BOOK II

Treatise on Government

by Aristotle

BOOK II, TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT by Aristotle




CHAPTER I


Since then we propose to inquire what civil society is of all others
best for those who have it in their power to live entirely as they
wish, it is necessary to examine into the polity of those states which
are allowed to be well governed; and if there should be any others
which some persons have described, and which appear properly
regulated, to note what is right and useful in them; and when we point
out wherein they have failed, let not this be imputed to an
affectation of wisdom, for it is because there are great defects in
all those which are already 'established, that I have been induced to
undertake this work. We will begin with that part of the subject which
naturally presents itself first to our consideration. The members of
every state must of necessity have all things in common, or some
things common, and not others, or nothing at all common. To have
nothing in common is evidently impossible, for society itself is one
species of [1261a] community; and the first thing necessary thereunto
is a common place of habitation, namely the city, which must be one,
and this every citizen must have a share in. But in a government which
is to be well founded, will it be best to admit of a community in
everything which is capable thereof, or only in some particulars, but
in others not? for it is possible that the citizens may have their
wives, and children, and goods in common, as in Plato's Commonwealth;
for in that Socrates affirms that all these particulars ought to be
so. Which then shall we prefer? the custom which is already
established, or the laws which are proposed in that treatise?




CHAPTER II


Now as a community of wives is attended with many other difficulties,
so neither does the cause for which he would frame his government in
this manner seem agreeable to reason, nor is it capable of producing
that end which he has proposed, and for which he says it ought to take
place; nor has he given any particular directions for putting it in
practice. Now I also am willing to agree with Socrates in the
principle which he proceeds upon, and admit that the city ought to be
one as much as possible; and yet it is evident that if it is
contracted too much, it will be no longer a city, for that necessarily
supposes a multitude; so that if we proceed in this manner, we shall
reduce a city to a family, and a family to a single person: for we
admit that a family is one in a greater degree than a city, and a
single person than a family; so that if this end could be obtained, it
should never be put in practice, as it would annihilate the city; for
a city does not only consist of a large number of inhabitants, but
there must also be different sorts; for were they all alike, there
could be no city; for a confederacy and a city are two different
things; for a confederacy is valuable from its numbers, although all
those who compose it are men of the same calling; for this is entered
into for the sake of mutual defence, as we add an additional weight to
make the scale go down. The same distinction prevails between a city
and a nation when the people are not collected into separate villages,
but live as the Arcadians. Now those things in which a city should be
one are of different sorts, and in preserving an alternate
reciprocation of power between these, the safety thereof consists (as
I have already mentioned in my treatise on Morals), for amongst
freemen and equals this is absolutely necessary; for all cannot govern
at the same time, but either by the year, or according to some other
regulation or time, by which means every one in his turn will be in
office; as if the shoemakers and carpenters should exchange
occupations, and not always be employed in the same calling. But as it
is evidently better, that these should continue to exercise their
respective trades; so also in civil society, where it is possible, it
would be better that the government should continue in the same hands;
but where it [1261b] is not (as nature has made all men equal, and
therefore it is just, be the administration good or bad, that all
should partake of it), there it is best to observe a rotation, and let
those who are their equals by turns submit to those who are at that
time magistrates, as they will, in their turns, alternately be
governors and governed, as if they were different men: by the same
method different persons will execute different offices. From hence it
is evident, that a city cannot be one in the manner that some persons
propose; and that what has been said to be the greatest good which it
could enjoy, is absolutely its destruction, which cannot be: for the
good of anything is that which preserves it. For another reaton also
it is clear, that it is not for the best to endeavour to make a city
too much one, because a family is more sufficient in itself than a
single person, a city than a family; and indeed Plato supposes that a
city owes its existence to that sufficiency in themselves which the
members of it enjoy. If then this sufficiency is so desirable, the
less the city is one the better.




CHAPTER III


But admitting that it is most advantageous for a city to be one as
much as possible, it does not seem to follow that this will take place
by permitting all at once to say this is mine, and this is not mine
(though this is what Socrates regards as a proof that a city is
entirely one), for the word All is used in two senses; if it means
each individual, what Socrates proposes will nearly take place; for
each person will say, this is his own son, and his own wife, and his
own property, and of everything else that may happen to belong to him,
that it is his own. But those who have their wives and children in
common will not say so, but all will say so, though not as
individuals; therefore, to use the word all is evidently a fallacious
mode of speech; for this word is sometimes used distributively, and
sometimes collectively, on account of its double meaning, and is the
cause of inconclusive syllogisms in reasoning. Therefore for all
persons to say the same thing was their own, using the word all in its
distributive sense, would be well, but is impossible: in its
collective sense it would by no means contribute to the concord of the
state. Besides, there would be another inconvenience attending this
proposal, for what is common to many is taken least care of; for all
men regard more what is their own than what others share with them in,
to which they pay less attention than is incumbent on every one: let
me add also, that every one is more negligent of what another is to
see to, as well as himself, than of his own private business; as in a
family one is often worse served by many servants than by a few. Let
each citizen then in the state have a thousand children, but let none
of them be considered as the children of that individual, but let the
relation of father and child be common to them all, and they will all
be neglected. Besides, in consequence of this, [1262a] whenever any
citizen behaved well or ill, every person, be the number what it
would, might say, this is my son, or this man's or that; and in this
manner would they speak, and thus would they doubt of the whole
thousand, or of whatever number the city consisted; and it would be
uncertain to whom each child belonged, and when it was born, who was
to take care of it: and which do you think is better, for every one to
say this is mine, while they may apply it equally to two thousand or
ten thousand; or as we say, this is mine in our present forms of
government, where one man calls another his son, another calls that
same person his brother, another nephew, or some other relation,
either by blood or marriage, and first extends his care to him and
his, while another regards him as one of the same parish and the same
tribe; and it is better for any one to be a nephew in his private
capacity than a son after that manner. Besides, it will be impossible
to prevent some persons from suspecting that they are brothers and
sisters, fathers and mothers to each other; for, from the mutual
likeness there is between the sire and the offspring, they will
necessarily conclude in what relation they stand to each other, which
circumstance, we are informed by those writers who describe different
parts of the world, does sometimes happen; for in Upper Africa there
are wives in common who yet deliver their children to their respective
fathers, being guided by their likeness to them. There are also some
mares and cows which naturally bring forth their young so like the
male, that we can easily distinguish by which of them they were
impregnated: such was the mare called Just, in Pharsalia.




