magistrates, nor the censure of their conduct, should be
entrusted to the many.

But probably all that has been here said may not be right; for, to
resume the argument I lately used, if the people are not very brutal
indeed, although we allow that each individual knows less of these
affairs than those who have given particular attention to them, yet
when they come together they will know them better, or at least not
worse; besides, in some particular arts it is not the workman only who
is the best judge; namely, in those the works of which are understood
by those who do not profess them: thus he who builds a house is not
the only judge of it, for the master of the family who inhabits it is
a better; thus also a steersman is a better judge of a tiller than he
who made it; and he who gives an entertainment than the cook. What has
been said seems a sufficient solution of this difficulty; but there is
another that follows: for it seems absurd that the power of the state
should be lodged with those who are but of indifferent morals, instead
of those who are of excellent characters. Now the power of election
and censure are of the utmost consequence, and this, as has been said,
in some states they entrust to the people; for the general assembly is
the supreme court of all, and they have a voice in this, and
deliberate in all public affairs, and try all causes, without any
objection to the meanness of their circumstances, and at any age: but
their treasurers, generals, and other great officers of state are
taken from men of great fortune and worth. This difficulty also may be
solved upon the same principle; and here too they may be right, for
the power is not in the man who is member of the assembly, or council,
but the assembly itself, and the council, and the people, of which
each individual of the whole community are the parts, I mean as
senator, adviser, or judge; for which reason it is very right, that
the many should have the greatest powers in their own hands; for the
people, the council, and the judges are composed of them, and the
property of all these collectively is more than the property of any
person or a few who fill the great offices of the state: and thus I
determine these points.

The first question that we stated shows plainly, that the supreme
power should be lodged in laws duly made and that the magistrate or
magistrates, either one or more, should be authorised to determine
those cases which the laws cannot particularly speak to, as it is
impossible for them, in general language, to explain themselves upon
everything that may arise: but what these laws are which are
established upon the best foundations has not been yet explained, but
still remains a matter of some question: but the laws of every state
will necessarily be like every state, either trifling or excellent,
just or unjust; for it is evident, that the laws must be framed
correspondent to the constitution of the government; and, if so, it is
plain, that a well-formed government will have good laws, a bad one,
bad ones.




CHAPTER XII


Since in every art and science the end aimed at is always good, so
particularly in this, which is the most excellent of all, the founding
of civil society, the good wherein aimed at is justice; for it is this
which is for the benefit of all. Now, it is the common opinion, that
justice is a certain equality; and in this point all the philosophers
are agreed when they treat of morals: for they say what is just, and
to whom; and that equals ought to receive equal: but we should know
how we are to determine what things are equal and what unequal; and in
this there is some difficulty, which calls for the philosophy of the
politician. Some persons will probably say, that the employments of
the state ought to be given according to every particular excellence
of each citizen, if there is no other difference between them and the
rest of the community, but they are in every respect else alike: for
justice attributes different things to persons differing from each
other in their character, according to their respective merits. But if
this is admitted to be true, complexion, or height, or any such
advantage will be a claim for a greater share of the public rights.
But that this is evidently absurd is clear from other arts and
sciences; for with respect to musicians who play on the flute
together, the best flute is not given to him who is of the best
family, for he will play never the better for that, but the best
instrument ought to be given to him who is the best artist.

If what is now said does not make this clear, we will explain it still
further: if there should be any one, a very excellent player on the
flute, but very deficient in family and beauty, though each of them
are more valuable endowments than a skill in music, and excel this art
in a higher degree than that player excels others, yet the best flutes
ought to be given to him; for the superiority [1283a] in beauty and
fortune should have a reference to the business in hand; but these
have none. Moreover, according to this reasoning, every possible
excellence might come in comparison with every other; for if bodily
strength might dispute the point with riches or liberty, even any
bodily strength might do it; so that if one person excelled in size
more than another did in virtue, and his size was to qualify him to
take place of the other's virtue, everything must then admit of a
comparison with each other; for if such a size is greater than virtue
by so much, it is evident another must be equal to it: but, since this
is impossible, it is plain that it would be contrary to common sense
to dispute a right to any office in the state from every superiority
whatsoever: for if one person is slow and the other swift, neither is
the one better qualified nor the other worse on that account, though
in the gymnastic races a difference in these particulars would gain
the prize; but a pretension to the offices of the state should be
founded on a superiority in those qualifications which are useful to
it: for which reason those of family, independency, and fortune, with
great propriety, contend with each other for them; for these are the
fit persons to fill them: for a city can no more consist of all poor
men than it can of all slaves But if such persons are requisite, it is
evident that those also who are just and valiant are equally so; for
without justice and valour no state can be supported, the former being
necessary for its existence, the latter for its happiness.




