THE THIRD DIALOGUE

Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous

by George Berkeley

THE THIRD DIALOGUE, THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS by George Berkeley



PHILONOUS. Tell me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday's
meditation? Has it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting?
or have you since seen cause to change your opinion?

HYLAS. Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and
uncertain. What we approve to-day, we condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir
about knowledge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas I
we know nothing all the while: nor do I think it possible for us ever to
know anything in this life. Our faculties are too narrow and too few.
Nature certainly never intended us for speculation.

PHIL. What! Say you we can know nothing, Hylas?

HYL. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know
the real nature, or what it is in itself.

PHIL. Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?

HYL. You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid; but
this is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own
mind, upon the application of fire and water to your organs of sense.
Their internal constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly
in the dark as to THAT.

PHIL. Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that
which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?

HYL. KNOW? No, it is impossible you or any man alive should know it.
All you know is, that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your
own mind. But what is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you that
colour, figure, and hardness, which you perceive, are not the real
natures of those things, or in the least like them. The same may be said
of all other real things, or corporeal substances, which compose the
world. They have none of them anything of themselves, like those sensible
qualities by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or
know anything of them, as they are in their own nature.

PHIL. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example,
from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?

HYL. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own
ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think
you they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses,
and have no absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to
distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances in your mind,
you may perhaps act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of
a different species, because their clothes were not of the same colour.

PHIL. It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of
things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I
wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel.

HYL. Even so.

PHIL. But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on,
and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how it is,
but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life,
as comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they
are conversant about.

HYL. They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a
nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the vulgar retain their mistakes,
and for all that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life. But
philosophers know better things.

PHIL. You mean, they KNOW that they KNOW NOTHING.

HYL. That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.

PHIL. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you
seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you
are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like
another man; and do you not know what it is you call for?

HYL. How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any
one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen,
ink, and paper. But what any one of them is in its own true nature, I
declare positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every,
other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the
true and real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be
denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot
be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think
on it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that
it is impossible any REAL corporeal thing should exist in nature.

PHIL. You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than
the notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into all
these extravagances by the belief of MATERIAL SUBSTANCE? This makes you
dream of those unknown natures in everything. It is this occasions your
distinguishing between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It
is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else
knows perfectly well. Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant of the
true nature of everything, but you know not whether anything really
exists, or whether there are any true natures at all; forasmuch as you
attribute to your material beings an absolute or external existence,
wherein you suppose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in the
end to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct repugnancy, or
nothing at all, it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own
hypothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny the real
existence of any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into the
deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was. Tell me, Hylas,
is it not as I say?

HYL. I agree with you. MATERIAL SUBSTANCE was no more than an
hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my
breath in defence of it. But whatever hypothesis you advance, or
whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it
will appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question you
upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant
it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions, to
the very same state of scepticism that I myself am in at present.

PHIL. I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at
all. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave
things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things
are those very things I see, and feel, and perceive by my senses. These I
know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life,
have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings. A piece
of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten
thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you
speak of. It is likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible
qualities are on the objects. I cannot for my life help thinking
that snow is white, and fire hot. You indeed, who by SNOW and fire mean
certain external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the right
to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in THEM. But I, who
understand by those words the things I see and feel, am obliged to think
like other folks. And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of
things, so neither am I as to their existence. That a thing should be
really perceived by my senses, and at the same time not really exist, is
to me a plain contradiction; since I cannot prescind or abstract, even in
thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being perceived.
Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name
and discourse of, are things that I know. And I should not have known
them but that I perceived them by my senses; and things perceived by the
senses are immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are
ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore
consists in being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived
there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that
scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a jest is it
for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he
hath it proved to him from the veracity of God; or to pretend our
knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or demonstration! I
might as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things I
actually see and feel.

HYL. Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible
things should exist without the mind. Do you not?

PHIL. I do.

HYL. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible
that things perceivable by sense may still exist?

PHIL. _I_ can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny
sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in
particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence
exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of
it. There is therefore some other Mind wherein they exist, during the
intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they
did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as
the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it
necessarily follows there is an OMNIPRESENT ETERNAL MIND, which knows
and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a
manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are
by us termed the LAWS OF NATURE.

HYL. Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings? Or
have they any agency included in them?

PHIL. They are altogether passive and inert.

HYL. And is not God an agent, a being purely active?

PHIL. I acknowledge it.

HYL. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of
God?

PHIL. It cannot.

HYL. Since therefore you have no IDEA of the mind of God, how can you
conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind? Or, if you can
conceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be
allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no
idea of it?