CHAPTER IV


Besides, those who contrive this plan of community cannot easily avoid
the following evils; namely, blows, murders involuntary or voluntary,
quarrels, and reproaches, all which it would be impious indeed to be
guilty of towards our fathers and mothers, or those who are nearly
related to us; though not to those who are not connected to us by any
tie of affinity: and certainly these mischiefs must necessarily happen
oftener amongst those who do not know how they are connected to each
other than those who do; and when they do happen, if it is among the
first of these, they admit of a legal expiation, but amongst the
latter that cannot be done. It is also absurd for those who promote a
community of children to forbid those who love each other from
indulging themselves in the last excesses of that passion, while they
do not restrain them from the passion itself, or those intercourses
which are of all things most improper, between a Father and a son, a
brother and a brother, and indeed the thing itself is most absurd. It
is also ridiculous to prevent this intercourse between the nearest
relations, for no other reason than the violence of the pleasure,
while they think that the relation of father and daughter, the brother
and sister, is of no consequence at all. It seems also more
advantageous for the state, that the husbandmen should have their
wives and children in common than the military, for there will be less
affection [1262b] among them in that case than when otherwise; for
such persons ought to be under subjection, that they may obey the
laws, and not seek after innovations. Upon the whole, the consequences
of such a law as this would be directly contrary to those things which
good laws ought to establish, and which Socrates endeavoured to
establish by his regulations concerning women and children: for we
think that friendship is the greatest good which can happen to any
city, as nothing so much prevents seditions: and amity in a city is
what Socrates commends above all things, which appears to be, as
indeed he says, the effect of friendship; as we learn from
Aristophanes in the Erotics, who says, that those who love one another
from the excess of that passion, desire to breathe the same soul, and
from being two to be blended into one: from whence it would
necessarily follow, that both or one of them must be destroyed. But
now in a city which admits of this community, the tie of friendship
must, from that very cause, be extremely weak, when no father can say,
this is my son; or son, this is my father; for as a very little of
what is sweet, being mixed with a great deal of water is imperceptible
after the mixture, so must all family connections, and the names they
go by, be necessarily disregarded in such a community, it being then
by no means necessary that the father should have any regard for him
he called a son, or the brothers for those they call brothers. There
are two things which principally inspire mankind with care and love of
their offspring, knowing it is their own, and what ought to be the
object of their affection, neither of which can take place in this
sort of community. As for exchanging the children of the artificers
and husbandmen with those of the military, and theirs reciprocally
with these, it will occasion great confusion in whatever manner it
shall be done; for of necessity, those who carry the children must
know from whom they took and to whom they gave them; and by this means
those evils which I have already mentioned will necessarily be the
more likely to happen, as blows, incestuous love, murders, and the
like; for those who are given from their own parents to other
citizens, the military, for instance, will not call them brothers,
sons, fathers, or mothers. The same thing would happen to those of the
military who were placed among the other citizens; so that by this
means every one would be in fear how to act in consequence of
consanguinity. And thus let us determine concerning a community of
wives and children.




CHAPTER V


We proceed next to consider in what manner property should be
regulated in a state which is formed after the most perfect mode of
government, whether it should be common or not; for this may be
considered as a separate question from what had been determined
concerning [1263a] wives and children; I mean, whether it is better
that these should be held separate, as they now everywhere are, or
that not only possessions but also the usufruct of them should be in
common; or that the soil should have a particular owner, but that the
produce should be brought together and used as one common stock, as
some nations at present do; or on the contrary, should the soil be
common, and should it also be cultivated in common, while the produce
is divided amongst the individuals for their particular use, which is
said to be practised by some barbarians; or shall both the soil and
the fruit be common? When the business of the husbandman devolves not
on the citizen, the matter is much easier settled; but when those
labour together who have a common right of possession, this may
occasion several difficulties; for there may not be an equal
proportion between their labour and what they consume; and those who
labour hard and have but a small proportion of the produce, will
certainly complain of those who take a large share of it and do but
little for that. Upon the whole, as a community between man and man so
entire as to include everything possible, and thus to have all things
that man can possess in common, is very difficult, so is it
particularly so with respect to property; and this is evident from
that community which takes place between those who go out to settle a
colony; for they frequently have disputes with each other upon the
most common occasions, and come to blows upon trifles: we find, too,
that we oftenest correct those slaves who are generally employed in
the common offices of the family: a community of property then has
these and other inconveniences attending it.

But the manner of life which is now established, more particularly
when embellished with good morals and a system of equal laws, is far
superior to it, for it will have the advantage of both; by both I mean
properties being common, and divided also; for in some respects it
ought to be in a manner common, but upon the whole private: for every
man's attention being employed on his own particular concerns, will
prevent mutual complaints against each other; nay, by this means
industry will be increased, as each person will labour to improve his
own private property; and it will then be, that from a principle of
virtue they will mutually perform good offices to each other,
according to the proverb, "All things are common amongst friends;" and
in some cities there are traces of this custom to be seen, so that it
is not impracticable, and particularly in those which are best
governed; some things are by this means in a manner common, and others
might be so; for there, every person enjoying his own private
property, some things he assists his friend with, others are
considered as in common; as in Lacedaemon, where they use each other's
slaves, as if they were, so to speak, their own, as they do their
horses and dogs, or even any provision they may want in a journey.

It is evident then that it is best to have property private, but to
make the use of it common; but how the citizens are to be brought to
it is the particular [1263b] business of the legislator. And also
with respect to pleasure, it is unspeakable how advantageous it is,
that a man should think he has something which he may call his own;
for it is by no means to no purpose, that each person should have an
affection for himself, for that is natural, and yet to be a self-lover
is justly censured; for we mean by that, not one that simply loves
himself, but one that loves himself more than he ought; in like manner
we blame a money-lover, and yet both money and self is what all men
love. Besides, it is very pleasing to us to oblige and assist our
friends and companions, as well as those whom we are connected with by
the rights of hospitality; and this cannot be done without the
establishment of private property, which cannot take place with those
who make a city too much one; besides, they prevent every opportunity
of exercising two principal virtues, modesty and liberality. Modesty
with respect to the female sex, for this virtue requires you to
abstain from her who is another's; liberality, which depends upon
private property, for without that no one can appear liberal, or do
any generous action; for liberality consists in imparting to others
what is our own.

This system of polity does indeed recommend itself by its good
appearance and specious pretences to humanity; and when first proposed
to any one, must give him great pleasure, as he will conclude it to be
a wonderful bond of friendship, connecting all to all; particularly
when any one censures the evils which are now to be found in society,
as arising from properties not being common, I mean the disputes which
happen between man and man, upon their different contracts with each
other; those judgments which are passed in court in consequence of
fraud, and perjury, and flattering the rich, none of which arise from
properties being private, but from the vices of mankind. Besides,
those who live in one general community, and have all things in
common, oftener dispute with each other than those who have their
property separate; from the very small number indeed of those who have
their property in common, compared with those where it is
appropriated, the instances of their quarrels are but few. It is also
but right to mention, not only the inconveniences they are preserved
from who live in a communion of goods, but also the advantages they
are deprived of; for when the whole comes to be considered, this
manner of life will be found impracticable.

We must suppose, then, that Socrates's mistake arose from the
principle he set out with being false; we admit, indeed, that both a
family and a city ought to be one in some particulars, but not
entirely; for there is a point beyond which if a city proceeds in
reducing itself to one, it will be no longer a city.

There is also another point at which it will still continue to be a
city, but it will approach so near to not being one, that it will be
worse than none; as if any one should reduce the voices of those who
sing in concert to one, or a verse to a foot. But the people ought to
be made one, and a community, as I have already said, by education; as
property at Lacedsemon, and their public tables at Crete, were made
common by their legislators. But yet, whosoever shall introduce any
education, and think thereby to make his city excellent and
respectable, will be absurd, while he expects to form it by such
regulations, and not by manners, philosophy, and laws. And whoever
[1264a] would establish a government upon a community of goods,
ought to know that he should consult the experience of many years,
which would plainly enough inform him whether such a scheme is useful;
for almost all things have already been found out, but some have been
neglected, and others which have been known have not been put in
practice. But this would be most evident, if any one could see such a
government really established: for it would be impossible to frame
such a city without dividing and separating it into its distinct
parts, as public tables, wards, and tribes; so that here the laws will
do nothing more than forbid the military to engage in agriculture,
which is what the Lacedaemonians are at present endeavouring to do.