CHAPTER XIII


It seems, then, requisite for the establishment of a state, that all,
or at least many of these particulars should be well canvassed and
inquired into; and that virtue and education may most justly claim the
right of being considered as the necessary means of making the
citizens happy, as we have already said. As those who are equal in one
particular are not therefore equal in all, and those who are unequal
in one particular are not therefore unequal in all, it follows that
all those governments which are established upon a principle which
supposes they are, are erroneous.

We have already said, that all the members of the community will
dispute with each other for the offices of the state; and in some
particulars justly, but not so in general; the rich, for instance,
because they have the greatest landed property, and the ultimate right
to the soil is vested in the community; and also because their
fidelity is in general most to be depended on. The freemen and men of
family will dispute the point with each other, as nearly on an
equality; for these latter have a right to a higher regard as citizens
than obscure persons, for honourable descent is everywhere of great
esteem: nor is it an improper conclusion, that the descendants of men
of worth will be men of worth themselves; for noble birth is the
fountain of virtue to men of family: for the same reason also we
justly say, that virtue has a right to put in her pretensions.
Justice, for instance, is a virtue, and so necessary to society, that
all others must yield her the precedence.

Let us now see what the many have to urge on their side against the
few; and they may say, that if, when collectively taken, they are
compared with them, they are stronger, richer, and better than they
are. But should it ever happen that all these should inhabit the
[1283b] same city, I mean the good, the rich, the noble, as well as
the many, such as usually make up the community, I ask, will there
then be any reason to dispute concerning who shall govern, or will
there not? for in every community which we have mentioned there is no
dispute where the supreme power should be placed; for as these differ
from each other, so do those in whom that is placed; for in one state
the rich enjoy it, in others the meritorious, and thus each according
to their separate manners. Let us however consider what is to be done
when all these happen at the same time to inhabit the same city. If
the virtuous should be very few in number, how then shall we act?
shall we prefer the virtuous on account of their abilities, if they
are capable of governing the city? or should they be so many as almost
entirely to compose the state?

There is also a doubt concerning the pretensions of all those who
claim the honours of government: for those who found them either on
fortune or family have nothing which they can justly say in their
defence; since it is evident upon their principle, that if any one
person can be found richer than all the rest, the right of governing
all these will be justly vested in this one person. In the same
manner, one man who is of the best family will claim it from those who
dispute the point upon family merit: and probably in an aristocracy
the same dispute might arise on the score of virtue, if there is one
man better than all the other men of worth who are in the same
community; it seems just, by the same reasoning, that he should enjoy
the supreme power. And upon this principle also, while the many
suppose they ought to have the supreme command, as being more powerful
than the few, if one or more than one, though a small number should be
found stronger than themselves, these ought rather to have it than
they.

All these things seem to make it plain, that none of these principles
are justly founded on which these persons would establish their right
to the supreme power; and that all men whatsoever ought to obey them:
for with respect to those who claim it as due to their virtue or their
fortune, they might have justly some objection to make; for nothing
hinders but that it may sometimes happen, that the many may be better
or richer than the few, not as individuals, but in their collective
capacity.

As to the doubt which some persons have proposed and objected, we may
answer it in this manner; it is this, whether a legislator, who would
establish the most perfect system of laws, should calculate them for
the use of the better part of the citizens, or the many, in the
circumstances we have already mentioned? The rectitude of anything
consists in its equality; that therefore which is equally right will
be advantageous to the whole state, and to every member of it in
common.