PHIL. As to your first question: I own I have properly no IDEA,
either of God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be
represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do
nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as
certainly as I know my ideas exist. Farther, I know what I mean by the
terms I AND MYSELF; and I know this immediately or intuitively, though
I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. The
Mind, Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks,
acts, and perceives. I say INDIVISIBLE, because unextended; and
UNEXTENDED, because extended, figured, moveable things are ideas; and
that which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is plainly itself no
idea, nor like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And
Spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them. I do not
therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the
word IDEA in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an
idea, that is, an image or likeness of God--though indeed extremely
inadequate. For, all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting
on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its
imperfections. I have, therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in
MYSELF some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though
I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by
reflexion and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate
knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the
possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas. Farther, from my
own being, and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do,
by an act of reason, necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all
created things in the mind of God. So much for your first question. For
the second: I suppose by this time you can answer it yourself. For you
neither perceive Matter objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea;
nor know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act, neither do you
mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other; nor yet
collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately. All which
makes the case of MATTER widely different from that of the DEITY.

HYL. You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea or
image of God. But, at the same time, you acknowledge you have, properly
speaking, no IDEA of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a
sort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea
can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit
nevertheless that there is spiritual Substance, although you have no idea
of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance,
because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act
consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What say you
to this?

PHIL. _I_ say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence of
material substance, merely because I have no notion of it' but because
the notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, because it is
repugnant that there should be a notion of it. Many things, for aught I
know, may exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can have any
idea or notion whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that
is, nothing inconsistent must be included in their definition. I
say, secondly, that, although we believe things to exist which we do not
perceive, yet we may not believe that any particular thing exists,
without some reason for such belief: but I have no reason for believing
the existence of Matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither
can I immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or
passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance--either
by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas the being of my
Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know
by reflexion. You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer
to the same objections. In the very notion or definition of MATERIAL
SUBSTANCE, there is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency.
But this cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist
in what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is
repugnant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should
be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. It is
granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative
knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits; but it will not
thence follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances:
if to suppose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to
suppose the other; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and there
is a probability for the other; if we see signs and effects indicating
distinct finite agents like ourselves, and see no sign or symptom
whatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I
have a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of
it. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it
by reflexion.

HYL. Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according
to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles,
it should follow that YOU are only a system of floating ideas, without
any substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a
meaning. And, as there is no more meaning in SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE than
in MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, the one is to be exploded as well as the other.

PHIL. How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own
being; and that _I_ MYSELF am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a
thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wifls, and operates
about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both
colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a
colour: that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from
colour and sound; and, for the same reason, from aft other sensible
things and inert ideas. But, I am not in like manner conscious either of
the existence or essence of Matter. On the contrary, I know that nothing
inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an
inconsistency. Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a
spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and
perceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an
unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or
the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no parity of
case between Spirit and Matter.

HYL. I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think
the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually
perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them?
Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, TO BE PERCEIVED is
one thing, and TO EXIST is another.

PHIL. _I_ am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world
for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder
cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees
and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him
why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you,
because he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he
terms a real, being, and saith it IS OR EXISTS; but, that which is not
perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no being.

HYL. Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists
in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.

PHIL. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist
without being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed
between us.

HYL. But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny
it is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men. Ask the
fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: what answer
think you he would make?

PHIL. The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of
his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say,
the real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended
by (that is EXISTS IN) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not at
first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this;
inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing,
implies a mind wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The
question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a
REAL existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they
have an ABSOLUTE existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and
exterior to all minds. This indeed some heathens and philosophers have
affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the
Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion.

HYL. But, according to your notions, what difference is there between
real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a
dream--since they are all equally in the mind?

PHIL. The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct;
they have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas
perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and,
being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the
like dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of confounding
these with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with
the visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And,
though they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by
their not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding and
subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished
from realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish THINGS FROM
CHIMERAS on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon
mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am
not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.

HYL. But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but
spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very
oddly.

PHIL. I own the word IDEA, not being commonly used for THING,
sounds something out of the way. My reason for using it was, because a
necessary relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that
term; and it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate
objects of the understanding. But, however oddly the proposition may
sound in words, yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in
its sense; which in effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that
there are only things perceiving, and things perceived; or that every
unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature of its
existence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite created mind, yet
certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom "we five, and move, and
have our being." Is this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are
not on the objects: or that we cannot be sure of the existence of things,
or know any thing of their real natures--though we both see and feel
them, and perceive them by all our senses?

HYL. And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such
things as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is the
immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature? Can there be anything
more extravagant than this?

PHIL. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say--a thing which is
inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our
perceptions, without any regard either to consistency, or the old known
axiom, NOTHING CAN GIVE TO ANOTHER THAT WHICH IT HATH NOT ITSELF.
Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so
extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred
places. In them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author of
all those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to
ascribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. This
is so much the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to
confirm it by citations.

HYL. You are not aware, Philonous, that in making God the immediate
Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder,
sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins.

PHIL. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt
is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an
instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of
an instrument or occasion, called MATTER, you as truly make Him the
author of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent in all those
operations vulgarly ascribed to Nature. I farther observe that sin or
moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or
motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason
and religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or
putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though the
outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder. Since,
therefore, sin doth not consist in the physical action, the making God an
immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him the Author of sin.
Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all
the motions in bodies. It is true I have denied there are any other
agents besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to
thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of
limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under
the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to
all the guilt of their actions.