Nor has Socrates told us (nor is it easy to say) what plan of
government should be pursued with respect to the individuals in the
state where there is a community of goods established; for though the
majority of his citizens will in general consist of a multitude of
persons of different occupations, of those he has determined nothing;
whether the property of the husbandman ought to be in common, or
whether each person should have his share to himself; and also,
whether their wives and children ought to be in common: for if all
things are to be alike common to all, where will be the difference
between them and the military, or what would they get by submitting to
their government? and upon what principles would they do it, unless
they should establish the wise practice of the Cretans? for they,
allowing everything else to their slaves, forbid them only gymnastic
exercises and the use of arms. And if they are not, but these should
be in the same situation with respect to their property which they are
in other cities, what sort of a community will there be? in one city
there must of necessity be two, and those contrary to each other; for
he makes the military the guardians of the state, and the husbandman,
artisans, and others, citizens; and all those quarrels, accusations,
and things of the like sort, which he says are the bane of other
cities, will be found in his also: notwithstanding Socrates says they
will not want many laws in consequence of their education, but such
only as may be necessary for regulating the streets, the markets, and
the like, while at the same time it is the education of the military
only that he has taken any care of. Besides, he makes the husbandmen
masters of property upon paying a tribute; but this would be likely to
make them far more troublesome and high-spirited than the Helots, the
Penestise, or the slaves which others employ; nor has he ever
determined whether it is necessary to give any attention to them in
these particulars, nor thought of what is connected therewith, their
polity, their education, their laws; besides, it is of no little
consequence, nor is it easy to determine, how these should be framed
so as to preserve the community of the military.

Besides, if he makes the wives common, while the property [1264b]
continues separate, who shall manage the domestic concerns with the
same care which the man bestows upon his fields? nor will the
inconvenience be remedied by making property as well as wives common;
and it is absurd to draw a comparison from the brute creation, and
say, that the same principle should regulate the connection of a man
and a woman which regulates theirs amongst whom there is no family
association.

It is also very hazardous to settle the magistracy as Socrates has
done; for he would have persons of the same rank always in office,
which becomes the cause of sedition even amongst those who are of no
account, but more particularly amongst those who are of a courageous
and warlike disposition; it is indeed evidently necessary that he
should frame his community in this manner; for that golden particle
which God has mixed up in the soul of man flies not from one to the
other, but always continues with the same; for he says, that some of
our species have gold, and others silver, blended in their composition
from the moment of their birth: but those who are to be husbandmen and
artists, brass and iron; besides, though he deprives the military of
happiness, he says, that the legislator ought to make all the citizens
happy; but it is impossible that the whole city can be happy, without
all, or the greater, or some part of it be happy. For happiness is not
like that numerical equality which arises from certain numbers when
added together, although neither of them may separately contain it;
for happiness cannot be thus added together, but must exist in every
individual, as some properties belong to every integral; and if the
military are not happy, who else are so? for the artisans are not, nor
the multitude of those who are employed in inferior offices. The state
which Socrates has described has all these defects, and others which
are not of less consequence.




CHAPTER VI


It is also nearly the same in the treatise upon Laws which was writ
afterwards, for which reason it will be proper in this place to
consider briefly what he has there said upon government, for Socrates
has thoroughly settled but very few parts of it; as for instance, in
what manner the community of wives and children ought to be regulated,
how property should be established, and government conducted.

Now he divides the inhabitants into two parts, husbandmen and
soldiers, and from these he select a third part who are to be senators
and govern the city; but he has not said whether or no the husbandman
and artificer shall have any or what share in the government, or
whether they shall have arms, and join with the others in war, or not.
He thinks also that the women ought to go to war, and have the same
education as the soldiers; as to other particulars, he has filled his
treatise with matter foreign to the purpose; and with respect to
education, he has only said what that of the guards ought to be.

[1265a] As to his book of Laws, laws are the principal thing which
that contains, for he has there said but little concerning government;
and this government, which he was so desirous of framing in such a
manner as to impart to its members a more entire community of goods
than is to be found in other cities, he almost brings round again to
be the same as that other government which he had first proposed; for
except the community of wives and goods, he has framed both his
governments alike, for the education of the citizens is to be the same
in both; they are in both to live without any servile employ, and
their common tables are to be the same, excepting that in that he says
the women should have common tables, and that there should be a
thousand men-at-arms, in this, that there should be five thousand.

All the discourses of Socrates are masterly, noble, new, and
inquisitive; but that they are all true it may probably be too much to
say. For now with respect to the number just spoken of, it must be
acknowledged that he would want the country of Babylonia for them, or
some one like it, of an immeasurable extent, to support five thousand
idle persons, besides a much greater number of women and servants.
Every one, it is true, may frame an hypothesis as he pleases, but yet
it ought to be possible. It has been said, that a legislator should
have two things in view when he frames his laws, the country and the
people. He will also do well, if he has some regard to the
neighbouring states, if he intends that his community should maintain
any political intercourse with them, for it is not only necessary that
they should understand that practice of war which is adapted to their
own country, but to others also; for admitting that any one chooses
not this life either in public or private, yet there is not the less
occasion for their being formidable to their enemies, not only when
they invade their country, but also when they retire out of it.

It may also be considered whether the quantity of each person's
property may not be settled in a different manner from what he has
done it in, by making it more determinate; for he says, that every one
ought to have enough whereon to live moderately, as if any one had
said to live well, which is the most comprehensive expression.
Besides, a man may live moderately and miserably at the same time; he
had therefore better have proposed, that they should live both
moderately and liberally; for unless these two conspire, luxury will
come in on the one hand, or wretchedness on the other, since these two
modes of living are the only ones applicable to the employment of our
substance; for we cannot say with respect to a man's fortune, that he
is mild or courageous, but we may say that he is prudent and liberal,
which are the only qualities connected therewith.

It is also absurd to render property equal, and not to provide for the
increasing number of the citizens; but to leave that circumstance
uncertain, as if it would regulate itself according to the number of
women who [1265b] should happen to be childless, let that be what it
would because this seems to take place in other cities; but the case
would not be the same in such a state which he proposes and those
which now actually unite; for in these no one actually wants, as the
property is divided amongst the whole community, be their numbers what
they will; but as it could not then be divided, the supernumeraries,
whether they were many or few, would have nothing at all. But it is
more necessary than even to regulate property, to take care that the
increase of the people should not exceed a certain number; and in
determining that, to take into consideration those children who will
die, and also those women who will be barren; and to neglect this, as
is done in several cities, is to bring certain poverty on the
citizens; and poverty is the cause of sedition and evil. Now Phidon
the Corinthian, one of the oldest legislators, thought the families
and the number of the citizens should continue the same; although it
should happen that all should have allotments at the first,
disproportionate to their numbers.

In Plato's Laws it is however different; we shall mention hereafter
what we think would be best in these particulars. He has also
neglected in that treatise to point out how the governors are to be
distinguished from the governed; for he says, that as of one sort of
wool the warp ought to be made, and of another the woof, so ought some
to govern, and others to be governed. But since he admits, that all
their property may be increased fivefold, why should he not allow the
same increase to the country? he ought also to consider whether his
allotment of the houses will be useful to the community, for he
appoints two houses to each person, separate from each other; but it
is inconvenient for a person to inhabit two houses. Now he is desirous
to have his whole plan of government neither a democracy nor an
oligarchy, but something between both, which he calls a polity, for it
is to be composed of men-at-arms. If Plato intended to frame a state
in which more than in any other everything should be common, he has
certainly given it a right name; but if he intended it to be the next
in perfection to that which he had already framed, it is not so; for
perhaps some persons will give the preference to the Lacedaemonian
form of government, or some other which may more completely have
attained to the aristocratic form.

Some persons say, that the most perfect government should be composed
of all others blended together, for which reason they commend that of
Lacedsemon; for they say, that this is composed of an oligarchy, a
monarchy, and a democracy, their kings representing the monarchical
part, the senate the oligarchical; and, that in the ephori may be
found the democratical, as these are taken from the people. But some
say, that in the ephori is absolute power, and that it is their common
meal and daily course of life, in which the democratical form is
represented. It is also said in this treatise of [1266a] Laws, that
the best form of government must, be one composed of a democracy and a
tyranny; though such a mixture no one else would ever allow to be any
government at all, or if it is, the worst possible; those propose what
is much better who blend many governments together; for the most
perfect is that which is formed of many parts. But now in this
government of Plato's there are no traces of a monarchy, only of an
oligarchy and democracy; though he seems to choose that it should
rather incline to an oligarchy, as is evident from the appointment of
the magistrates; for to choose them by lot is common to both; but that
a man of fortune must necessarily be a member of the assembly, or to
elect the magistrates, or take part in the management of public
affairs, while others are passed over, makes the state incline to an
oligarchy; as does the endeavouring that the greater part of the rich
may be in office, and that the rank of their appointments may
correspond with their fortunes.