Now, in general, a citizen is one who both shares in the government
and also in his turn submits to be governed; [1284a] their condition,
it is true, is different in different states: the best is that in
which a man is enabled to choose and to persevere in a course of
virtue during his whole life, both in his public and private state.
But should there be one person, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon
degree of virtue, though not enough to make up a civil state, so that
the virtue of the many, or their political abilities, should be too
inferior to come in comparison with theirs, if more than one; or if
but one, with his only; such are not to be considered as part of the
city; for it would be doing them injustice to rate them on a level
with those who are so far their inferiors in virtue and political
abilities, that they appear to them like a god amongst men. From
whence it is evident, that a system of laws must be calculated for
those who are equal to each other in nature and power. Such men,
therefore, are not the object of law; for they are themselves a law:
and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to include them in
the penalties of a law: for probably they might say what Antisthenes
tells us the lions did to the hares when they demanded to be admitted
to an equal share with them in the government. And it is on this
account that democratic states have established the ostracism; for an
equality seems the principal object of their government. For which
reason they compel all those who are very eminent for their power,
their fortune, their friendships, or any other cause which may give
them too great weight in the government, to submit to the ostracism,
and leave the city for a stated time; as the fabulous histories relate
the Argonauts served Hercules, for they refused to take him with them
in the ship Argo on account of his superior valour. For which reason
those who hate a tyranny and find fault with the advice which
Periander gave to Thrasybulus, must not think there was nothing to be
said in its defence; for the story goes, that Periander said nothing
to the messenger in answer to the business he was consulted about, but
striking off those ears of corn which were higher than the rest,
reduced the whole crop to a level; so that the messenger, without
knowing the cause of what was done, related the fact to Thrasybulus,
who understood by it that he must take off all the principal men in
the city. Nor is this serviceable to tyrants only; nor is it tyrants
only who do it; for the same thing is practised both in oligarchies
and democracies: for the ostracism has in a manner nearly the same
power, by restraining and banishing those who are too great; and what
is done in one city is done also by those who have the supreme power
in separate states; as the Athenians with respect to the Samians, the
Chians, and the Lesbians; for when they suddenly acquired the
superiority over all Greece, they brought the other states into
subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted between them. The
King of Persia also very often reduces the Medes and Babylonians when
they assume upon their former power: [1284b] and this is a principle
which all governments whatsoever keep in their eye; even those which
are best administered, as well as those which are not, do it; these
for the sake of private utility, the others for the public good.

The same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and sciences; for
a painter would not represent an animal with a foot disproportionally
large, though he had drawn it remarkably beautiful; nor would the
shipwright make the prow or any other part of the vessel larger than
it ought to be; nor will the master of the band permit any who sings
louder and better than the rest to sing in concert with them. There is
therefore no reason that a monarch should not act in agreement with
free states, to support his own power, if they do the same thing for
the benefit of their respective communities; upon which account when
there is any acknowledged difference in the power of the citizens, the
reason upon which the ostracism is founded will be politically just;
but it is better for the legislator so to establish his state at the
beginning as not to want this remedy: but if in course of time such an
inconvenience should arise, to endeavour to amend it by some such
correction. Not that this was the use it was put to: for many did not
regard the benefit of their respective communities, but made the
ostracism a weapon in the hand of sedition.

It is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly just and
useful to the individual, though probably it is as clear that it is
not entirely just: for in a well-governed state there may be great
doubts about the use of it, not on account of the pre-eminence which
one may have in strength, riches, or connection: but when the
pre-eminence is virtue, what then is to be done? for it seems not
right to turn out and banish such a one; neither does it seem right to
govern him, for that would be like desiring to share the power with
Jupiter and to govern him: nothing then remains but what indeed seems
natural, and that is for all persons quietly to submit to the
government of those who are thus eminently virtuous, and let them be
perpetually kings in the separate states.