HYL. But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal Substance; there
is the point. You can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to the
universal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most
voices, I am confident you would give up the point, without gathering the
votes.

PHIL. I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the
judgment of men who had plain common sense, without the prejudices of a
learned education. Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses,
who thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains no
doubts of their existence; and you fairly set forth with all your doubts,
your paradoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly
acquiesce in the determination of any indifferent person. That there is
no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident. And
that the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed.
And that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived no one can
deny. It is therefore evident there can be no SUBSTRATUM of those
qualities but spirit; in which they exist, not by way of mode or
property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it. I deny
therefore that there is ANY UNTHINKING-SUBSTRATUM of the objects of
sense, and IN THAT ACCEPTATION that there is any material substance.
But if by MATERIAL SUBSTANCE is meant only SENSIBLE BODY, THAT
which is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world, I dare
say, mean no more)--then I am more certain of matter's existence than you
or any other philosopher pretend to be. If there be anything which makes
the generality of mankind averse from the notions I espouse, it is
a misapprehension that I deny the reality of sensible things. But, as it
is you who are guilty of that, and not I, it follows that in truth their
aversion is against your notions and not mine. I do therefore assert that
I am as certain as of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal
substances (meaning the things I perceive by my senses); and that,
granting this, the bulk of mankind will take no thought about, nor think
themselves at all concerned in the fate of those unknown natures, and
philosophical quiddities, which some men are so fond of.

HYL. What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the
reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking
the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square
tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water,
crooked?

PHIL. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually
perceives, but in the inference he makes from his present perceptions.
Thus, in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is
certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence
conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the
same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are
wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude
from what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards
the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is
mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and
at present, (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err
in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the
ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or,
concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines
would be perceived in other circumstances. The case is the same with
regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any motion of
the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we
were placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other
planets, we should not then perceive its motion.

HYL. I understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible
enough. But, give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray,
Philonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you
are now that it does not?

PHIL. I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was
founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry,
upon evidence.

HYL. After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things.
We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with
ideas FROM WITHOUT is evident; and it is no less evident that there
must be (I will not say archetypes, but) Powers without the mind,
corresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot subsist by
themselves, there is some subject of them necessarily to be admitted;
which I call MATTER, and you call SPIRIT. This is all the difference.

PHIL. Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers,
extended?

HYL. It hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the
idea of extension.

PHIL. It is therefore itself unextended?

HYL. I grant it.

PHIL. Is it not also active?

HYL. Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?

PHIL. Now let me ask you two questions: FIRST, Whether it be
agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name
MATTER to an unextended active being? And, SECONDLY, Whether it be
not ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of
language?

HYL. Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have it so,
but some THIRD NATURE distinct from Matter and Spirit. For what reason
is there why you should call it Spirit? Does not the notion of spirit
imply that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended?

PHIL. My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of
meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from
volition, neither. can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a
spirit: therefore, when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean
a Spirit. Beside, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no
ideas in itself cannot impart them to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely
it must be a Spirit. To make you comprehend the point still more
clearly if it be possible, I assert as well as you that, since we are
affected from without, we must allow Powers to be without, in a Being
distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to
the kind of this powerful Being. I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter,
or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) Third Nature. Thus,
I prove it to be Spirit. From the effects I see produced, I conclude
there are actions; and, because actions, volitions; and, because there
are volitions, there must be a WILL. Again, the things I perceive must
have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of MY mind: but, being
ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an
understanding; there is therefore an UNDERSTANDING. But will and
understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The
powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a
SPIRIT.

HYL. And now I warrant you think you have made the point very clear,
little suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a
contradiction. Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in God?

PHIL. Without a doubt.

HYL. To suffer pain is an imperfection?

PHIL. It is.

HYL. Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some
other Being?

PHIL. We are.

HYL. And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not that
Spirit God?

PHIL. I grant it.

HYL. But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive from without
are in the mind which affects us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and
uneasiness are in God; or, in other words, God suffers pain: that is to
say, there is an imperfection in the Divine nature: which, you
acknowledged, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain contradiction.

PHIL. That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows,
among other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation,
and what it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But,
that God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us,
can Himself suffer pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and
dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an
external Agent, which, being produced against our wills, are
sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect,
who perceives nothing by sense as we do; whose will is absolute and
independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by
nothing: it is evident, such a Being as this can suffer nothing, nor be
affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all. We
are chained to a body: that is to say, our perceptions are connected with
corporeal motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every
alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible
body, rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion of such qualities
or ideas as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind. So
that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions means no more
than a correspondence in the order of nature, between two sets of ideas,
or things immediately perceivable. But God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged
from all such sympathy, or natural ties. No corporeal motions are
attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind. To know
everything knowable, is certainly a perfection; but to endure, or suffer,
or feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees
to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath ideas; but His ideas are
not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are. Your not distinguishing, where
there is so manifest a difference, makes you fancy you see an absurdity
where there is none.