The same principle prevails also in the choice of their senate; the
manner of electing which is favourable also to an oligarchy; for all
are obliged to vote for those who are senators of the first class,
afterwards they vote for the same number out of the second, and then
out of the third; but this compulsion to vote at the election of
senators does not extend to the third and fourth classes and the first
and second class only are obliged to vote for the fourth. By this
means he says he shall necessarily have an equal number of each rank,
but he is mistaken--for the majority will always consist of those of
the first rank, and the most considerable people; and for this reason,
that many of the commonalty not being obliged to it, will not attend
the elections. From hence it is evident, that such a state will not
consist of a democracy and a monarchy, and this will be further proved
by what we shall say when we come particularly to consider this form
of government.

There will also great danger arise from the manner of electing the
senate, when those who are elected themselves are afterwards to elect
others; for by this means, if a certain number choose to combine
together, though not very considerable, the election will always fall
according to their pleasure. Such are the things which Plato proposes
concerning government in his book of Laws.




CHAPTER VII


There are also some other forms of government, which have been
proposed either by private persons, or philosophers, or politicians,
all of which come much nearer to those which have been really
established, or now exist, than these two of Plato's; for neither have
they introduced the innovation of a community of wives and children,
and public tables for the women, but have been contented to set out
with establishing such rules as are absolutely necessary.

There are some persons who think, that the first object of government
should be to regulate well everything relating to private property;
for they say, that a neglect herein is the source of all seditions
whatsoever. For this reason, Phaleas the Chalcedonian first proposed,
that the fortunes of the citizens should be equal, which he thought
was not difficult to accomplish when a community was first settled,
but that it was a work of greater difficulty in one that had been long
established; but yet that it might be effected, and an equality of
circumstances introduced by these means, that the rich should give
marriage portions, but never receive any, while the poor should always
receive, but never give.

But Plato, in his treatise of Laws, thinks that a difference in
circumstances should be permitted to a certain degree; but that no
citizen should be allowed to possess more than five times as much as
the lowest census, as we have already mentioned. But legislators who
would establish this principle are apt to overlook what they ought to
consider; that while they regulate the quantity of provisions which
each individual shall possess, they ought also to regulate the number
of his children; for if these exceed the allotted quantity of
provision, the law must necessarily be repealed; and yet, in spite of
the repeal, it will have the bad effect of reducing many from wealth
to poverty, so difficult is it for innovators not to fall into such
mistakes. That an equality of goods was in some degree serviceable to
strengthen the bands of society, seems to have been known to some of
the ancients; for Solon made a law, as did some others also, to
restrain persons from possessing as much land as they pleased. And
upon the same principle there are laws which forbid men to sell their
property, as among the Locrians, unless they can prove that some
notorious misfortuue has befallen them. They were also to preserve
their ancient patrimony, which custom being broken through by the
Leucadians, made their government too democratic; for by that means it
was no longer necessary to be possessed of a certain fortune to be
qualified to be a magistrate. But if an equality of goods is
established, this may be either too much, when it enables the people
to live luxuriously, or too little, when it obliges them to live hard.
Hence it is evident, that it is not proper for the legislator to
establish an equality of circumstances, but to fix a proper medium.
Besides, if any one should regulate the division of property in such a
manner that there should be a moderate sufficiency for all, it would
be of no use; for it is of more consequence that the citizen should
entertain a similarity of sentiments than an equality of
circumstances; but this can never be attained unless they are properly
educated under the direction of the law. But probably Phaleas may say,
that this in what he himself mentions; for he both proposes a equality
of property and one plan of education in his city. But he should have
said particularly what education he intended, nor is it of any
service to have this to much one; for this education may be one, and
yet such as will make the citizens over-greedy, to grasp after
honours, or riches, or both. Besides, not only an in equality of
possessions, but also of honours, will occasion [1267a] seditions, but
this upon contrary grounds; for the vulgar will be seditious if there
be an inequality of goods, by those of more elevated sentiments, if
there is an equality of honours.

"When good and bad do equal honours share."

For men are not guilty of crimes for necessaries only (for which he
thinks an equality of goods would be a sufficient remedy, as they
would then have no occasion to steal cold or hunger), but that they
may enjoy what the desire, and not wish for it in vain; for if their
desire extend beyond the common necessaries of life, they were be
wicked to gratify them; and not only so, but if their wishes point
that way, they will do the same to enjoy those pleasures which are
free from the alloy of pain. What remedy then shall we find for these
three disorder; and first, to prevent stealing from necessity, let
every one be supplied with a moderate subsistence, which may make the
addition of his own industry necessary; second to prevent stealing to
procure the luxuries of life, temperance be enjoined; and thirdly,
let those who wish for pleasure in itself seek for it only in
philosophy, all others want the assistance of men.

Since then men are guilty of the greatest crimes from ambition, and
not from necessity, no one, for instance aims at being a tyrant to
keep him from the cold, hence great honour is due to him who kills not
a thief, but tyrant; so that polity which Phaleas establishes would
only be salutary to prevent little crimes. He has also been very
desirous to establish such rules as will conduce to perfect the
internal policy of his state, and he ought also to have done the same
with respect to its neighbours and all foreign nations; for the
considerations of the military establishment should take place in
planning every government, that it may not be unprovided in case of a
war, of which he has said nothing; so also with respect to property,
it ought not only to be adapted to the exigencies of the state, but
also to such dangers as may arise from without.

Thus it should not be so much as to tempt those who are near, and more
powerful to invade it, while those who possess it are not able to
drive out the invaders, nor so little as that the state should not be
able to go to war with those who are quite equal to itself, and of
this he has determined nothing; it must indeed be allowed that it is
advantageous to a community to be rather rich than poor; probably the
proper boundary is this, not to possess enough to make it worth while
for a more powerful neighbour to attack you, any more than he would
those who had not so much as yourself; thus when Autophradatus
proposed to besiege Atarneus, Eubulus advised him to consider what
time it would require to take the city, and then would have him
determine whether it would answer, for that he should choose, if it
would even take less than he proposed, to quit the place; his saying
this made Autophradatus reflect upon the business and give over the
siege. There is, indeed, some advantage in an equality of goods
amongst the citizens to prevent seditions; and yet, to say truth, no
very great one; for men of great abilities will stomach their being
put upon a level with the rest of the community. For which reason
they will very often appear ready for every commation and sedition;
for the wickedness of mankind is insatiable. For though at first
two oboli might be sufficient, yet when once it is become customary,
they continually want something more, until they set no limits to
their expectations; for it is the nature of our desires to be
boundless, and many live only to gratify them. But for this purpose
the first object is, not so much to establish an equality of fortune,
as to prevent those who are of a good disposition from desiring more
than their own, and those who are of a bad one from being able to
acquire it; and this may be done if they are kept in an inferior
station, and not exposed to injustice. Nor has he treated well the
equality of goods, for he has extended his regulation only to land;
whereas a man's substance consists not only in this, but also in
slaves, cattle, money, and all that variety of things which fall under
the name of chattels; now there must be either an equality established
in all these, or some certain rule, or they must be left entirely at
large. It appears too by his laws, that he intends to establish only a
small state, as all the artificers are to belong to the public, and
add nothing to the complement of citizens; but if all those who are to
be employed in public works are to be the slaves of the public, it
should be done in the same manner as it is at Epidamnum, and as
Diophantus formerly regulated it at Athens. From these particulars any
one may nearly judge whether Phaleas's community is well or ill
established.