CHAPTER XIV


What has been now said, it seems proper to change our subject and to
inquire into the nature of monarchies; for we have already admitted
them to be one of those species of government which are properly
founded. And here let us consider whether a kingly government is
proper for a city or a country whose principal object is the happiness
of the inhabitants, or rather some other. But let us first determine
whether this is of one kind only, or more; [1285a] and it is easy to
know that it consists of many different species, and that the forms of
government are not the same in all: for at Sparta the kingly power
seems chiefly regulated by the laws; for it is not supreme in all
circumstances; but when the king quits the territories of the state he
is their general in war; and all religious affairs are entrusted to
him: indeed the kingly power with them is chiefly that of a general
who cannot be called to an account for his conduct, and whose command
is for life: for he has not the power of life and death, except as a
general; as they frequently had in their expeditions by martial law,
which we learn from Homer; for when Agamemnon is affronted in council,
he restrains his resentment, but when he is in the field and armed
with this power, he tells the Greeks:

"Whoe'er I know shall shun th' impending fight, To dogs and
vultures soon shall be a prey; For death is mine. . . ."

This, then, is one species of monarchical government in which the
kingly power is in a general for life; and is sometimes hereditary,
sometimes elective: besides, there is also another, which is to be met
with among some of the barbarians, in which the kings are invested
with powers nearly equal to a tyranny, yet are, in some respects,
bound by the laws and the customs of their country; for as the
barbarians are by nature more prone to slavery than the Greeks, and
those in Asia more than those in Europe, they endure without murmuring
a despotic government; for this reason their governments are
tyrannies; but yet not liable to be overthrown, as being customary and
according to law. Their guards also are such as are used in a kingly
government, not a despotic one; for the guards of their kings are his
citizens, but a tyrant's are foreigners. The one commands, in the
manner the law directs, those who willingly obey; the other,
arbitrarily, those who consent not. The one, therefore, is guarded by
the citizens, the other against them.

These, then, are the two different sorts of these monarchies, and
another is that which in ancient Greece they called _aesumnetes_;
which is nothing more than an elective tyranny; and its difference
from that which is to be found amongst the barbarians consists not in
its' not being according to law, but only in its not being according
to the ancient customs of the country. Some persons possessed this
power for life, others only for a particular time or particular
purpose, as the people of Mitylene elected Pittacus to oppose the
exiles, who were headed by Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet, as we
learn from a poem of his; for he upbraids the Mitylenians for having
chosen Pittacus for their tyrant, and with one [1285b] voice extolling
him to the skies who was the ruin of a rash and devoted people. These
sorts of government then are, and ever were, despotic, on account of
their being tyrannies; but inasmuch as they are elective, and over a
free people, they are also kingly.

A fourth species of kingly government is that which was in use in the
heroic times, when a free people submitted to a kingly government,
according to the laws and customs of their country. For those who were
at first of benefit to mankind, either in arts or arms, or by
collecting them into civil society, or procuring them an
establishment, became the kings of a willing people, and established
an hereditary monarchy. They were particularly their generals in war,
and presided over their sacrifices, excepting such only as belonged to
the priests: they were also the supreme judges over the people; and in
this case some of them took an oath, others did not; they did, the
form of swearing was by their sceptre held out.

In ancient times the power of the kings extended to everything
whatsoever, both civil, domestic, and foreign; but in after-times they
relinquished some of their privileges, and others the people assumed,
so that, in some states, they left their kings only the right of
presiding over the sacrifices; and even those whom it were worth while
to call by that name had only the right of being commander-in-chief in
their foreign wars.

These, then, are the four sorts of kingdoms : the first is that of the
heroic times; which was a government over a free people, with its
rights in some particulars marked out; for the king was their general,
their judge, and their high priest. The second, that of the
barbarians; which is an hereditary despotic government regulated by
laws: the third is that which they call aesumnetic, which is an
elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedaemonian; and this, in few
words, is nothing more than an hereditary generalship: and in these
particulars they differ from each other. There is a fifth species of
kingly government, which is when one person has a supreme power over
all things whatsoever, in the manner that every state and every city
has over those things which belong to the public: for as the master of
a family is king in his own house, so such a king is master of a
family in his own city or state.