HYL. But, all this while you have not considered that the quantity of
Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of bodies.
And what can withstand demonstration?

PHIL. Let me see how you demonstrate that point.

HYL. I lay it down for a principle, that the moments or quantities of
motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the velocities and
quantities of Matter contained in them. Hence, where the velocities are
equal, it follows the moments are directly as the quantity of Matter in
each. But it is found by experience that all bodies (bating the small
inequalities, arising from the resistance of the air) descend with an
equal velocity; the motion therefore of descending bodies, and
consequently their gravity, which is the cause or principle of that
motion, is proportional to the quantity of Matter; which was to be
demonstrated.

PHIL. You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quantity of
motion in any body is proportional to the velocity and MATTER
taken together; and this is made use of to prove a proposition from
whence the existence of CARTER is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in
a circle?

HYL. In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional to the
velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity.

PHIL. But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow that
gravity is proportional to MATTER, in your philosophic sense of the
word; except you take it for granted that unknown SUBSTRATUM, or
whatever else you call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities;
which to suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is magnitude
and solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant; as
likewise, that gravity may be proportional to those qualities I will not
dispute. But that either these qualities as perceived by us, or the
powers producing them, do exist in a MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM; this is what
I deny, and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your demonstration,
have not yet proved.

HYL. I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think, however, you
shall persuade me that the natural philosophers have been dreaming all
this while? Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of
the phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter?

PHIL. What mean you, Hylas, by the PHENOMENA?

HYL. I mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses.

PHIL. And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas?

HYL. I have told you so a hundred times.

PHIL. Therefore, to explain the phenomena, is, to shew how we come to
be affected with ideas, in that manner and order wherein they are
imprinted on our senses. Is it not?

HYL. It is.

PHIL. Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the
production of any one idea in our minds by the help of MATTER, I shall
for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said against it as
nothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of
phenomena. That a Being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or
exhibit ideas is easily understood. But that a Being which is utterly
destitute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any
sort to affect an intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say,
though we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew
its qualities, and could comprehend its existence, would yet be so far
from explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in
the world. And yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers
have been doing nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the
connexion of ideas, they discover the laws and methods of nature, which
is a part of knowledge both useful and entertaining.

HYL. After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind? Do
you imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of
Matter, if there was no such thing?

PHIL. That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, or
passion, or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it,
I believe you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it
must be either because He has discovered it to us by supernatural
revelation; or because it is so evident to our natural faculties, which
were framed and given us by God, that it is impossible we should withhold
our assent from it. But where is the revelation? or where is the evidence
that extorts the belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter,
TAKEN FOR SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM WHAT WE PERCEIVE BY OUR SENSES, is
thought to exist by all mankind; or indeed, by any except a few
philosophers, who do not know what they would be at? Your question
supposes these points are clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall
think myself obliged to give you another answer. In the meantime, let it
suffice that I tell you, I do not suppose God has deceived mankind at
all.

HYL. But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger.
New notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men's minds,
and nobody knows where they will end.

PHIL. Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in
sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to
unsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of
these, I cannot imagine. That innovations in government and religion are
dangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But is there
the like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy? The making
anything known which was unknown before is an innovation in knowledge:
and, if all such innovations had been forbidden, men would have
made a notable progress in the arts and sciences. But it is none of my
business to plead for novelties and paradoxes. That the qualities we
perceive are not on the objects: that we must not believe our senses:
that we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be
assured even of their existence: that real colours and sounds are nothing
but certain unknown figures and motions: that motions are in themselves
neither swift nor slow: that there are in bodies absolute extensions,
without any particular magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid,
thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit: that the least particle
of a body contains innumerable extended parts:--these are the novelties,
these are the strange notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted
judgment of all mankind; and being once admitted, embarrass the mind with
endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against these and the like
innovations I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense. It is true, in doing
this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some AMBAGES, and ways of speech
not common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly understood, that which
is most singular in them will, in effect, be found to amount to no more
than this.--that it is absolutely impossible, and a plain contradiction,
to suppose any unthinking Being should exist without being perceived by a
Mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be so, at
this time of day, and in a Christian country.

HYL. As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those
are out of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion.
Can anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into
ideas? You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge me WITH SCEPTICISM.
This is so plain, there is no denying it.

PHIL. You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but
rather ideas into things; since those immediate objects of perception,
which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the
real things themselves.

HYL. Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you
leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which
strikes the senses.

PHIL. What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me
the very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise
than upon your supposition--that Matter is an essential part of all
corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive
only sensible forms: but herein we differ--you will have them to be empty
appearances, I, real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I
do.