CHAPTER VIII


Hippodamus, the son of Euruphon a Milesian, contrived the art of
laying out towns, and separated the Pireus. This man was in other
respects too eager after notice, and seemed to many to live in a very
affected manner, with his flowing locks and his expensive ornaments,
and a coarse warm vest which he wore, not only in the winter, but also
in the hot weather. As he was very desirous of the character of a
universal scholar, he was the first who, not being actually engaged in
the management of public affairs, sat himself to inquire what sort of
government was best; and he planned a state, consisting of ten
thousand persons, divided into three parts, one consisting of
artisans, another of husbandmen, and the third of soldiers; he also
divided the lands into three parts, and allotted one to sacred
purposes, another to the public, and the third to individuals. The
first of these was to supply what was necessary for the established
worship of the gods; the second was to be allotted to the support of
the soldiery; and the third was to be the property of the husbandman.
He thought also that there need only be three sorts of laws,
corresponding to the three sorts of actions which can be brought,
namely, for assault, trespasses, or death. He ordered also that there
should be a particular court of appeal, into which all causes might be
removed which were supposed to have been unjustly determined
elsewhere; which court should be composed of old men chosen for that
purpose. He thought also [1268a] that they should not pass sentence by
votes; but that every one should bring with him a tablet, on which he
should write, that he found the party guilty, if it was so, but if
not, he should bring a plain tablet; but if he acquitted him of one
part of the indictment but not of the other, he should express that
also on the tablet; for he disapproved of that general custom already
established, as it obliges the judges to be guilty of perjury if they
determined positively either on the one side or the other. He also
made a law, that those should be rewarded who found out anything for
the good of the city, and that the children of those who fell in
battle should be educated at the public expense; which law had never
been proposed by any other legislator, though it is at present in use
at Athens as well as in other cities, he would have the magistrates
chosen out of the people in general, by whom he meant the three parts
before spoken of; and that those who were so elected should be the
particular guardians of what belonged to the public, to strangers, and
to orphans.

These are the principal parts and most worthy of notice in
Hippodamus's plan. But some persons might doubt the propriety of his
division of the citizens into three parts; for the artisans, the
husbandmen, and the soldiers are to compose one community, where the
husbandmen are to have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor
land, which would in a manner render them slaves to the soldiery. It
is also impossible that the whole community should partake of all the
honourable employments in it--for the generals and the guardians of
the state must necessarily be appointed out of the soldiery, and
indeed the most honourable magistrates; but as the two other parts
will not have their share in the government, how can they be expected
to have any affection for it? But it is necessary that the soldiery
should be superior to the other two parts, and this superiority will
not be easily gained without they are very numerous; and if they are
so, why should the community consist of any other members? why should
any others have a right to elect the magistrates? Besides, of what use
are the husbandmen to this community? Artisans, 'tis true, are
necessary, for these every city wants, and they can live upon their
business. If the husbandmen indeed furnished the soldiers with
provisions, they would be properly part of the community; but these
are supposed to have their private property, and to cultivate it for
their own use. Moreover, if the soldiers themselves are to cultivate
that common land which is appropriated for their support, there will
be no distinction between the soldier and the husbandman, which the
legislator intended there should be; and if there should be any others
who are to cultivate the private property of the husbandman and the
common lands of the military, there will be a fourth order in the
state which will have no share in it, and always entertain hostile
sentiments towards it. If any one should propose that the same persons
should cultivate their own lands and the public ones also, then there
would be a deficiency [1268b] of provisions to supply two families, as
the lands would not immediately yield enough for themselves and the
soldiers also; and all these things would occasion great confusion.

Nor do I approve of his method of determining causes, when he would
have the judge split the case which comes simply before him; and thus,
instead of being a judge, become an arbitrator. Now when any matter is
brought to arbitration, it is customary for many persons to confer
together upon the business that is before them; but when a cause is
brought before judges it is not so; and many legislators take care
that the judges shall not have it in their power to communicate their
sentiments to each other. Besides, what can prevent confusion on the
bench when one judge thinks a fine should be different from what
another has set it at; one proposing twenty minae, another ten, or be
it more or less, another four, and another five; and it is evident,
that in this manner they will differ from each other, while some will
give the whole damages sued for, and others nothing; in this
situation, how shall their determinations be settled? Besides, a judge
cannot be obliged to perjure himself who simply acquits or condemns,
if the action is fairly and justly brought; for he who acquits the
party does not say that he ought not to pay any fine at all, but that
he ought not to pay a fine of twenty minae. But he that condemns him
is guilty of perjury if he sentences him to pay twenty minae while he
believes the damages ought not to be so much.

Now with respect to these honours which he proposes to bestow on those
who can give any information useful to the community, this, though
very pleasing in speculation, is what the legislator should not
settle, for it would encourage informers, and probably occasion
commotions in the state. And this proposal of his gives rise also to
further conjectures and inquiries; for some persons have doubted
whether it is useful or hurtful to alter the established law of any
country, if even for the better; for which reason one cannot
immediately determine upon what he here says, whether it is
advantageous to alter the law or not. We know, indeed, that it is
possible to propose to new model both the laws and government as a
common good; and since we have mentioned this subject, it may be very
proper to enter into a few particulars concerning it, for it contains
some difficulties, as I have already said, and it may appear better to
alter them, since it has been found useful in other sciences.

Thus the science of physic is extended beyond its ancient bounds; so
is the gymnastic, and indeed all other arts and powers; so that one
may lay it down for certain that the same thing will necessarily hold
good in the art of government. And it may also be affirmed, that
experience itself gives a proof of this; for the ancient laws are too
simple and barbarous; which allowed the Greeks to wear swords in the
city, and to buy their wives of each [1269a]. other. And indeed all
the remains of old laws which we have are very simple; for instance, a
law in Cuma relative to murder. If any person who prosecutes another
for murder can produce a certain number of witnesses to it of his own
relations, the accused person shall be held guilty. Upon the whole,
all persons ought to endeavour to follow what is right, and not what
is established; and it is probable that the first men, whether they
sprung out of the earth, or were saved from some general calamity, had
very little understanding or knowledge, as is affirmed of these
aborigines; so that it would be absurd to continue in the practice of
their rules. Nor is it, moreover, right to permit written laws always
to remain without alteration; for as in all other sciences, so in
politics, it is impossible to express everything in writing with
perfect exactness; for when we commit anything to writing we must use
general terms, but in every action there is something particular to
itself, which these may not comprehend; from whence it is evident,
that certain laws will at certain times admit of alterations. But if
we consider this matter in another point of view, it will appear to
require great caution; for when the advantage proposed is trifling, as
the accustoming the people easily to abolish their laws is of bad
consequence, it is evidently better to pass over some faults which
either the legislator or the magistrates may have committed; for the
alterations will not be of so much service as a habit of disobeying
the magistrates will be of disservice. Besides, the instance brought
from the arts is fallacious; for it is not the same thing to alter the
one as the other. For a law derives all its strength from custom, and
this requires long time to establish; so that, to make it an easy
matter to pass from the established laws to other new ones, is to
weaken the power of laws. Besides, here is another question; if the
laws are to be altered, are they all to be altered, and in every
goverment or not, and whether at the pleasure of one person or many?
all which particulars will make a great difference; for
which reason we will at present drop the inquiry, to pursue it at some
other time.