CHAPTER XV


But the different sorts of kingly governments may, if I may so say, be
reduced to two; which we will consider more particularly. The last
spoken of, and the Lacedaemonian, for the chief of the others are
placed between these, which are as it were at the extremities, they
having less power than an absolute government, and yet more than the
Lacedaemonians; so that the whole matter in question may be reduced to
these two points; the one is, whether it is advantageous to the
citizens to have the office of general continue in one person for
life, and whether it should be confined to any particular families or
whether every one should be eligible: the other, whether [1286a] it is
advantageous for one person to have the supreme power over everything
or not. But to enter into the particulars concerning the office of a
Lacedaemonian general would be rather to frame laws for a state than
to consider the nature and utility of its constitution, since we know
that the appointing of a general is what is done in every state.
Passing over this question then, we will proceed to consider the other
part of their government, which is the polity of the state; and this
it will be necessary to examine particularly into, and to go through
such questions as may arise.

Now the first thing which presents itself to our consideration is
this, whether it is best to be governed by a good man, or by good
laws? Those who prefer a kingly government think that laws can only
speak a general language, but cannot adapt themselves to particular
circumstances; for which reason it is absurd in any science to follow
written rule; and even in Egypt the physician was allowed to alter the
mode of cure which the law prescribed to him, after the fourth day;
but if he did it sooner it was at his own peril: from whence it is
evident, on the very same account, that a government of written laws
is not the best; and yet general reasoning is necessary to all those
who are to govern, and it will be much more perfect in those who are
entirely free from passions than in those to whom they are natural.
But now this is a quality which laws possess; while the other is
natural to the human soul. But some one will say in answer to this,
that man will be a better judge of particulars. It will be necessary,
then, for a king to be a lawgiver, and that his laws should be
published, but that those should have no authority which are absurd,
as those which are not, should. But whether is it better for the
community that those things which cannot possibly come under the
cognisance of the law either at all or properly should be under the
government of every worthy citizen, as the present method is, when the
public community, in their general assemblies, act as judges and
counsellors, where all their determinations are upon particular cases,
for one individual, be he who he will, will be found, upon comparison,
inferior to a whole people taken collectively: but this is what a city
is, as a public entertainment is better than one man's portion: for
this reason the multitude judge of many things better than any one
single person. They are also less liable to corruption from their
numbers, as water is from its quantity: besides, the judgment of an
individual must necessarily be perverted if he is overcome by anger or
any other passion; but it would be hard indeed if the whole community
should be misled by anger. Moreover, let the people be free, and they
will do nothing but in conformity to the law, except only in those
cases which the law cannot speak to. But though what I am going to
propose may not easily be met with, yet if the majority of the state
should happen to be good men, should they prefer one uncorrupt
governor or many equally good, is it not evident that they should
choose the many? But there may be divisions among [1286b] these which
cannot happen when there is but one. In answer to this it may be
replied that all their souls will be as much animated with virtue as
this one man's.

If then a government of many, and all of them good men, compose an
aristocracy, and the government of one a kingly power, it is evident
that the people should rather choose the first than the last; and this
whether the state is powerful or not, if many such persons so alike
can be met with: and for this reason probable it was, that the first
governments were generally monarchies; because it was difficult to
find a number of persons eminently virtuous, more particularly as the
world was then divided into small communities; besides, kings were
appointed in return for the benefits they had conferred on mankind;
but such actions are peculiar to good men: but when many persons equal
in virtue appeared at the time, they brooked not a superiority, but
sought after an equality and established a free state; but after this,
when they degenerated, they made a property of the public; which
probably gave rise to oligarchies; for they made wealth meritorious,
and the honours of government were reserved for the rich: and these
afterwards turned to tyrannies and these in their turn gave rise to
democracies; for the power of the tyrants continually decreasing, on
account of their rapacious avarice, the people grew powerful enough to
frame and establish democracies: and as cities after that happened to
increase, probably it was not easy for them to be under any other
government than a democracy. But if any person prefers a kingly
government in a state, what is to be done with the king's children? Is
the family also to reign? But should they have such children as some
persons usually have, it will be very detrimental. It may be said,
that then the king who has it in his power will never permit such
children to succeed to his kingdom. But it is not easy to trust to
that; for it is very hard and requires greater virtue than is to be
met with in human nature. There is also a doubt concerning the power
with which a king should be entrusted: whether he should be allowed
force sufficient to compel those who do not choose to be obedient to
the laws, and how he is to support his government? for if he is to
govern according to law and do nothing of his own will which is
contrary thereunto, at the same time it will be necessary to protect
that power with which he guards the law, This matter however may not
be very difficult to determine; for he ought to have a proper power,
and such a one is that which will be sufficient to make the king
superior to any one person or even a large part of the community, but
inferior to the whole, as the ancients always appointed guards for
that person whom they created aesumnetes or tyrant; and some one
advised the Syracusians, when Dionysius asked for guards, to allow him
such.