HYL. You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that
in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true
nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that
disagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities,
perceived all manner of ways? and why should we use a microscope the
better to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to
the naked eye?

PHIL. Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we
feel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by
the naked eye. But, in case every variation was thought sufficient to
constitute a new kind of individual, the endless number of confusion of
names would render language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as
well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men
combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the
same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but
observed, however, to have some connexion in nature, either with respect
to co-existence or succession; all which they refer to one name, and
consider as one thing. Hence it follows that when I examine, by my other
senses, a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the
same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one sense not
being perceived by the other senses. And, when I look through a
microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived
already with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the glass being quite
different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know
what ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the
connexion of ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things.
What, therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in
all circumstances affected with the same appearances. It will not thence
follow they are not to be trusted; or that they are inconsistent either
with themselves or anything else: except it be with your preconceived
notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real
Nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems to have taken its rise
from not rightly understanding the common language of men, speaking
of several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And,
indeed, there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the
philosophers are owing to the same original: while they began to build
their schemes not so much on notions as on words, which were framed by
the vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of
life, without any regard to speculation.

HYL. Methinks I apprehend your meaning.

PHIL. It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not
real things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is
no farther real than as our ideas are the true REPRESENTATIONS OF THOSE
ORIGINALS. But, as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown,
it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they
resemble them at all. We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real
knowledge. Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any
change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot
all be true copies of them: or, if some are and others are not, it is
impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this plunges us
yet deeper in uncertainty. Again, when we consider the point, we cannot
conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an absolute
existence out of a mind: nor consequently, according to you, how there
should be any real thing in nature. The result of all which is that we
are thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now, give me
leave to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain
absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not
the source of all this scepticism? Secondly, whether you are informed,
either by sense or reason, of the existence of those unknown originals?
And, in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them?
Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is anything distinctly
conceived or meant by the ABSOLUTE OR EXTERNAL EXISTENCE OF UNPERCEIVING
SUBSTANCES? Lastly, Whether, the premises considered, it be not the
wisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all
anxious thought about unknown natures or substances, admit with the
vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses?

HYL. For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I
would much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are not the
objects perceived by the SENSES of one, likewise perceivable to
others present? If there were a hundred more here, they would all see the
garden, the trees, and flowers, as I see them. But they are not in the
same manner affected with the ideas I frame in my IMAGINATION. Does not
this make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?

PHIL. I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the
objects of sense and those of imagination. But what would you infer from
thence? You cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, because
they are perceived by many.

HYL. I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me
into another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only
the ideas existing in our minds?

PHIL. It is.

HYL. But the SAME idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in
any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow, from your principles, that
no two can see the same thing? And is not this highly, absurd?

PHIL. If the term SAME be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is
certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that
different persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea
exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since
men are used to apply the word SAME where no distinction or variety is
perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows
that, as men have said before, SEVERAL SAW THE SAME THING, so they may,
upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any
deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things. But,
if the term SAME be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who
pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their
sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that
philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers
persons to perceive the same thing. But whether philosophers shall think
fit to CALL a thing the SAME or no, is, I conceive, of small
importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same
faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and
who had yet never known the use of language; they would, without
question, agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to
the use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived,
might call it the SAME thing: others, especially regarding the
diversity of persons who perceived, might choose the denomination of
DIFFERENT things. But who sees not that all the dispute is about a
word? to wit, whether. what is perceived by different persons may yet
have the term SAME applied to it? Or, suppose a house, whose walls or
outward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and
new ones built in their place; and that you should call this the SAME,
and I should say it was not the SAME house.--would we not, for all
this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself?
And would not all the difference consist in a sound? If you should say,
We differed in our notions; for that you super-added to your idea of the
house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would
tell you, I know not what you mean by THE ABSTRACTED IDEA OF IDENTITY;
and should desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you
understood yourself.--Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet satisfied men
may dispute about identity and diversity, without any real difference in
their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take this farther
reflexion with you: that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the
case is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the Materialists
themselves acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be
our own ideas. Your difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same
thing, makes equally against the Materialists and me.

HYL. Ay, Philonous, but they suppose an external archetype, to
which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive
the same thing.

PHIL. And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so
may you suppose an external archetype on my principles;--EXTERNAL, _I_
MEAN, TO YOUR OWN MIND: though indeed it must be' supposed to exist in
that Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the
ends of IDENTITY, as well as if it existed out of a mind. And I am sure
you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.

HYL. You have indeed clearly satisfied me--either that there is no
difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes
equally against both opinions.

PHIL. But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions
can be a proof against neither.

HYL. I acknowledge it. But, after all, Philonous, when I consider
the substance of what you advance against SCEPTICISM, it amounts to no
more than this: We are sure that we really see, hear, feel; in a word,
that we are affected with sensible impressions.