CHAPTER IX


There are two considerations which offer themselves with respect to
the government established at Lacedsemon and Crete, and indeed in
almost all other states whatsoever; one is whether their laws do or do
not promote the best establishment possible? the other is whether
there is anything, if we consider either the principles upon which it
is founded or the executive part of it, which prevents the form of
government that they had proposed to follow from being observed; now
it is allowed that in every well-regulated state the members of it
should be free from servile labour; but in what manner this shall be
effected is not so easy to determine; for the Penestse have very often
attacked the Thessalians, and the Helots the Lacedaemonians, for they
in a manner continually watch an opportunity for some misfortune
befalling them. But no such thing has ever happened to the Cretans;
the [1269b] reason for which probably is, that although they are
engaged in frequent wars with the neighbouring cities, yet none of
these would enter into an alliance with the revolters, as it would be
disadvantageous for them, who themselves also have their villains. But
now there is perpetual enmity between the Lacedaemonians and all their
neighbours, the Argives, the Messenians, and the Arcadians. Their
slaves also first revolted from the Thessalians while they were
engaged in wars with their neighbours the Acheans, the Perrabeans, and
the Magnesians. It seems to me indeed, if nothing else, yet something
very troublesome to keep upon proper terms with them; for if you are
remiss in your discipline they grow insolent, and think themselves
upon an equality with their masters; and if they are hardly used they
are continually plotting against you and hate you. It is evident,
then, that those who employ slaves have not as yet hit upon the right
way of managing them.

As to the indulging of women in any particular liberties, it is
hurtful to the end of government and the prosperity of the city; for
as a man and his wife are the two parts of a family, if we suppose a
city to be divided into two parts, we must allow that the number of
men and women will be equal.

In whatever city then the women are not under good regulations, we
must look upon one half of it as not under the restraint of law, as it
there happened; for the legislator, desiring to make his whole city a
collection of warriors with respect to the men, he most evidently
accomplished his design; but in the meantime the women were quite
neglected, for they live without restraint in every improper
indulgence and luxury. So that in such a state riches will necessarily
be in general esteem, particularly if the men are governed by their
wives, which has been the case with many a brave and warlike people
except the Celts, and those other nations, if there are any such, who
openly practise pederasty. And the first mythologists seem not
improperly to have joined Mars and Venus together; for all nations of
this character are greatly addicted either to the love of women or of
boys, for which reason it was thus at Lacedaemon; and many things in
their state were done by the authority of the women. For what is the
difference, if the power is in the hands of the women, or in the hands
of those whom they themselves govern? it must turn to the same
account. As this boldness of the women can be of no use in any common
occurrences, if it was ever so, it must be in war; but even here we
find that the Lacedaemonian women were of the greatest disservice, as
was proved at the time of the Theban invasion, when they were of no
use at all, as they are in other cities, but made more disturbance
than even the enemy.

The origin of this indulgence which the Lacedaemonian women enjoy is
easily accounted for, from the long time the men were absent from home
upon foreign expeditions [1270a] against the Argives, and afterwards
the Arcadians and Messenians, so that, when these wars were at an end,
their military life, in which there is no little virtue, prepared them
to obey the precepts of their law-giver; but we are told, that when
Lycurgus endeavoured also to reduce the women to an obedience to his
laws, upon their refusal he declined it. It may indeed be said that
the women were the causes of these things, and of course all the fault
was theirs. But we are not now considering where the fault lies, or
where it does not lie, but what is right and what is wrong; and when
the manners of the women are not well regulated, as I have already
said, it must not only occasion faults which are disgraceful to the
state, but also increase the love of money. In the next place, fault
may be found with his unequal division of property, for some will have
far too much, others too little; by which means the land will come
into few hands, which business is badly regulated by his laws. For he
made it infamous for any one either to buy or sell their possessions,
in which he did right; but he permitted any one that chose it to give
them away, or bequeath them, although nearly the same consequences
will arise from one practice as from the other. It is supposed that
near two parts in five of the whole country is the property of women,
owing to their being so often sole heirs, and having such large
fortunes in marriage; though it would be better to allow them none, or
a little, or a certain regulated proportion. Now every one is
permitted to make a woman his heir if he pleases; and if he dies
intestate, he who succeeds as heir at law gives it to whom he pleases.
From whence it happens that although the country is able to support
fifteen hundred horse and thirty thousand foot, the number does not
amount to one thousand.

And from these facts it is evident, that this particular is badly
regulated; for the city could not support one shock, but was ruined
for want of men. They say, that during the reigns of their ancient
kings they used to present foreigners with the freedom of their city,
to prevent there being a want of men while they carried on long wars;
it is also affirmed that the number of Spartans was formerly ten
thousand; but be that as it will, an equality of property conduces
much to increase the number of the people. The law, too, which he made
to encourage population was by no means calculated to correct this
inequality; for being willing that the Spartans should be as numerous
as [1270b] possible, to make them desirous of having large families he
ordered that he who had three children should be excused the
night-watch, and that he who had four should pay no taxes: though it
is very evident, that while the land was divided in this manner, that
if the people increased there must many of them be very poor.

Nor was he less blamable for the manner in which he constituted the
ephori; for these magistrates take cognisance of things of the last
importance, and yet they are chosen out of the people in general; so
that it often happens that a very poor person is elected to that
office, who, from that circumstance, is easily bought. There have been
many instances of this formerly, as well as in the late affair at
Andros. And these men, being corrupted with money, went as far as they
could to ruin the city: and, because their power was too great and
nearly tyrannical, their kings were obliged to natter them, which
contributed greatly to hurt the state; so that it altered from an
aristocracy to a democracy. This magistracy is indeed the great
support of the state; for the people are easy, knowing that they are
eligible to the first office in it; so that, whether it took place by
the intention of the legislator, or whether it happened by chance,
this is of great service to their affairs; for it is necessary that
every member of the state should endeavour that each part of the
government should be preserved, and continue the same. And upon this
principle their kings have always acted, out of regard to their
honour; the wise and good from their attachment to the senate, a seat
wherein they consider as the reward of virtue; and the common people,
that they may support the ephori, of whom they consist. And it is
proper that these magistrates should be chosen out of the whole
community, not as the custom is at present, which is very ridiculous.
The ephori are the supreme judges in causes of the last consequence;
but as it is quite accidental what sort of persons they may be, it is
not right that they should determine according to their own opinion,
but by a written law or established custom. Their way of life also is
not consistent with the manners of the city, for it is too indulgent;
whereas that of others is too severe; so that they cannot support it,
but are obliged privately to act contrary to law, that they may enjoy
some of the pleasures of sense. There are also great defects in the
institution of their senators. If indeed they were fitly trained to
the practice of every human virtue, every one would readily admit that
they would be useful to the government; but still it might be debated
whether they should be continued judges for life, to determine points
of the greatest moment, since the mind has its old age as well as the
body; but as they are so brought up, [1271a] that even the legislator
could not depend upon them as good men, their power must be
inconsistent with the safety of the state: for it is known that the
members of that body have been guilty both of bribery and partiality
in many public affairs; for which reason it had been much better if
they had been made answerable for their conduct, which they are not.
But it may be said the ephori seem to have a check upon all the
magistrates. They have indeed in this particular very great power; but
I affirm that they should not be entrusted with this control in the
manner they are. Moreover, the mode of choice which they make use of
at the election of their senators is very childish. Nor is it right
for any one to solicit for a place he is desirous of; for every
person, whether he chooses it or not, ought to execute any office he
is fit for. But his intention was evidently the same in this as in the
other parts of his government. For making his citizens ambitious after
honours, with men of that disposition he has filled his senate, since
no others will solicit for that office; and yet the principal part of
those crimes which men are deliberately guilty of arise from ambition
and avarice.

We will inquire at another time whether the office of a king is useful
to the state: thus much is certain, that they should be chosen from a
consideration of their conduct and not as they are now. But that the
legislator himself did not expect to make all his citizens honourable
and completely virtuous is evident from this, that he distrusts them
as not being good men; for he sent those upon the same embassy that
were at variance with each other; and thought, that in the dispute of
the kings the safety of the state consisted. Neither were their common
meals at first well established: for these should rather have been
provided at the public expense, as at Crete, where, as at Lacedaemon,
every one was obliged to buy his portion, although he might be very
poor, and could by no means bear the expense, by which means the
contrary happened to what the legislator desired: for he intended that
those public meals should strengthen the democratic part of his
government: but this regulation had quite the contrary effect, for
those who were very poor could not take part in them; and it was an
observation of their forefathers, that the not allowing those who
could not contribute their proportion to the common tables to partake
of them, would be the ruin of the state. Other persons have censured
his laws concerning naval affairs, and not without reason, as it gave
rise to disputes. For the commander of the fleet is in a manner set up
in opposition to the kings, who are generals of the army for life.