CHAPTER XVI


[1287a] We will next consider the absolute monarch that we have just
mentioned, who does everything according to his own will: for a king
governing under the direction of laws which he is obliged to follow
does not of himself create any particular species of government, as we
have already said: for in every state whatsoever, either aristocracy
or democracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life; and there are
many who entrust the administration of affairs to one person only;
such is the government at Dyrrachium, and nearly the same at Opus. As
for an absolute monarchy as it is called, that is to say, when the
whole state is wholly subject to the will of one person, namely the
king, it seems to many that it is unnatural that one man should have
the entire rule over his fellow-citizens when the state consists of
equals: for nature requires that the same right and the same rank
should necessarily take place amongst all those who are equal by
nature: for as it would be hurtful to the body for those who are of
different constitutions to observe the same regimen, either of diet or
clothing, so is it with respect to the honours of the state as
hurtful, that those who are equal in merit should be unequal in rank;
for which reason it is as much a man's duty to submit to command as to
assume it, and this also by rotation; for this is law, for order is
law; and it is more proper that law should govern than any one of the
citizens: upon the same principle, if it is advantageous to place the
supreme power in some particular persons, they should be appointed to
be only guardians, and the servants of the laws, for the supreme power
must be placed somewhere; but they say, that it is unjust that where
all are equal one person should continually enjoy it. But it seems
unlikely that man should be able to adjust that which the law cannot
determine; it may be replied, that the law having laid down the best
rules possible, leaves the adjustment and application of particulars
to the discretion of the magistrate; besides, it allows anything to be
altered which experience proves may be better established. Moreover,
he who would place the supreme power in mind, would place it in God
and the laws; but he who entrusts man with it, gives it to a wild
beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him; for passion
influences those who are in power, even the very best of men: for
which reason law is reason without desire.

The instance taken from the arts seems fallacious: wherein it is said
to be wrong for a sick person to apply for a remedy to books, but that
it would be far more eligible to employ those who are skilful in
physic; for these do nothing contrary to reason from motives of
friendship but earn their money by curing the sick, whereas those who
have the management of public affairs do many things through hatred or
favour. And, as a proof of what we have advanced, it may be observed,
that whenever a sick person suspects that his physician has been
persuaded by his enemies to be guilty of any foul practice to him in
his profession, he then rather chooses to apply to books for his cure:
and not only this [1287b] but even physicians themselves when they are
ill call in other physicians: and those who teach others the gymnastic
exercises, exercise with those of the same profession, as being
incapable from self-partiality to form a proper judgment of what
concerns themselves. From whence it is evident, that those who seek
for what is just, seek for a mean; now law is a mean. Moreover; the
moral law is far superior and conversant with far superior objects
than the written law; for the supreme magistrate is safer to be
trusted to than the one, though he is inferior to the other. But as it
is impossible that one person should have an eye to everything
himself, it will be necessary that the supreme magistrate should
employ several subordinate ones under him; why then should not this be
done at first, instead of appointing one person in this manner?
Besides, if, according to what has been already said, the man of worth
is on that account fit to govern, two men of worth are certainly
better than one: as, for instance, in Homer, "Let two together go:"
and also Agamemnon's wish; "Were ten such faithful counsel mine!" Not
but that there are even now some particular magistrates invested with
supreme power to decide, as judges, those things which the law cannot,
as being one of those cases which comes not properly under its
jurisdiction; for of those which can there is no doubt: since then
laws comprehend some things, but not all, it is necessary to enquire
and consider which of the two is preferable, that the best man or the
best law should govern; for to reduce every subject which can come
under the deliberation of man into a law is impossible.