PHIL. And how are WE concerned any farther? I see this cherry, I feel
it, I taste it: and I am sure NOTHING cannot be seen, or felt, or.
tasted: it is therefore red. Take away the sensations of softness,
moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is
not a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a
congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses:
which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by
the mind, because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the
palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected
with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I
see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the
cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing
abstracted from those sensations. But if by the word CHERRY you, mean
an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its
EXISTENCE something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I
own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.

HYL. But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very
same reasons against the existence of sensible things IN A MIND, which
you have offered against their existing IN A MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM?

PHIL. When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to
them.

HYL. Is the mind extended or unextended?

PHIL. Unextended, without doubt.

HYL. Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?

PHIL. They are.

HYL. Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?

PHIL. I believe you may.

HYL. Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be
room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended
things be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine
impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects
are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on
it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to
understand those expressions? Explain me this if you can: and I shall
then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my
SUBSTRATUM.

PHIL. Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind,
or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross
literal sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to
make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends
or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being
distinct from itself. This is my explication of your difficulty; and how
it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material SUBSTRATUM
intelligible, I would fain know.

HYL. Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made
of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?

PHIL. None at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is
the rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being more usual, than for
philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as
things existing in the mind. 'Nor is there anything in this but what is
conformable to the general analogy of language; most part of the mental
operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is
plain in the terms COMPREHEND, reflect, DISCOURSE, &C., which,
being applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, original
sense.

HYL. You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there still
remains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get over.
And, indeed, it is of such importance that if you could solve all others,
without being able to find a solution for this, you must never expect to
make me a proselyte to your principles.

PHIL. Let me know this mighty difficulty.

HYL. The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to me
utterly irreconcilable with your notions. Moses tells us of a creation: a
creation of what? of ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things,
solid corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and
I shall perhaps agree with you.

PHIL. Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants
and animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning
created by God, I make no question. If by IDEAS you mean fictions
and fancies of the mind, then these are no ideas. If by IDEAS you mean
immediate objects of the understanding, or sensible things, which cannot
exist unperceived, or out of a mind, then these things are ideas. But
whether you do or do not call them IDEAS, IT matters little. The
difference is only about a name. And, whether that name be retained or
rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things continues the same.
In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed IDEAS, but
THINGS. Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any
absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a
word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation of things,
of RED things. Neither is this in the least inconsistent with my
principles, as is evident from what I have now said; and would have been
evident to you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been so
often said before. But as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to
show where Moses makes any mention of them; and, if they should be
mentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be
incumbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the vulgar
acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the philosophic
acceptation, for Matter, or AN UNKNOWN QUIDDITY, WITH AN ABSOLUTE
EXISTENCE. When you have proved these points, then (and not till then)
may you bring the authority of Moses into our dispute.

HYL. It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to
refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some
peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your
notions?

PHIL. If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of
Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other,
then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you
may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all
you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither
do you pretend they exist without the mind.

HYL. Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.

PHIL. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I
should have seen things produced into being--that is become
perceptible--in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever
before believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no
alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or
end their existence, we do not mean this with regard to God, but
His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the
same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but when things,
before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible
to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with respect
to created minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the
creation, I understand that the several parts of the world became
gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties;
so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth perceived by them.
This is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the
Holy Scripture: in which is included no mention, or no thought, either of
SUBSTRATUM, INSTRUMENT, OCCASION, or ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. And, upon
inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain honest men, who
believe the creation, never think of those things any more than I. What
metaphysical sense you may understand it in, you only can tell.

HYL. But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created
things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical
being: that is to say, upon supposition there were MEN to perceive
them; without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein
creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly
impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of
man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?

PHIL. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to
exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will
not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my
notions, unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created
spirits in being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the
creation, as we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of
all sorts produced, by an invisible Power, in a desert where nobody was
present--that this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with
my principles, since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or
imaginable; that it exactly suits with the common, natural, and
undebauched notions of mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all
things on God; and consequently hath all the good effect or influence,
which it is possible that important article of our faith should have in
making men humble, thankful, and resigned to their great Creator. I
say, moreover, that, in this naked conception of things, divested
of words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the
ACTUALITY OF ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. You may indeed raise a dust with those
terms, and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you
calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a
useless and unintelligible jargon.

HYL. I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say
you to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in
their being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of
God? Did they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you?
And how could that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be
clearer or better connected than this?

PHIL. And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from
eternity?

HYL. I am.

PHIL. Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect.

HYL. This I acknowledge.

PHIL. By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to
be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in that point.

HYL. What shall we make then of the creation?

PHIL. May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of
finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said
to begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should
become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner
which He then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may
call this a RELATIVE, or HYPOTHETICAL EXISTENCE if you please. But,
so long as it supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and literal
sense of the Mosaic history of the creation; so long as it answers all
the religious ends of that great article; in a word, so long as you can
assign no other sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this?
Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything
nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory
of God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the
corporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind
of God, as well as to the minds of all created spirits; yet how could
this set forth either the immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the
necessary and immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would
it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes?