[1271b] There is also another defect in his laws worthy of censure,
which Plato has given in his book of Laws; that the whole constitution
was calculated only for the business of war: it is indeed excellent to
make them conquerors; for which reason the preservation of the state
depended thereon. The destruction of it commenced with their
victories: for they knew not how to be idle, or engage in any other
employment than war. In this particular also they were mistaken, that
though they rightly thought, that those things which are the objects
of contention amongst mankind are better procured by virtue than vice,
yet they wrongfully preferred the things themselves to virtue. Nor was
the public revenue well managed at Sparta, for the state was worth
nothing while they were obliged to carry on the most extensive wars,
and the subsidies were very badly raised; for as the Spartans
possessed a large extent of country, they were not exact upon each
other as to what they paid in. And thus an event contrary to the
legislator's intention took place; for the state was poor, the
individuals avaricious. Enough of the Lacedaemonian government; for
these seem the chief defects in it.




CHAPTER X


The government of Crete bears a near resemblance to this, in some few
particulars it is not worse, but in general it is far inferior in its
contrivance. For it appears and is allowed in many particulars the
constitution of Lacedaemon was formed in imitation of that of Crete;
and in general most new things are an improvement upon the old. For
they say, that when Lycurgus ceased to be guardian to King Charilles
he went abroad and spent a long time with his relations in Crete, for
the Lycians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians; and those who first
settled there adopted that body of laws which they found already
established by the inhabitants; in like manner also those who now live
near them have the very laws which Minos first drew up.

This island seems formed by nature to be the mistress of Greece, for
it is entirely surrounded by a navigable ocean which washes almost all
the maritime parts of that country, and is not far distant on the one
side from Peloponnesus, on the other, which looks towards Asia, from
Triopium and Rhodes. By means of this situation Minos acquired the
empire of the sea and the islands; some of which he subdued, in others
planted colonies: at last he died at Camicus while he was attacking
Sicily. There is this analogy between the customs of the
Lacedaemonians and the Cretans, the Helots cultivate the grounds
[1272a] for the one, the domestic slaves for the other. Both states
have their common meals, and the Lacedaemonians called these formerly
not _psiditia_ but _andpia_, as the Cretans do; which proves from
whence the custom arose. In this particular their governments are also
alike: the ephori have the same power with those of Crete, who are
called _kosmoi_; with this difference only, that the number of the one
is five, of the other ten. The senators are the same as those whom the
Cretans call the council. There was formerly also a kingly power in
Crete; but it was afterwards dissolved, and the command of their
armies was given to the _kosmoi_. Every one also has a vote in their
public assembly; but this has only the power of confirming what has
already passed the council and the _kosmoi_.

The Cretans conducted their public meals better than the
Lacedaemonians, for at Lacedsemon each individual was obliged to
furnish what was assessed upon him; which if he could not do, there
was a law which deprived him of the rights of a citizen, as has been
already mentioned: but in Crete they were furnished by the community;
for all the corn and cattle, taxes and contributions, which the
domestic slaves were obliged to furnish, were divided into parts and
allotted to the gods, the exigencies of the state, and these public
meals; so that all the men, women, and children were maintained from a
common stock. The legislator gave great attention to encourage a habit
of eating sparingly, as very useful to the citizens. He also
endeavoured, that his community might not be too populous, to lessen
the connection with women, by introducing the love of boys: whether in
this he did well or ill we shall have some other opportunity of
considering. But that the public meals were better ordered at Crete
than at Lacedaemon is very evident.

The institution of the _kosmoi_, was still worse than that of the
ephori: for it contained all the faults incident to that magistracy
and some peculiar to itself; for in both cases it is uncertain who
will be elected: but the Lacedae-monians have this advantage which the
others have not, that as all are eligible, the whole community have a
share in the highest honours, and therefore all desire to preserve the
state: whereas among the Cretans the _kosmoi_ are not chosen out of
the people in general, but out of some certain families, and the
senate out of the _kosmoi_. And the same observations which may be
made on the senate at Lacedaemon may be applied to these; for their
being under no control, and their continuing for life, is an honour
greater than they merit; and to have their proceedings not regulated
by a written law, but left to their own discretion, is dangerous. (As
to there being no insurrections, although the people share not in the
management of public affairs, this is no proof of a well-constituted
government, as the _kosmoi_ have no opportunity of being bribed like
the ephori, as they live in an [1272b] island far from those who would
corrupt them.) But the method they take to correct that fault is
absurd, impolitic, and tyrannical: for very often either their
fellow-magistrates or some private persons conspire together and turn
out the _kosmoi_. They are also permitted to resign their office
before their time is elapsed, and if all this was done by law it would
be well, and not at the pleasure of the individuals, which is a bad
rule to follow. But what is worst of all is, that general confusion
which those who are in power introduce to impede the ordinary course
of justice; which sufficiently shows what is the nature of the
government, or rather lawless force: for it is usual with the
principal persons amongst them to collect together some of the common
people and their friends, and then revolt and set up for themselves,
and come to blows with each other. And what is the difference, if a
state is dissolved at once by such violent means, or if it gradually
so alters in process of time as to be no longer the same constitution?
A state like this would ever be exposed to the invasions of those who
were powerful and inclined to attack it; but, as has been already
mentioned, its situation preserves it, as it is free from the inroads
of foreigners; and for this reason the family slaves still remain
quiet at Crete, while the Helots are perpetually revolting: for the
Cretans take no part in foreign affairs, and it is but lately that any
foreign troops have made an attack upon the island; and their ravages
soon proved the ineffectualness of their laws. And thus much for the
government of Crete.




CHAPTER XI


The government of Carthage seems well established, and in many
respects superior to others; in some particulars it bears a near
resemblance to the Lacedaemonians; and indeed these three states, the
Cretans, the Lacedaemonians and the Carthaginians are in some things
very like each other, in others they differ greatly. Amongst many
excellent constitutions this may show how well their government is
framed, that although the people are admitted to a share in the
administration, the form of it remains unaltered, without any popular
insurrections, worth notice, on the one hand, or degenerating into a
tyranny on the other. Now the Carthaginians have these things in
common with the Lacedaemonians: public tables for those who are
connected together by the tie of mutual friendship, after the manner
of their Phiditia; they have also a magistracy, consisting of an
hundred and four persons, similar to the ephori, or rather selected
with more judgment; for amongst the Lacedaemonians, all the citizens
are eligible, but amongst the Carthaginians, they are chosen out of
those of the better sort: there is also some analogy between the king
and the senate in both these governments, though the Carthaginian
method of appointing their kings is best, for they do not confine
themselves to one family; nor do they permit the election to be at
large, nor have they any regard to seniority; for if amongst the
candidates there are any of greater merit than the rest, these they
prefer to those who may be older; for as their power is very
extensive, if they are [1273a] persons of no account, they may be very
hurtful to the state, as they have always been to the Lacedaemonians;
also the greater part of those things which become reprehensible by
their excess are common to all those governments which we have
described.

Now of those principles on which the Carthaginians have established
their mixed form of government, composed of an aristocracy and
democracy, some incline to produce a democracy, others an oligarchy:
for instance, if the kings and the senate are unanimous upon any point
in debate, they can choose whether they will bring it before the
people or no; but if they disagree, it is to these they must appeal,
who are not only to hear what has been approved of by the senate, but
are finally to determine upon it; and whosoever chooses it, has a
right to speak against any matter whatsoever that may be proposed,
which is not permitted in other cases. The five, who elect each other,
have very great and extensive powers; and these choose the hundred,
who are magistrates of the highest rank: their power also continues
longer than any other magistrates, for it commences before they come
into office, and is prolonged after they are out of it; and in this
particular the state inclines to an oligarchy: but as they are not
elected by lot, but by suffrage, and are not permitted to take money,
they are the greatest supporters imaginable of an aristocracy.

The determining all causes by the same magistrates, and not orae in
one court and another in another, as at Lacedaemon, has the same
influence. The constitution of Carthage is now shifting from an
aristocracy to an oligarchy, in consequence of an opinion which is
favourably entertained by many, who think that the magistrates in the
community ought not to be persons of family only, but of fortune also;
as it is impossible for those who are in bad circumstances to support
the dignity of their office, or to be at leisure to apply to public
business. As choosing men of fortune to be magistrates make a state
incline to an oligarchy, and men of abilities to an aristocracy, so is
there a third method of proceeding which took place in the polity of
Carthage; for they have an eye to these two particulars when they
elect their officers, particularly those of the highest rank, their
kings and their generals. It must be admitted, that it was a great
fault in their legislator not to guard against the constitution's
degenerating from an aristocracy; for this is a most necessary thing
to provide for at first, that those citizens who have the best
abilities should never be obliged to do anything unworthy their
character, but be always at leisure to serve the public, not only when
in office, but also when private persons; for if once you are obliged
to look among the wealthy, that you may have men at leisure to serve
you, your greatest offices, of king and general, will soon become
venal; in consequence of which, riches will be more honourable than
virtue and a love of money be the ruling principle in the city-for
what those who have the chief power regard as honourable will
necessarily be the object which the [1273b] citizens in general will
aim at; and where the first honours are not paid to virtue, there the
aristocratic form of government cannot flourish: for it is reasonable
to conclude, that those who bought their places should generally make
an advantage of what they laid out their money for; as it is absurd to
suppose, that if a man of probity who is poor should be desirous of
gaining something, a bad man should not endeavour to do the same,
especially to reimburse himself; for which reason the magistracy
should be formed of those who are most able to support an aristocracy.
It would have been better for the legislature to have passed over the
poverty of men of merit, and only to have taken care to have ensured
them sufficient leisure, when in office, to attend to public affairs.

It seems also improper, that one person should execute several
offices, which was approved of at Carthage; for one business is best
done by one person; and it is the duty of the legislator to look to
this, and not make the same person a musician and a shoemaker: so that
where the state is not small it is more politic and more popular to
admit many persons to have a share in the government; for, as I just
now said, it is not only more usual, but everything is better and
sooner done, when one thing only is allotted to one person: and this
is evident both in the army and navy, where almost every one, in his
turn, both commands and is under command. But as their government
inclines to an oligarchy, they avoid the ill effects of it by always
appointing some of the popular party to the government of cities to
make their fortunes. Thus they consult this fault in their
constitution and render it stable; but this is depending on chance;
whereas the legislator ought to frame his government, that there the
no room for insurrections. But now, if there should be any general
calamity, and the people should revolt from their rulers, there is no
remedy for reducing them to obedience by the laws. And these are the
particulars of the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian
governments which seem worthy of commendation.




CHAPTER XII


Some of those persons who have written upon government had never any
share in public affairs, but always led a private life. Everything
worthy of notice in their works we have already spoke to. Others were
legislators, some in their own cities, others were employed in
regulating the governments of foreign states. Some of them only
composed a body of laws; others formed the constitution also, as
Lycurgus; and Solon, who did both. The Lacedaemonians have been
already mentioned. Some persons think that Solon was an excellent
legislator, who could dissolve a pure oligarchy, and save the people
from that slavery which hung over them, and establish the ancient
democratic form of government in his country; wherein every part of it
was so framed as to be well adapted to the whole. In the senate of
Areopagus an oligarchy was preserved; by the manner of electing their
[1274a] magistrates, an aristocracy; and in their courts of justice, a
democracy.

Solon seems not to have altered the established form of government,
either with respect to the senate or the mode of electing their
magistrates; but to have raised the people to great consideration in
the state by allotting the supreme judicial department to them; and
for this some persons blame him, as having done what would soon
overturn that balance of power he intended to establish; for by trying
all causes whatsoever before the people, who were chosen by lot to
determine them, it was necessary to flatter a tyrannical populace who
had got this power; which contributed to bring the government to that
pure democracy it now is.

Both Ephialtes and Pericles abridged the power of the Areopagites, the
latter of whom introduced the method of paying those who attended the
courts of justice: and thus every one who aimed at being popular
proceeded increasing the power of the people to what we now see it.
But it is evident that this was not Solon's intention, but that it
arose from accident; for the people being the cause of the naval
victory over the Medes, assumed greatly upon it, and enlisted
themselves under factious demagogues, although opposed by the better
part of the citizens. He thought it indeed most necessary to entrust
the people with the choice of their magistrates and the power of
calling them to account; for without that they must have been slaves
and enemies to the other citizens: but he ordered them to elect those
only who were persons of good account and property, either out of
those who were worth five hundred medimns, or those who were called
xeugitai, or those of the third census, who were called horsemen.

As for those of the fourth, which consisted of mechanics, they were
incapable of any office. Zaleucus was the legislator of the Western
Locrians, as was Charondas, the Catanean, of his own cities, and those
also in Italy and Sicily which belonged to the Calcidians. Some
persons endeavour to prove that Onomacritus, the Locrian, was the
first person of note who drew up laws; and that he employed himself in
that business while he was at Crete, where he continued some time to
learn the prophetic art: and they say, that Thales was his companion;
and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were the scholars of Thales, and
Charondas of Zaleucus; but those who advance this, advance what is
repugnant to chronology. Philolaus also, of the family of the
Bacchiades, was a Theban legislator. This man was very fond of
Diocles, a victor in the Olympic games, and when he left his country
from a disgust at an improper passion which his mother Alithoe had
entertained for him, and settled at Thebes, Philolaus followed him,
where they both died, and where they still show their tombs placed in
view of each other, but so disposed, that one of them looks towards
Corinth, the other does not; the reason they give for this is, that
Diodes, from his detestation of his mother's passion, would have his
tomb so placed that no one could see Corinth from it; but Philolaus
chose that it might be seen from his: and this was the cause of their
living at Thebes. [1274b]

As Philolaus gave them laws concerning many other things, so did he
upon adoption, which they call adoptive laws; and this he in
particular did to preserve the number of families. Charondas did
nothing new, except in actions for perjury, which he was the first
person who took into particular consideration. He also drew up his
laws with greater elegance and accuracy than even any of our present
legislators. Philolaus introduced the law for the equal distribution
of goods; Plato that for the community of women, children, and goods,
and also for public tables for the women; and one concerning
drunkenness, that they might observe sobriety in their symposiums. He
also made a law concerning their warlike exercises; that they should
acquire a habit of using both hands alike, as it was necessary that
one hand should be as useful as the other.

As for Draco's laws, they were published when the government was
already established, and they have nothing particular in them worth
mentioning, except their severity on account of the enormity of their
punishments. Pittacus was the author of some laws, but never drew up
any form of government; one of which was this, that if a drunken man
beat any person he should be punished more than if he did it when
sober; for as people are more apt to be abusive when drunk than sober,
he paid no consideration to the excuse which drunkenness might claim,
but regarded only the common benefit. Andromadas Regmus was also a
lawgiver to the Thracian talcidians. There are some laws of his
concerning murders and heiresses extant, but these contain nothing
that any one can say is new and his own. And thus much for different
sorts of governments, as well those which really exist as those which
different persons have proposed.