No one then denies, that it is necessary that there should be some
person to decide those cases which cannot come under the cognisance of
a written law: but we say, that it is better to have many than one;
for though every one who decides according to the principles of the
law decides justly; yet surely it seems absurd to suppose, that one
person can see better with two eyes, and hear better with two ears, or
do better with two hands and two feet, than many can do with many: for
we see that absolute monarchs now furnish themselves with many eyes
and ears and hands and feet; for they entrust those who are friends to
them and their government with part of their power; for if they are
not friends to the monarch, they will not do what he chooses; but if
they are friends to him, they are friends also to his government: but
a friend is an equal and like his friend: if then he thinks that such
should govern, he thinks that his equal also should govern. These are
nearly the objections which are usually made to a kingly power.




CHAPTER XVII


Probably what we have said may be true of some persons, but not of
others; for some men are by nature formed to be under the government
of a master; others, of a king; others, to be the citizens of a free
state, just and useful; but a tyranny is not according to nature, nor
the other perverted forms of government; for they are contrary to it.
But it is evident from what has been said, that among equals it is
neither advantageous nor [1288a] right that one person should be lord
over all where there are no established laws, but his will is the law;
or where there are; nor is it right that one who is good should have
it over those who are good; or one who is not good over those who are
not good; nor one who is superior to the rest In worth, except in a
particular manner, which shall be described, though indeed it has been
already mentioned. But let us next determine what people are best
qualified for a kingly government, what for an aristocratic, and what
for a democratic. And, first, for a kingly; and it should be those who
are accustomed by nature to submit the civil government of themselves
to a family eminent for virtue: for an aristocracy, those who are
naturally framed to bear the rule of free men, whose superior virtue
makes them worthy of the management of others: for a free state, a
war-like people, formed by nature both to govern and be governed by
laws which admit the poorest citizen to share the honours of the
commonwealth according to his worth. But whenever a whole family or
any one of another shall happen so far to excel in virtue as to exceed
all other persons in the community, the n it is right that the kingly
power should be in them, or if it is an individual who does so, that
he should be king and lord of all; for this, as we have just
mentioned, is not only correspondent to that principle of right which
all founders of all states, whether aristocracies, oligarchies, or
democracies, have a regard to (for in placing the supreme power they
all think it right to fix it to excellence, though not the same); but
it is also agreeable to what has been already said; as it would not be
right to kill, or banish, or ostracise such a one for his superior
merit. Nor would it be proper to let him have the supreme power only
in turn; for it is contrary to nature that what is highest should ever
be lowest: but this would be the case should such a one ever be
governed by others. So that there can nothing else be done but to
submit, and permit him continually to enjoy the supreme power. And
thus much with respect to kingly power in different states, and
whether it is or is not advantageous to them, and to what, and in what
manner.




CHAPTER XVIII


Since then we have said that there are three sorts of regular
governments, and of these the best must necessarily be that which is
administered by the best men (and this must be that which happens to
have one man, or one family, or a number of persons excelling all the
rest in virtue, who are able to govern and be governed in such a
manner as will make life most agreeable, and we have already shown
that the virtue of a good man and of a citizen in the most perfect
government will be the same), it is evident, that in the same manner,
and for those very qualities which would procure a man the character
of good, any one would say, that the government of a state was a
well-established aristocracy or kingdom; so that it will be found to
be education and [1288b] morals that are almost the whole which go to
make a good man, and the same qualities will make a good citizen or
good king.

These particulars being treated of, we will now proceed to consider
what sort of government is best, how it naturally arises, and how it
is established; for it is necessary to make a proper inquiry
concerning this.