HYL. Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making things
perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, God did either
execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to
will what He had not actually willed before, but only designed to will?
If the former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of
existence, in finite things. If the latter, then we must acknowledge
something new to befall the Deity; which implies a sort of change: and
all change argues imperfection.

PHIL. Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this
objection concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against
every other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None
of which can WE conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and
having a beginning. God is a Being of transcerident and unlimited
perfections: His nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite
spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether
Materialist or Immaterialist, should have exactly just notions of the
Deity, His attributes, and ways of operation. If then you would infer
anything against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the
inadequateness of our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is
unavoidable on any scheme; but from the denial of Matter, of which there
is not one word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.

HYL. I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are
such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are peculiar to
that notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring
myself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation
and your opinion; though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly
know.

PHIL. What would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of
things--the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The
former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the
mind of God. Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines? or,
is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But
you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies.
To take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this
one point. Either you are not able to conceive the Creation on any
hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or
complaint against any particular opinion on that score: or you are able
to conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby
nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the
full scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you
could before apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses,
or by ratiocination from your senses; whatever you could perceive,
imagine, or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion
you have of the creation by other Principles be intelligible, you have it
still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion
at all; and so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very
plain that the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown
and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope
it need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter doth not
make the creation conceivable, the creation's being without it
inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.

HYL. I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point
of the creation.

PHIL. I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me
indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism: but
you know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I
should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, to pass by all
that, would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy
between the received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?

HYL. And so I am.

PHIL. Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a
plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the
way?

HYL. In the plain sense, doubtless.

PHIL. When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been
created by God; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by
those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader?

HYL. I cannot help thinking so.

PHIL. And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied
a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?

HYL. This I have already acknowledged.

PHIL. The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the
creation of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of
certain unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation
might terminate?

HYL. True.

PHIL. Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy the
plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly
inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not what; something
equally unintelligible to themselves and me?

HYL. I cannot contradict you.

PHIL. Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown
quiddities, of occasions, or SUBSTRATUM? No, certainly; but of things
obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions,
if you expect I should be reconciled to them.

HYL. I see you can assault me with my own weapons.

PHIL. Then as to ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE; was there ever known a more
jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible
that you have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain
anything by it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute
existence to be clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the
creation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and
infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a
creation? That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence
without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, by the
mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to
all reason, so impossible and absurd! that not only the most celebrated
among the ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers
have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity. Lay these things together,
and then judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the
creation of things.

HYL. I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the CREATION is
the last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it hath been
sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be
overcome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself
towards your notions.

PHIL. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of' the
question, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of
prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And
indeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very
much the advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned,
education.

HYL. I confess it seems to be as you say.

PHIL. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us
throw into the scale the great advantages that arise from the belief of
Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. The being
of a God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of
religion, are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate
evidence? When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general
Cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but God, in the strict
and proper sense of the word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence,
providence, omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous
as the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the
fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more
reason to doubt than of our own being.--Then, with relation to human
sciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what
contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into! To say nothing of
the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, homogeneity,
gravity, divisibility, &c.--do they not pretend to explain all things by
bodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are
they able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting
there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with
a cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to
another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant
suppositions, have they been able to reach the MECHANICAL production of
any one animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of
motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course
of things? Have they accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude
and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe?
But, laying aside Matter and corporeal, causes, and admitting only the
efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy
and intelligible? If the PHENOMENA are nothing else but IDEAS; God is
a SPIRIT, but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they
demonstrate an unlimited power in their cause; God is active and
omnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and
usefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired; God is
infinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute of all contrivance
and design. These surely are great advantages in PHYSICS. Not to
mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men
to a negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more cautious
of, in case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on their
minds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking second
causes.--Then in METAPHYSICS: what difficulties concerning entity in
abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures,
substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of
Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent
substances so widely different as SPIRIT AND MATTER, should mutually
operate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and endless
disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do
we escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas?--Even the MATHEMATICS
themselves, if we take away the absolute existence of extended things,
become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and
intricate speculations in those sciences depending on the. infinite
divisibility of finite extension; which depends on that supposition--But
what need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that
opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and
modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much
as one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of
that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose
their reality to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this
supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of colours in a
pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be
allowed to have weight. But these and the like objections vanish, if we
do not maintain the being of absolute external originals, but place the
reality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable;--however,
not changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For,
herein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the
concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is real from the
IRREGULAR VISIONS of the fancy.

HYL. I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can
incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is
attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment
in knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement,
what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be
avoided by that single notion of IMMATERIALISM!

PHIL. After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You
may remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination
should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism.
This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the
ABSOLUTE existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same
notion has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued
in its consequences, and all objections against it cleared. Can there be
a greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the
marks of a true opinion and yet be false?

HYL. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects.
But, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full
assent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty
will occur hereafter?

PHIL. Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once
evidently proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or
difficulties it may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the
doctrine of incommensurable quantities, of the angle of contact, of the
asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out
against mathematical demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the Providence
of God, because there may be some particular things which you know not
how to reconcile with it? If there are difficulties ATTENDING
IMMATERIALISM, there are at the same time direct and evident proofs of
it. But for the existence of Matter there is not one proof, and far more
numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are
those mighty difficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what
they are; something which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a
sufficient pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never
yield it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly
and solidly soever demonstrated.

HYL. You have satisfied me, Philonous.

PHIL. But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider:
That which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be
proof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if
you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the MATERIALISTS.
Be not deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you
cannot conceive it easier by the help of MATERIALISM, it is plain it
can be no objection against IMMATERIALISM. Had you proceeded all along
by this rule, you would probably have spared yourself abundance of
trouble in objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge you to
shew one that is explained by Matter: nay, which is not more
unintelligible with than without that supposition; and consequently makes
rather AGAINST than FOR it. You should consider, in each particular,
whether the difficulty arises from the NON-EXISTENCE OF MATTER. If it
doth not, you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of
extension against the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty
against IMMATERIALISM. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will
find this to have been often, if not always, the case. You should
likewise take heed not to argue on a PETITIO PRINCIPII. One is apt to
say--The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things, rather than
the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external
substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in the productions of our
ideas? But is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such
external substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the question?
But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on yourself by that
vulgar sophism which is called IGNORATIO ELENCHI. You talked often as
if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible Things. Whereas
in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than I
am. And it is you who doubt; I should have said, positively deny it.
Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by the senses,
is, on the principles I embrace, a real being; but not on yours.
Remember, the Matter you contend for is an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it
may be termed SOMEWHAT), which is quite stripped of all sensible
qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the
mind. Remember I say, that it is not any object which is hard or soft,
hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c. For all these things I
affirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct
from being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever.
Think on these points; let them be attentively considered and still kept
in view. Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question;
without which your objections will always be wide of the mark, and,
instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they have
been) against your own notions.

HYL. I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from
agreeing with you more than this same MISTAKING THE QUESTION. In
denying Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the
things we see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for
it. What think you, therefore, of retaining the name MATTER, and
applying it to SENSIBLE THINGS? This may be done without any change in
your sentiments: and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them
to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in
opinion.

PHIL. With all my heart: retain the word MATTER, and apply it to the
objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them
any subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never
quarrel with you for an expression. MATTER, or MATERIAL SUBSTANCE,
are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort
of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a
mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify
the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as
the names of all particular things, with the TERMS SENSIBLE,
SUBSTANCE, BODY, STUFF, and the like, are retained, the word
MATTER should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical
discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is
not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the
depraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general
confused term.

HYL. Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of
an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to
deny me the privilege of using the word MATTER as I please, and
annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the
mind. I freely own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than
SPIRIT. But I have been so long accustomed to the term MATTER that I
know not how to part with it: to say, there is no MATTER in the world,
is still shocking to me. Whereas to say--There is no MATTER, if by that
term be meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if
by MATTER is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists in
being perceived, then there is MATTER:--THIS distinction gives it
quite another turn; and men will come into your notions with small
difficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. For, after all, the
controversy about MATTER in the strict acceptation of it, lies
altogether between you and the philosophers: whose principles, I
acknowledge, are not near so natural, or so agreeable to the common sense
of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either
desire or shun but as it makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of
our happiness or misery. But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief,
pleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Existence; or with unknown
entities, ABSTRACTED FROM ALL RELATION TO US? It is evident, things
regard us only as they are pleasing or displeasing: and they can please
or displease only so far forth as they are perceived. Farther, therefore,
we are not concerned; and thus far you leave things as you found them.
Yet still there is something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I do not
now think with the Philosophers; nor yet altogether with the vulgar. I
would know how the case stands in that respect; precisely, what you have
added to, or altered in my former notions.

PHIL. I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours
tend only to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was
before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers:--the former being
of opinion, that THOSE THINGS THEY IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVE ARE THE REAL
THINGS; and the latter, that THE THINGS IMMEDIATELY PERCEIVED ARE
IDEAS, WHICH EXIST ONLY IN THE MIND. Which two notions put together,
do, in effect, constitute the substance of what I advance.

HYL. I have been a long time distrusting my senses: methought I saw
things by a dim light and through false glasses. Now the glasses are
removed and a new light breaks in upon my under standing. I am clearly
convinced that I see things in their native forms, and am no longer in
pain about their UNKNOWN NATURES OR ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. This is the
state I find myself in at present; though, indeed, the course that
brought me to it I do not yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the
same principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually
do; and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their
philosophical Scepticism: but, in the end, your conclusions are directly
opposite to theirs.

PHIL. You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced
upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it
breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent, as
well as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of
GRAVITATION. just so, the same Principles which, at first view, lead to
Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense.